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THE THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES

OF THE

CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

AN HISTORICAL AND SPECULATIVE EXPOSITION.

RECENTLY PUBLISHED.

VOLS. I., II. AND III., 8vo.

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THE THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES
OF THE
CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

AN HISTORICAL AND SPECULATIVE
EXPOSITION.

THE
THIRTY-NINE ARTICLES
OF THE
CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

*AN HISTORICAL AND SPECULATIVE
EXPOSITION.*

BY
THE REV. JOSEPH MILLER, B.D.,
CURATE OF NEWBOLD-ON-AVON, -RUGBY.

THE NINTH ARTICLE
HAMARTIALOGY.



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P R E F A C E .

THE present treatise has been the result of considerable premeditation on a very hard subject for some time back, indeed since the publication of the previous volume, and its final completion in a period of three or four months has entailed very great labour.

The intelligent reader, at all conversant with the various topics that come successively under consideration, will not expect here a perfect or exhaustive treatment of perhaps any one of them, but it is hoped that he will frequently meet throughout the volume with suggestive thoughts and it may be with not a few fresh ideas.

The terminology of the book is a subject that has been forestalled, and objections on such a score have happily subsided, since it has been perceived (1) that a little acquaintance with the Apostolic writings in the original will easily obviate any supposed difficulty, and

(2) that it is impossible to treat any subject whatever in a philosophic manner without the use of corresponding language.

That the treatise has assumed an unconventional form may be thought by some to call for apology ; with others that feature may probably be regarded as a main excellence. It is so difficult usually to work oneself out of conventional grooves of thought or accustomed associations of idea.

At all events the book is before the public with all its faults and it may be with excellencies peculiar to itself. Those who have previously engaged in such research will be best able to judge and appreciate.

The author must own his great obligations to Julius Müller whose most learned and elaborate work "*Die Christliche Lehre von der Sünde*" forms for the thoughtful an inexhaustible treasure of profoundest ideas, and which for several years has been a favourite resort of the author during his leisure moments.

Acknowledgments of great indebtedness are also due to Canon Knowles, Principal of S. Bees' Theological College, who has furnished numerous suggestions and corrected many of the rough

proofs, and who would have contributed to make the treatise still more perfect, if time had permitted for further opportunity and research in following out several of his references.

Thanks are also due to the Rev. T. W. Powell, A.M., Vicar of Aspatiria, and to Mrs. Senhouse, Netherhall, Maryport, for kind use of books from their libraries.

The author regrets that the limited time and opportunities at his disposal have precluded so full a treatment as he intended of the subjects of the two last sections, namely, the bearings of Biblical Psychology, and the development of the idea of sin in Holy Scripture. The suggestiveness of the contents may however make sufficient amends for briefness of exposition.

It is to be hoped that the present contribution in which negative views have been controverted throughout, may in some measure give an impulse to a more careful and exhaustive study of some doctrinal topics in connection with sin, which are of the deepest curiosity and most momentous interest.

NEWBOLD-ON-AVON, RUGBY,

27th March, 1885.

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Ninth Article.

HAMARTIALOGY, OR THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SIN.

INTRODUCTION.

The study of the fact of sin is one at once of intense curiosity and profound difficulty.

The importance of the study is undoubted, since on correct views of sin depend right apprehensions of the supernatural facts of redemption and of grace.

If Pelagianism be the scylla of the science of this fact, Manichæism is the charybdis. In accordance with modern scientific nomenclature, the former may be classed with systems of absolute Indeterminism, just as the latter presents the most rigid form of absolute Determinism. These terms, already alluded to in

the last volume,* will be further explained in the present. Suffice it now to say that though the caution against the extreme form of determinism is not so pronounced as that against the other extreme, it is quite as imperative in face of modern current theories of Necessity.

The positive philosophy, an increasingly obtrusive and portentous phenomenon of modern life, is a new form of negation, which being mainly busied in its theories of sociology with other parts of anthropology, and ignoring the facts of our science, cannot well be overlooked in a treatise on sin, that has any pretensions of keeping abreast of the times.

There is of course no standing ground between theism and positivism, since the positivists not only deny the existence of a spirit in man related to the divine Spirit, but simply ignore the being of God and every other supernatural relationship and existence whatsoever, without the conception of which, the idea of sin is utterly emptied of its momentous import. With such thinkers, indeed, there can be no straightforward reasoning on this subject, the basis of argument being disallowed on one side: and

* Vol. iii., Article vii., Sec. v.

yet on their own ground, from their simple admission of certain facts of moral order, which in their view constitute the real value of life, they may be confuted, as may be seen from further consideration in its proper place.

But there are other forms of the modern philosophic spirit, which acknowledge the facts of the supernatural world, but which, reducing sin to a mere negation or privation of good, or metaphysical limitation or an unavoidable incident of man's sensuous nature, deny its existence from a divine point of view. Subjectively true, sin is maintained to be objectively false. A subjective illusion, necessary as a moral stimulus in the education and development of the race, it has no objective reality in God's sight, and consequently its real guilt is done away, though the shadow has still its function in the moral economy. These theories must, I conceive, come in for more careful consideration in our day. Perhaps they may be made to subserve the useful purpose of sifting the chaff from the wheat in some systems that were formerly current and recognized in the Christian Church, as, for example, the privative theory of S. Augustine, or that of the derivation

of sin from man's sensuous nature of Michaelis and others, so popular during last century, but now fast growing effete.

It will further, I trust, be seen in the course of this short treatise, that the pessimistic views of human life, which have always been prevalent, and notably in Roman Catholicism have practical outcome in asceticism, monachism, and celibacy, however much they may justly be considered as symptoms of disease of the human intellect, are yet palpable and strong attestations of the deep sense of the radical evil, which everywhere gnaws at the very vitals of humanity. The scientific form, which pessimism has assumed in Germany of late years, and which is well known to the English reader in the writings of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, will thus be found to be instructive, and, apart from the errors that attach to it, will be directly corroborative of our doctrine.

As Biblical Psychology is fitted to convey sober and accurate views of the powers and capacity of the human constitution in its entirety, the study of it in relation to sin is likely to be fruitful of results in the confutation and avoidance of error. It is a department of research, to

which the friends of positivism are respectfully invited, since it deals with facts and workings of the human mind, which they may feel in themselves every day and hour, and therefore may abundantly verify in experience. With the recognition of these facts and their higher bearings, sin will be obtrusive enough in all its guiltiness and extent.

Our subject is involved in other difficulties, full of interest. Take the baptism of infants. If, from the fact of original sin being universal, remission with regeneration be therefore necessary in order to the salvation of every one, how in the absence of Christian baptism is this remission and regeneration to be conveyed? The existence of infant baptism from the beginning of Christianity attests the Church's sense of the need of forgiveness and renewal in the infant of a day in order to eternal life. And yet in the case of infants of Christian parents dying unbaptised, as well as unbaptised martyrs and catechumens, certain distinguished teachers of the Church, as will be seen in the third section of this essay, have not been slow to predicate salvation; while of other infants dying in the same case, they, as, for example, S. Augustine

pronounce the gentlest possible condemnation, notwithstanding the apparently very stringent cautions, in certain canons and standards of the Church, against the neglect of baptism.

In the various text books on the Articles, there does not appear to be a sufficient recognition of the difference between what is absolutely destructive or false, and the elements of truth or other excellence, which exist in the numberless theories, that have been from time to time propounded on this subject. In order to a candid and clear consideration, a process of careful comparison, as well in other branches of the subject, as of the contents of the symbols of belief, received by the various bodies of professing Christians, must, it appears, be instituted, a method of inquiry which is indicated in the first section of the present treatise.

The author has felt the great difficulty of the undertaking, but the principal reason of delay in a work that has received so much friendly recognition by competent critics, has been mainly want of time and access to libraries, which apology he is under necessity of pleading for the foreseen imperfections which must attach to the treatment of large and momentous subjects

in so brief space as is at his disposal. The work, such as it is, is the product of *horae subsecivae*, the author having been all along occupied with the tuition of his family as well as with parochial duties.

ARTICLE NINTH.

ARTICULUS IX.

De Peccato Originali.

PECCATUM originis non est (ut fabulantur Pelagiani) in imitatione Adami situm; sed est vitium, et depravatio naturae, cujus libet hominis ex Adamo naturaliter propagati: qua fit, ut ab originali justitia quam longissime distet, ad malum sua natura propendeat, et caro semper adversus spiritum concupiscat; unde in unoquoque nascentium, iram Dei atque damnationem meretur. Manet etiam in renatis haec naturae depravatio, qua fit ut affectus carnis, *Græce* φρόνημα σαρκός (quod alii sapientiam, alii sensum, alii affectum, alii studium carnis interpretantur), legi Dei non subjiciatur. Et quanquam renatis et credentibus nulla propter Christum est condemnatio, peccati tamen in sese rationem habere concupiscentiam fatetur Apostolus.

ARTICLE IX.

Of Original or Birth Sin.

ORIGINAL sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk), but it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit; and therefore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation. And this infection of nature doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated, whereby the lust of the flesh, called in Greek φρόνημα σαρκός, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God. And although there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptised, yet the Apostle doth confess that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin.

SOURCE: Based on the second Article of the Augsburg confession 1530, which formed substantially the second of the Thirteen Articles, framed by the joint committee of Lutheran and Anglican divines, 1538 (with the sanction of Henry VIII.), by whom the doctrine was stated less strongly, the first reference to original righteousness having been introduced. It assumed nearly its present shape in the eighth Article of the forty-five of 1552, and of the forty-two of 1553, the *prima institutione* of the former however being changed into the *originali justitia* of the latter. By the omission of the clause *et hodie*

Anapaptistæ repetunt, "whiche also the Anabaptistes do now a daies renue," occurring in both of these, and by other merely verbal changes, the ninth of the thirty-nine Articles, 1563, and of the corresponding Latin, 1571, completed its growth.

OBJECT: The Article was manifestly directed against the errors of the Anabaptist sectaries of the time, as well as the Pelagian tendency of the scholastics and the Roman Church. It was also corrective of the tenets that original sin was eradicated in baptism, and that concupiscence has not in itself, 'vere et proprie,' the nature of sin.

SECTION I.

COMPARATIVE SYMBOLISM OF THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN.

To illustrate fully the Anglican position, a comparison of the Article with the corresponding formulæ in the confessions or symbols of other Christian communions is likely to be fraught with profit.

But whereas the setting forth at length in the words of the various creeds themselves, the manifold correspondencies and differences, would be too tedious for the present task, and would require a separate treatise, it will here be sufficient to indicate the course of exhaustive study, and to give suggestive references.

The method of comparative symbolic is honest and fair to all parties, since none can have any ground of complaint when their

opinions are set forth in their own words. The critical and scientific spirit of the age, I apprehend, requires that it be strenuously prosecuted.

An exposition of the present Article obviously involves a statement of the whole circle of anthropological dogma, since it is mainly connected with the question of the original as well as the present constitution of man, what he was at first and what he is now, each of which positions will illustrate the other.

But the difficulty of attaining a clear and full conception of our original condition will be apparent from the fact, that we have no experience of such a state to go upon, but only faint reminiscences of a lost ideal, and those imperfect features of the new creature, which are being progressively restored in the souls of the regenerate, and which have a retrospective reference to the perfect historical ideal in Christ, of which they are the imperfect copy.

Our first endeavour, then, is to know what is meant by "original righteousness," since everything is understood the better from its contrary. By the process of comparative symbolic, the various features, both of man's formation and deformation will be aptly gleaned, so as to pre-

sent a somewhat comprehensive, if not perfect, picture. It is agreeable to common sense, that diverse intellects and schools, all equally concerned and exercised in the understanding and interpretation of Holy Scripture, would attach themselves, each to that particular aspect of the truth, that is most congenial to it, to the partial or even total exclusion of other bearings quite as important.

SUB-SECTION I.

ORIGINAL RIGHTEOUSNESS.

The feature of the divine image in man, which the Socinian in his doctrinal standards mainly dwells on, is free will, of which it is maintained, there was "no cause, why God, after the fall should deprive him of it." * Thus Socinus coincides in opinion with Pelagius on this point.

The Arminians also, who entertain semi-pelagian sentiments, place in prominence the faculty of free will and dominion over other creatures, with the co-relative adornments of a "pure intellect" and "upright soul." "God furnished man sufficiently with wisdom, integrity, and various grace, that he should rightly know to

* Catechism of Racow, p. 22.

use his glorious power, and understanding the divine will should subject his own proper will to God." *

The Mennonite instances, as chief features of the divine image, "lordship over all creatures," "righteousness," and "true holiness," with "immortality."

The confessions of the "Reformed" Church (of Geneva, etc.); on the continent, in addition to other endowments, lay special emphasis on the "clear and true and salutary knowledge of God himself," as may be seen by turning to the second Article of the Scottish confession and the second of the canons of Dort.

The gift of original righteousness, according to the Lutheran, consists of a "more certain knowledge of God, fear of God, and trust in God." . . . "To be able to love God above all things with one's whole proper forces, to do the precepts of God, what else is it than original righteousness?" †

According to the doctrinal formulæ of the Greek Church, "all knowledge was embraced by the mind, and all goodness and beauty by

* Confession of the Remonstrants, v. 5.

† Apology of the Augburg Confession, pp. 52, 53.

the will. . . . The will itself was always subject to the reason, beautiful and altogether free, and there was power in man to sin and not to sin." *

The confession of Metrophanes Critopulos, patriarch of Alexandria, A.D. 1625, who co-operated with G. Callixtus and other Lutherans in the cause of catholic union, presents the more liberal and progressive aspects of eastern theology, which, though in other respects eclectic or syncretistic, with strong tincture of protestantism, yet on the point now in hand retains the hypothetical distinction between natural and supernatural elements in the first man. "The protoplasts having lost all their divine and spiritual gifts, remained devoid of these, only the natural life being left."

The necessity of supernatural gifts of grace, superadded to the other excellent natural endowments of the first man, is a most prominent feature in Roman Catholic anthropology.

"God so made and constituted man in body, that not by the force of nature itself, but by a divine influence (*beneficio*) he should be immortal and incapable of passion. To the soul

formed in the divine image and likeness, free will has been assigned. All impulses and appetites were so compounded in due proportion that they ever obeyed the commands of reason. Then God added the admirable gift of original righteousness,"* with other things of like kind in the Roman Confession, to which the reader is referred.

Bellarmino speaks of a supernatural elevation (*supernaturalis evectio*) in the first man. "God added to the natural adornments of his soul a certain distinguished gift, namely, original righteousness, by which, as by a golden bridle, the inferior elements of his nature were held in subordination to the superior, while the superior were easily kept subject to God."†

The comparison of original righteousness to "a wreath upon a maiden's hair, which is an ornament bestowed on her and not a part of herself," is a striking illustration from Luther of the Roman opinion.

Thus much truth however may enter into this tenet, "that no finite power is holy save by the holy and sanctifying spirit,"‡ a proposition which

* Cat. Rom., 1, 2, 19.

† Gratia primi Hominis, 2.

‡ Moehler's Symbolism, p. 25.

no protestant would care to controvert, even with reference to the first man.

Let all these features be put into one picture, (1) intimate and unbroken communion of the created spirit with God ; (2) love to him with the faith and obedience which spring from love ; (3) holy conformity with the divine will, which raises man above the world and confers supremacy over all other creatures ; (4) the 'real' freedom, distinguished from 'formal' though growing from it, which comes from divine sonship and holy love ; (5) a clear and salutary knowledge of God himself ; (6) a goodness, purity, and truth, as yet unmixed with evil. Such is the sort of representation of original righteousness to be gathered from comparative symbolic.

A *posse non peccare*, ability not to sin, marks the beginning of the normal progressive development of man towards perfection, a *non posse peccare*, incapability of sinning, marks its completion.

S. John's words, "he cannot sin, because he is born of God," are therefore prophetic of the completion and perfectionment of humanity ; since, however true of man in ideal, they cannot be predicated of the mixed virtue of even the

holiest saint of this world, being inconsistent with that other utterance of the Apostle, "if we say that we have no sin we deceive ourselves."

It has been often objected, "why was man not at first made impeccable?" But, if he had been so, could he, as a created being, without the possibility of sin, be said to possess liberty or free self-conscious determination, which is an essential factor of personality? And, if he did not possess that freedom of choice, would he, however upright, have differed essentially from the irresponsible part of creation? There is, doubtless, a higher necessity to love God and conform in all things to his holy will, wherein consists the real liberty of humanity, but such love and conformity is morally valueless, if it be not the voluntary and deliberate outcome of the will, or if it be impossible for the creature to do otherwise. But sin, though possible in the very conception of created personality, is not necessary, since it was in the power of the first man to resist and overcome all seductions to evil, just as Christ did, just as the regenerate are expected to do increasingly, as the principle of grace and spiritual life grows stronger in them. The

formal freedom, which in every human being makes sin possible, and which is consistent with blamelessness or innocence, ought in normal development to pass into and enhance the real freedom above described, which is the moral goal of man's life. Without voluntary and perfectly free adherence to the good, there could be no real personality and consequently no image and likeness of God in creation. Man would be reduced to a passive and irresponsible mechanism.

But as he was endowed with the noblest gifts of personality, self consciousness and self determination, with all necessary wisdom and power, whereby, if he chose, he might have stood upright and persevered to the final stage of impeccability, it is apparent that through his own fault he fell into a condition of deep guiltiness. God did his part well. Man did his part ill. Therefore the divine holiness is not to be disparaged through man's fault, and evil is in no sort, as will be seen in a section further on, to be attributed to God.

SUB-SECTION II.

ORIGINAL OR BIRTH SIN.

The principal features of man in his innocence, being an unimpaired self consciousness and self determination, which reflected as in a mirror the personality of deity, the first effect of transgression was the loss of such a glorious vision.

With estrangement, man forewent the clear consciousness of God, habitual fellowship and dependence on him. The spirit of love and sonship was supplanted by one of fear and bondage. All other disorders and miseries, betokening death in its widest sense, crept into the sphere of man's inner being as well as outward relationships. Turned from God, the true centre of his life, he became self engrossed or fixed his affections on the world.

The clear intuition of God, together with communion and dependence on him, which raised man above the world, having been lost, real freedom was at an end, since perfect obedience and conformity to God's holy will was no longer possible. Formal freedom was indeed retained, and with it the capacity for the exercise of those relative virtues or excellencies of character, which are so much admired in classic story,

and which we may ourselves be cognisant of in living examples, beyond the circle of Christian influences.

Perhaps it is not too much to say, that without this formal freedom or shred of the nigh extinct image of God, there would remain in man no recuperative energy whatever, no capacity for redemption.

But the character and consequences of original sin will be best understood from an examination of the symbols of the different Christian communions, observing wherein they agree together, and are true exponents of the word of God. Laboured comparison, however, as has been already said, does not enter into the scope of this treatise.

The Roman Catholic opinion, as expressed by the Council at Trent, is as follows: (1) "If any one shall not confess that the first man Adam, when the command of God had been transgressed in Paradise, lost holiness and justice, and by that offence incurred the wrath of God, and that the whole man in soul and body had been thereby thoroughly deteriorated, let him be accursed."

(2.) "If any one assert that the transgression

of Adam has hindered himself alone and not his descendants, and has lost the holiness and justice, which he did lose, for himself alone and not for us also, or that he having been corrupted, by the offence of disobedience, did only transmit to the whole human race death and corporeal punishment, and not also sin which is the death of the soul, let him be accursed." *

It was not merely the supernatural assistance of grace, which man forfeited ; but, with the loss of the divine presence and favour, all his powers and capacities became strangely deteriorated and inclined to evil.

Thomas Aquinas, the ablest of the schoolmen, makes a distinction between the *form* and *matter* of original sin. "The deprivation of original justice is the formal part, that is to say, the causal determining and essential part ; but every other disorder in the faculties of the soul is the material part of original sin, that is to say, the thing determined. . . . The disorder of the other powers of the soul shews itself in the perverted affection to transitory goods."

In another place he says, "All the faculties of the soul have been, to a certain degree,

* Concil. Trid. Sess. v., 1.

displaced from their proper direction and destination, a displacement which is called the wound of nature. . . . In so far as reason has been diverted from its bearing toward the truth, has arisen the wound of ignorance ; inasmuch as the will has been diverted from its bearing toward good, has arisen the wound of wickedness ; inasmuch as the faculty of exertion has been diverted from its bearing toward the arduous, has arisen the wound of frailty ; lastly, inasmuch as the faculty of desire has been diverted from its course, as directed by reason, towards the term of pleasure, has arisen concupiscence." *

The dogma of the Council of Trent in regard to human freedom after the fall is noteworthy. "Although all men by the transgression of Adam were so far slaves in sin, yet in them free will was very little (*minime*) extinguished, although it be weakened and distorted. . . . If any one shall say that the free will, after the sin of Adam has been lost and extinguished, let him be anathema," † a dictum which undoubtedly holds good of *formal* though not of *real* freedom. The latter was lost, though it has afterwards been recovered by redemption.

* Aquinas as quoted in the 'Symbolism' of Dr. J. A. Moehler, one of the most accomplished expositors of Roman Catholic doctrine, p. 48

† Concil. Trid. Sess. vi., 1.

The worst feature of the Roman doctrine is the predication of the *pura naturalia* in fallen man after baptism, though weakened and deteriorated, and the consequent denial that "concupiscence," in the wide sense used by the Apostle, as explained in the next section, "hath of itself the nature of sin," a position, which, as it is in accordance with the semi pelagian teaching of that Church, is directly contraverted in this ninth Article.

Moehler gives a very condensed and impartial expression to Lutheran opinion on this subject, "Man did lose through Adam's fall, the most exalted and most subtle portion of his spiritual essence, the part of his substance kindred to divinity, the implanted organ for God and divine things, inherent in his nature ; so that, after its loss, he sank down into a mere earthly power, having henceforth organs only for the finite world, its laws, its ordinances, and its relations."*

This learned controversialist, however, is sadly at fault when he represents the extreme view of M. Flaccius, that "original sin forms the very substance of human nature," as being a logical development of Lutheran principle.

* Moehler's Symbolism, p. 57.

Our own Article having its source in the second of the confession of Augsburg, there is the less need of making a long quotation. In that standard, as well as in the Apology for it, which is equally authoritative, we meet with "ignorance of God," "contempt of God," "absence of fear of God and of faith toward him," "inability to love God," particularized as leading characters of the disease of original sin, inborn and universal.

Suffice it to say, that whilst both Lutheran and Anglican shun the errors of Pelagius by recognising the fact that fallen man has lost real freedom in spiritual things ; they are nevertheless quite as far removed from the Manichæism of Flaccius by the acknowledgment of formal freedom and a co-relative susceptibility of redemption.

The charge of Manichæism, if at all applicable to any expression of protestant opinion, might, on a superficial view, appear pertinent to some of the strong calvinistic phrases of the 'Reformed' standards.

The Westminster confession is characteristically austere. "By this sin our first parents fell from their original righteousness and communion

with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body. They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of their sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation. From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions."

It is evident that such predicates, as utter inability and opposition to all good in the natural man, must mainly be understood of his spiritual relationship, the sphere of real freedom, and not of the civic or other spheres of ordinary life, in which formal freedom is ever in lively exercise, though corruption of nature permeates every faculty and energy.

Does not the pronounced imputation of guilt in these reformed standards preclude the charge of Manichæism, since human nature is no longer *essentially* a mass of corruption and perdition, but only *imputatively*?"

Amongst the Arminians or Remonstrants, the tenet of the universality of redemption is

held side by side with that of the ability of the human will to co-operate with divine grace, both positions being firmly taken by distinguished Anglicans like Jeremy Taylor and Isaac Barrow. Richard Baxter himself, strict Puritan in other respects, has strong leanings this way.

The Socinian restricts the evils consequent on the fall, to the imputation of death, and the bondage which the fear of death causes. "The first man transgressed the command of God, and drew the same obligation or penalty of death upon all his posterity." *

An interesting question occurs, What is the precise extent of fallen man's susceptibility of redemption or spiritual capacity?

It has been remarked "that a perfect inability to help himself is compatible with his ability to appropriate God's help."

Does not Holy Scripture throughout in its commands and admonitions proceed on the supposition that it is in the power of each to choose to hear the word of God and to yield oneself to its holy guidance, or on the contrary, to turn aside and resist the impulses of grace?

At least it is apparent, that man must refrain

from wilful and obstinate resistance, if divine love is to work savingly. Take conversion, for example. Whilst it may be admitted to be mainly God's act, a fruit of regeneration, must there not be in it a certain yielding or movement on the part of the man himself? Otherwise how is the necessity of irresistible grace in order to salvation and eternal life to be evaded?

Are not faith and repentance necessary conditions of regeneration in those of riper years? And have the will and other natural powers no part in these acts? Observe that the Article says, that "man is very far gone from original righteousness," not "altogether."

But suppose human nature so utterly corrupted, that irresistible grace is necessary in the first instance to regenerate, still the capacity exists of becoming regenerate, which we could not conceive to be the case, if sin formed the very substance of human nature. And thus the Calvinist evades the charybdis of Manichæism.

As the image and superscription of the lost coin, with much pains is wont to be restored, so the likeness of God, the divine personality, is never so wholly effaced, as to be incapable of renovation in the soul of the sinner. And does

not renovation imply a bias or inclination in the man himself?

We may be sure that man's responsibility in the sphere of grace, as elsewhere, is so undeniable a fact of each person's experience, that all theories of necessity must give way before it.

SECTION II.

S. PAUL'S PROOFS OF ORIGINAL OR BIRTH SIN.

The doctrine of sin in Scripture finds its most systematic statement in the Pauline epistles, more notably in that to the Romans. Thither, therefore, the mind naturally turns, though it will be found, in the concluding section, that other parts of the holy writings are replete with proofs of the radical and universal corruption of the human race.

SUB-SECTION I.

ARGUMENT FROM INDUCTION OF THE FACTS OF HISTORY.

Romans I., 18—III., 21.

The Apostle first forms his conclusion of human sinfulness from a careful survey of the

whole sphere of human history, Jew and Gentile.

It is a living picture of real facts accurately generalized, which these chapters present, as any one may be convinced, who seriously ponders the dark features of crime and wickedness, with which the annals of every nation are replete, as well as the vices and defects of character, from which the best men are not exempt.

A true philosophy of religion, based on actual phenomena of history is conveyed in the Apostle's remarks. The wrath of God, manifested by divers unmistakable judgments, which rested upon men everywhere, formed a dark background, upon which might be advantageously delineated the bright characters of grace. The thesis of the epistle, righteousness by faith, had thus as antithesis the condemnation and death attached to the prevalent ungodliness.

Of the guilt, which occasioned so manifest a revelation of wrath, there could be no doubt, since men knew better. 'That which is knowable of God,' the universal objective knowledge of the Creator,—a fact which the recent science of comparative religion has convincingly confirmed, 'is manifest in them,' still it was not a

knowledge which regulated life or moulded character as it was designed to do, for the simple reason that men restrained and crushed it by the practice of unrighteousness.

Man, being a free personal created Spirit, the unity of spirit and nature, forms the highest embodiment of the cosmical principle, whilst he is at the same time illuminated in his inner being by bright rays from the spiritual world. He possesses the faculty of *νοῦς*, the organ at once of religion and of moral law, which realizes the invisible presence and attributes of deity in nature, and which otherwise intuitively perceives the realities of the unseen and eternal.

The eternal power and divinity, yea, the very personality and will of God are patent in the spirit and personality of man, since the creature, in its highest form, is but the reflection and image of the uncreated excellence in this very respect. As S. Paul, a little further on, by way of reproach to the Jews, remarks that the law of divine righteousness was written on the heart of other peoples, inasmuch as not having knowledge of revealed law, they often did by nature the things contained in the law. But isolated instances of courage or temperance

of wisdom or rectitude, could not excuse or extenuate the prevalent corruption of heart or abandonment of manners, from which the best men were not exempt.

The condemnation which rested on the whole human race was grounded on the fact, that whilst men knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither cherished toward him grateful and loving spirits, but became the abandoned votaries of vanities, which cannot help or profit. The final consequence was, that their heart, *καρδία*, the conscious centre of will, thought and feeling, lost its power of quick apprehension and became dark as well as dead.

At the very entrance, then, of his inductive proof from the facts of history, S. Paul logically places estrangement from God as the fruitful source of all other sin. Disorder in the highest relationship of life involves disorder in every other. A false attitude towards the Creator, means a wrong posture towards one's fellows and the rest of creation.

With the rupture of divine fellowship, man's real freedom was gone. Having lost dependence upon God, and therewith true self dependence, man sank into slavish dependence

on the creature. A resplendent world outside could in some sort fill the place of God in the heart, and, therefore, henceforth became the object of superstitious reverence and worship. The history of the ancient world was indeed from the beginning a record of idolatry. The appalling spectacle of the worship of nature in its manifold aspects was realized in the motley forms of polytheism, which met the eye everywhere. The beauty and grace of the human form, corruptible at best became, for example, the object of religious regard in classic Greece, whilst "birds, four-footed beasts and creeping things" were deified in Egypt.

The darkening and perversion of the religious consciousness was accompanied or followed by a blunting and hardening of the moral consciousness. Men's character and practical activity always take the complexion of their religious beliefs or superstition. Their morals necessarily share in the degradation of their spiritual life, since there can be no true morality apart from true divinity,—love and communion of God with man and of man with God being at once the primary dogma of religion and the foremost duty of morality, as insisted on in former parts of this treatise.

Into the Apostle's revolting exhibition of human crimes and unnatural vices which followed upon the rupture of fellowship with the Creator and the simultaneous rent in man's moral being, it is unnecessary to enter. Suffice it to say, that the Jew, who boasted of a revealed law and other distinguished privileges, is proved by the Apostle to have fallen into similar depravity and superstition with his Gentile neighbour.

A terribly dark pessimist view of human life is this, where evil is no mere negation, but a fearfully obtrusive and positive quantity, just as the bright beams of grace, which relieve and illumine the darkness of the picture, are positive.

The steps of reasoning of Jonathan Edwards, in proof of original sin, are worth considering. His treatise on this doctrine is a masterpiece for the age in which it was written. He first lays down and establishes the proposition, that "all mankind, constantly, in all ages, without fail in any one instance, run into moral evil." This prepares the way for the further position, that "all men are under the influence of a prevailing effectual tendency in their nature to sin and wickedness," in the proof of which he

shews that this tendency to evil does not consist in any particular external circumstances that persons are in, influencing their minds, or in the general frame and constitution of the world, full of so many and great temptations and of such powerful influence on man, because "if any creature be of such a nature that it proves evil in its proper place, or in the situation which God has assigned it in the universe, it is of an evil nature," and "because it is proved by universal history and experience that the tendency to sin and wickedness is inherent and seated in that nature which is common to all mankind, which they carry with them wherever they go, and still remains the same however circumstances may differ." The next proposition, that "the propensity, which has been proved to be in the nature of all mankind, must be a very evil, depraved, and pernicious propensity ; making it manifest that the soul of man, as it is by nature, is in a corrupt, fallen and ruined state," is followed by a variety of corroborative facts of daily experience and history, such as "the propensity in all to sin immediately, as soon as they are capable of it," and the progressive degeneracy of the race in spite of divine

interferences to the contrary, as well as the exhortations and examples of good men,—those educated and brought up in the most favorable circumstances speedily degenerating.*

Those who impugn the Apostle's inference from the facts of history, do not look into the heart of all moral corruption, as instanced by him in the first place, namely, alienation of disposition and life from God. Where there is no communion with, or adequate love to God, the fruitful germ of all moral evil is present. There is essentially a condition of guiltiness. Therefore it is vain for the modern rationalist to pretend, that "the facts of experience," instanced by S. Paul, "on which the proof rests, consist from the nature of the case of gross acts of sin, which are at once suggested by the survey of general states of morality, and are certainly also indicative of the average character of a mass, of a people, of a generation, and the like, but which are far from justifying the inference of a similar corruption in every individual."†

Such objections were rife during last century, and the refutation of them was thought not

* Christian Doctrine of Original Sin defended, Part I., section 1, 2, 3, etc.
† Pfleiderer's Paulinism, p. 35.

unworthy of the labour and ingenuity of J. Edwards, though, perhaps, their palpable superficiality is of itself a sufficient exposure. "Let us," says one of the opponents of our doctrine, "make a fair estimate of human life, and set over against the shocking instances of barbarity and wickedness, that have been perpetrated in any age, not only the exceeding generous and brave actions, with which history shines, but the prevailing innocence, good nature, industry, felicity and cheerfulness of the greater part of mankind at all times," etc.*

SUB-SECTION II.

ARGUMENT FROM UNIVERSAL MORTALITY OR
THE REIGN OF DEATH.—*Romans V., 12—15.*

THANATOLOGY.

Exegetical Considerations. The article ἡ before ἀμαρτία, v. 12, denotes sin in its most general sense, both as an objective power, with the sentence of condemnation attached to it, and as a subjective principle, with the manifold lusts in the members, which exist in each and develops itself in the character.

* Jonathan Edwards' Works, Vol. I., p. 146.

Similarly the article δ before $\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$, in the same verse, as well as v. 14, gives as general a sense to the word 'death,' as it is capable of, denoting at once its objective dominion together with its subjective working and effects. Physical death which is the mere outward manifestation of that which is spiritual, is therefore just one part of the meaning. Whatever import may be attached to 'eternal death' is also included.

$\epsilon\phi'$ $\hat{\omega}$ $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ $\eta\mu\alpha\rho\tau\omicron\nu$, 'on the ground that (because) all did sin,' *i.e.*, all men in its representative Adam, from union with him,—the whole race in its generic relation to its ancestor, was involved in corruption and condemnation: it received at its source an inevitable bias and determination to moral evil and death. As happily expressed by a commentator, 'the sin of all together with its consequence was wrapped up in the one act of Adam's sin and only developed afterwards.'

This idea of the moral unity or 'solidarity' of the race is in direct opposition to the unqualified individualism or moral 'atomism' of Pelagius, though it is not inconsistent with a recognition of the distinctive original character of individuals, which bears upon it a direct

creative impress. Side by side with the determining energy of radical evil, an inscrutable energy of free self determination is found to assert itself at the successive turning points or epochs of each one's life.

In v. 13, ἐλλογείται, 'reckoned,' 'sin is not set down as transgression, *i.e.*, is not put in formal account by God, there being no law,'—the absence of a revealed law simultaneously giving occasion to a relatively faint impression of guilt and condemnation in the religious consciousness, which in the light of the divine word is wont to reflect clearly the objective judgment of the Almighty upon all unrighteousness: in such absence of law and consciousness of guilt, whatever be the objective character of the sin, one feels assured that it cannot be 'reckoned' in the same way as deliberate transgression of express command.

Therefore the interpretation of v. 14, turns on the distinction of meaning between παράβασις and ἁμαρτία, the former being transgression of a positive divine command, the latter sin in general. The universality of death proves the universality of sin (ἁμαρτία) in that long interval between Adam and Moses, when there was no

special or express revelation of moral law and therefore men 'could not sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression,' (παράβασις), *i.e.*, with the clear and distinct consciousness of sin. There may be here very special though not exclusive reference to infants. The proposition is flatly contradictory of the Pelagian position, that 'original sin consisteth in the mere following or imitation of the example of Adam,' and clearly purports that it is 'the fault and corruption of every one that is naturally engendered of his offspring.'

Symbolical Interpretations of Romans v. 12—15, etc. The Pelagians simply deny the causal connection between sin and death, the latter being regarded as a mere accident, normally incident to man's bodily organism.

In the Socinian standards, the idea of imputation of death to all men, as a punishment of the sin of their first parents, is prominent and strikingly differentiates them from the Pelagian position, so similar in other respects.

The Arminians agree with the Pelagians, as to the natural frailty and mortality of the bodily organism, yet are of opinion that the body of

Adam and his descendants would have, in case of obedience, been supernaturally preserved from decay and death by participation of the fruit of the tree of life, from which supreme blessing having been debarred upon the transgression of Adam, the whole race sank into a condition of naturalness and transient existence.

And so the Roman Catholic made exemption from death to be indeed the normal condition of man in his paradisiacal condition, but dependent on the continuous possession of the supernatural endowments of grace, *i.e.*, habitual communion with God and whatever else is comprehended in 'original righteousness,' as he understands it, upon the withdrawal of which as a punishment for the sin of our first parents, death became the portion of the whole race.

All the other Reformed symbols agree with the Lutheran and Anglican position, which is Scriptural and orthodox, that by the just judgment of God, for the offence of one, in whom as head and representative all men were included, the sentence of death in its widest extent, has taken effect on all after generations, none excepted. Original sin and its penal consequences were imputed and transmitted to all.

Consequently as 'the fault and corruption of nature in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation,' *i.e.*, eternal death according to our Article.

There is involved in the above statement an important distinction. On the one hand, sin and death, as objective powers, exercise uncontrolled dominion over the human race. 'The judgment (*κρίμα*), is of one to condemnation (*κατάκριμα*). . . . 'For by one offence death did reign (*ἐβασίλευσεν*) by one.' . . . It even 'exercised dominion over those who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression.' That is what in theological language has been called 'immediate imputation.'

On the other hand the subjective power of sin in the depraved passions and propensities of human character, breaks up the inner harmony and produces dissolution and decay of spiritual life. This radical corruption of nature has been transmitted to all men by natural generation, just as we see, in multitudes of cases, other generic defects or vices to be transmitted from one age to another. And so it is said in Scripture, after the fall, Gen. v., 3, that Adam, begat a son in his own (depraved) likeness

after his image,' deformed, corrupted and made perishable by transgression ; and, therefore, on the ground of becoming each one's proper fault, it deserves God's wrath, That is what is meant by 'mediate imputation.'

In anticipation of objections to the orthodox belief, it may be premised, that the principle of representation enters largely into the constitution of things and the divine economy in general : that it appears perfectly reasonable in ordinary civil transactions : that it pervades both revealed dispensations so as to form an essential element of them both : that we can see so far the expediency and wisdom of such an arrangement, and that there is good reason to think that if we could see further into the divine designs and plan, all obscurities would be cleared up, and the pretended difficulties, petulantly and obstinately obtruded, would appear as unsubstantial as a dream.

Logical connection between Sin and Death. In face of the reign of death over all living organisms, as well in previous geological epochs as in the age of man, the positivist of the present day stands as inflexibly opposed, as the Pelagian,

to the tenet of causal connection between sin and death, and transmission of original sin and guilt, in the orthodox sense, from one generation to another.

Man, so far as he is a mere bodily organism, is subject to the natural laws of growth and decay, by which the temporal existence of other creatures is determined, but because he is possessor of spirit, with a self conscious and self determining ego and a faculty of religion, he is essentially differentiated from them and shares a higher destiny.

The logical connection between sin and death, therefore, cannot be obvious to those who lose sight of the higher features of the divine image in man.

If man be a mere creature of nature, his intelligence and will nothing but the play of a highly elaborated organism, the product by secretion or other physical function of nervous centres, just as the instincts or impulses of other animals are conceived to be, nothing else can be looked for, in due course, than natural dissolution and a rendering back to their earthly source of the material elements of his organism.

In absence of the *Nous* (νοῦς) the faculty of

religion and morality, which inheres in spirit, man would be no better than the beasts that perish, excepting in a higher complexity and perfectness of organism. Annihilation at death, or at best transmutation of the essential elements of his framework into other organisms,—the mystical ‘metempsychosis’ of the Pythagorean, would afford a drear prospect. There could really be no higher destiny than to be manure for the ground. To those, therefore, who deny the being of spirit, *i.e.*, the eudæmonist or materialist, the Sadducee of the present day, everything in the shape of higher ideal and aspiration is at an end.

The elements of personality, self consciousness and self determination, which inhere in spirit, will, when examined, be found to have nothing akin to them in the domain of brute nature. They are not of the earth earthy, but spring from a celestial original, and reflect clearly enough the distinct features of the uncreated personality and do consequently in the very nature of the case partake of its imperishableness. Than this, it is apprehended, no other satisfactory explanation has ever been or can be given of them.

The very idea of unity and completeness attaching to man's normal individuality and complexity of constitution, as he now is, would appear to preclude the notion of the final dissolution of the essential factors of his being. "Scripture," indeed, as one well versed in biblical psychology remarks, "speaks of a seeing and a tasting of death and death's corruption, meaning a personal experience of them. In this way the consistency of individual life appears to be rent and divided. Still it is not absolutely destroyed ; but, as in a chemical solution, the agents always tend to form a new compound, so, while the soul retains its capacity to have bodily senses and the spirit its capacity to have a soul, they must still be held together by a joint effort after a living restoration of the dissolved individuality. The spirit has, indeed, on parting from the body, been freed from its earthly loads ; but its capacity of having a soul makes this a banishment into the wilderness of death. Therefore the desire for redemption unto life is only the more strongly kindled in it ; and in those men who have not gone so far as to sin against the Holy Spirit, the word of the Spirit of life can bring about a spiritual quickening that saves

their own individuality, even when they are condemned already in the flesh." *

Whatever weighty import these considerations may have when carefully considered, Holy Scripture assures us, that death, so far at all events as man is concerned, would not have entered into the world apart from sin, the one being the effect and manifestation of the other.

The condemnation pronounced by the Almighty upon transgression was not physical death in the first instance, since Adam continued to live for many years afterwards, but spiritual death, which consists in the deprivation of the light and fellowship with the Almighty, in whose presence and favor alone is our normal and true life. Severance from God was already for man death in its essence and power.

Human life, in a condition of alienation from God, is properly described as a continual dying or a delayed death. Death thus is rightly conceived of, not as a single momentous fact, but as a process reaching through the whole of life, consisting of a rending asunder the inner harmony of the factors of the soul, consequent on the rent of the harmony of the creaturely will with the will of the Almighty.

* Outlines of Biblical Psychology, by J. T. Beck, pp. 50, 51.

The Scripture representation is quite conformable to reasonable expectation, that had man retained his integrity, the energy of the spirit would have prevailed over the forces of decay and death which otherwise were ordained to take effect on his bodily organism. Both body and soul would have been penetrated by immortal vigor. Sin and death would have remained an unknown quantity, or a bare potentiality.

Humanity is not without experience in history of the imperishable nature of the essential elements of our physical organism, for not to speak of the instances of translation in the Old Testament, look what transformation or development took place in the Saviour's body after the resurrection, from whence it may be easy to conceive that the bodies of Adam or other mortals, if they had remained sinless, would have undergone a similar transition and glorification, thus evading mortality altogether. Once grant a predicate of sinlessness in the premiss and there will be no shirking a predicate of deathlessness in the conclusion, unless you strip man of his divine image and make him a mere animal.

The reign of death, therefore, in human life, is, according to a spiritual and Scriptural conception, a manifestation and effect of sin. But no error in this particular doctrine has at present to be more guarded against than the insinuation of the new school of rationalism, that 'the dominion of death is merely objective, and has no ground in the subjective condition of individuals,' that 'it cannot be caused by the personal culpability of individuals themselves,' that 'accordingly as it is a fixed axiom that it must in some way be caused by sin, it can only be caused by that impersonal sin of the mass, which was included in the sin of the first man Adam,' that 'because the sentence of death on all mankind, on account of the sin of one, has an appearance of great harshness from a moral point of view, Adam must be understood as a mere personification of the natural man,' that 'at bottom, *a priori*, the relation of man to God is, previous to all contingent individual action, therefore, from the beginning and of necessity, that of alienation and contradiction.' *

It is obvious that the main efforts of modern orthodox criticism and apologetic, must be

* Pfleiderer's Paulinism, pp. 43, 44.

directed against such subtle error of the prevalent negative criticism, because, 'if the sin which causes death be a necessary and integral element of humanity, there remains no longer any responsibility in its highest sense, and the notion of guilt vanishes.'

A contrasted form of rationalism (Pelagian), wanting in the subtilty of that just instanced, was prevalent a century ago. The causal connection between sin and death was disallowed. 'Affliction and death,' according to Dr. Taylor, instead of being regarded as a punishment of sin, or, as on the new rationalist ground, an *a-priori* necessity, inherent in man's naturally perishable and transient constitution and life, 'were to be spoken of as a great benefit, since they increase the vanity of all earthly things, tend to excite sober reflections, to induce us to be moderate in gratifying the appetites of the body, and to mortify pride and ambition.' But then, as J. Edwards naively remarks, 'Is it not strange, on such a theory, that death should fall so heavily on infants, who are not capable of making any such improvement of it?' *

It will be seen from further consideration of

* Original Sin Defended, Part I., c. 2., p. 176.

the subject, that we blame and condemn ourselves for whatever moral evil may be *in* us, though it may not be directly *of* us. The more enlightened and susceptible our moral judgment becomes, the more heavily do we feel the sentence of death and condemnation in ourselves, on account of that dark power of wrong doing, which somehow or other has gained deep seat in us, though we may not be able clearly to explain *whence* or *how*. Certainly evil had its beginning in us, previous to our earliest recollection, but we consider ourselves, none the less, culpable, because we feel that we have been in league with something destructive and foreign to us, an enemy and intruder.

SUB-SECTION III.

ARGUMENT BASED ON PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS.

S. PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF "THE FLESH."—*Rom. viii., 5—8.*

SARKOLOGY.

The phrase *φρόνημα σαρκὸς*, which occupies so prominent a place in the ninth Article, occurs twice in the passage which heads this sub-section, and nowhere else in the New Testament.

It means literally 'the mindedness of the flesh,'—that state of mind where the thoughts

and purposes are penetrated by the principle of the *σάρξ*, whose centre is self and the world, and is therefore directly contrary to the spirit, *πνεῦμα*, whose energy is Godward.

The framers of the Article appreciated the comprehensiveness of the term, when they add by way of explanation, "which some do expound to be the wisdom, some the sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh." And in saying that "it is not subject to the law of God," they suggest the other part of the Apostle's definition, that 'the mindedness,' which includes the care and aim 'of the flesh is enmity to God.'

The meaning plainly is that the mind in carnal men is made the organ through which the sinful principle residing in the flesh, whether selfishness or worldliness, "the lust of the flesh," operates and accomplishes its purposes. And so likewise the will and heart may be made the medium of its action, which extends over the entire man and effects the utter perversion and destruction of his true being, making him dead toward God and insensible of spiritual things. He becomes, in the Apostle's words, *σαρκικὸς ἄνθρωπος*, a fleshly or carnal man, whereas the

material organism itself, the body, *σῶμα*, with its members, *μέλη*, as well as the higher capacities of the soul and intellect, ought to be penetrated by the spirit, and made instruments of righteousness.

Accordingly in the abnormal and ruined state of fallen man, there is a manifold variety of sin, corresponding to the character of the organ of the sinful principle just as S. Paul teaches ; if it act through the body, sensuality or other excess as rioting and drunkenness ; if through the mind, superstition, idolatry, witchcraft, or irreligion ; if through the affections, covetousness, thirst for praise, jealousy and envy at the success of others ; if through the will, emulations, strifes, breaking out into open malice and revenge. The works of the flesh enumerated by the Apostle in various other places, but notably in the sixth chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians, amongst which mention is made of “ factions ” or “ divisions ” and “ heresies,” which take their rise from pride, which itself is a work of the flesh, throw sufficient light upon this singular principle of *σάρξ*, and shew that it is something vastly wider than sensuality, including along with it the other forms of selfishness, self being

made the centre of false world ideals and the end of life.

The evil principle, which resides in 'the flesh,' and is prolific of such a strange diversity of wickedness, and which has, as rule of action, "the law of sin and of death," is the direct opposite of that principle of "the inner man" which delights in the law of God, whose commandments, it is assured, are 'holy and just and good.' Amongst the contents of the Nous, is "the law of the spirit of life," which is the regulative and impelling norm of our higher being.

If 'the law of the spirit' be summed up in the principle of love, by which every factor of our personal existence or individuality ought to be regulated, 'the law of sin and death' will be reduced to the principle of selfishness, the exact contrary of love, which accordingly gathers up in itself and controls the operations of sensuality and of every other form of vice or ungodliness. Evil is thus no mere principle of arbitrariness but is governed by a fixed law of operation just as good is.

The active principle of the flesh, then, is selfishness and its norm of working 'the law of

sin and of death,' whilst the operative principle of the spirit is love and its norm, 'the law of the spirit of life.' The one concentrates in self, the other in God.

Much subtilty has been shewn in an exegesis of this very subject by an acute disciple of the new rationalism, who endeavours to make out that S. Paul's "flesh" is an original, *a-priori*, independent seat of the sinful principle, which exists previous to all objective command or subjective willing of the ego. His manner of representing the matter is as follows :

"Σάρξ, according to the common Hebraic notion, in the first place, signifies material substance, which is void indeed of the spirit, but not contrary to it, weak, perishable, unclean, but not positively evil. The next step was to raise the uncleanness and perishableness of the flesh, in consequence of which it cannot attain to the Kingdom of God, to actual sinfulness, a step already taken in many passages of the Old Testament. In the same way the Messianic Pneuma, πνεῦμα, had for S. Paul grown out of a principle of transcendent physical life into a principle of morally good life. When it is no longer the mere imperishableness and strength

of the heavenly substance, that is connected with the idea of πνεῦμα, but a morally good spontaneity, its opposite σάρξ can no longer be a mere earthly perishable substance but a moral spontaneity must also belong to it, which can, of course, only be the opposite of that Pneuma, and therefore wicked. Thus out of σάρξ, flesh, as merely spiritless substance, grows a causality opposed to the spirit, out of its merely passive mortality an active tendency toward death or working of death." *

An ingenious form of representation, but how can the mere material substance of flesh, 'not contrary to the spirit,' normally designed to be permeated by it, be transmuted into what is positively sinful on such an artificial hypothesis as the above? How could any passive matter like flesh, 'not in itself positively evil,' be raised to actual sinfulness? That was surely a task too hard for the will of an apostle or prophet to effect, though the fiction of it may suit the convenience of the negative theory of sin. But the theory is consistently worked out to its logical issues, as will be seen in the following quotation.

* Pfeiderer's Paulinism, pp. 52, 53.

“It is precisely the object of Rom. vii., to explain the moral constitution of the empirical nature of man from the flesh, ‘the law in the members, νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν, from the ἁμαρτία, which was already latent and potentially present in our members, before any commandment existed, and which is only called into life by the commandment. . . . An impersonal principle of sin, the ultimate cause which infallibly produces it, is just the pith of the whole passage. . . . Sin is already in man, before the law comes to him and brings it to his consciousness. . . . Sin, therefore, by no means originates in the ego, allowing itself with consciousness and will to be determined by that which is material, but rooted in the being of this conscious sinner, lies an ultimate cause, an unconscious ἁμαρτία, in the form of a purely objective power, which as unconscious may be called dead. . . . So completely is the σὰρξ an independent objective principle of sin, that it was not only sinful in itself from the beginning, as yet without the wishing or the willing of the ego,” etc. *

It is apparent that if sin be in this way a

* Pfleiderer's Paulinism, pp. 58, 59.

merely natural quantity, there can in reality be no sin. If the animated matter of the body be its principle, it is unavoidable; and humanity is tainted with sin by nature and of necessity!

SECTION III.

ARGUMENT FOR ORIGINAL SIN FROM THE CHURCH DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF INFANT BAPTISM.

SUB-SECTION I.

THE ARGUMENT STATED.

The proposition now to be made good can hardly have a more explicit or otherwise better statement than in the words of Origen, A.D. 210.

“Infants are baptised for the forgiveness of sins. Of what sins? Or when have they sinned? Or how can any reason of the laver in their case hold good, but according to that sense that we mentioned even now: none is free from pollution, though his life be but of the length of one day upon the earth? And it is for that reason that infants are baptized, because by the sacrament of baptism the pollution of their birth is taken away.” *

As an illustration how the argument may be

* Homil. in Lucam., 14.

extended, another passage from Origen will perhaps suffice. “In the law it is commanded that a sacrifice be offered for every child that is born, ‘a pair of turtle doves or two young pigeons, of which one is for a sin offering, the other for a burnt offering.’ For what sin is this pigeon offered? Can the child that is new born have committed any sin? It has even then sin, for which the sacrifice is commanded to be offered, from which even he, whose life is of one day, is denied to be free.” *

Or, to cite a passage from S. Augustine, “where baptism is had, though the faith which the thief had be wanting, yet he is saved; which the whole body of the church holds, as delivered to them in the case of little infants baptised. . . And if any one ask for divine authority in this matter: though that which the whole Church practices, and which has not been instituted by councils, but was ever in use, is very reasonably believed to be no other than a thing delivered by authority of the Apostles, yet we may besides take a true estimate, how much the sacrament of baptism does avail infants, by the circumcision which God’s former people received.” †

* Comment. in Epist. ad Romanos, lib. v., c. 9.

† De Baptismo contra Donatistas, lib. iv., c. 23.

SUB-SECTION II.

*ERRONEOUS OPINIONS EVASIVE OR SUBVERSIVE
OF THE ARGUMENT.*

The argument for original sin from the fact that remission in Scripture forms an essential part of the object of infant baptism, may be evaded in two ways, first, by the denial of original sin altogether, and assigning some other object to the institution of infant baptism admittedly of Apostolic origin, as the Pelagians do ; or, secondly, by denying the efficacy as well as apostolicity of pædobaptism, as the Antipædobaptists. The one sort of errorists, whilst admitting the necessity of infant baptism, limits the divine grace attached to it by the suppression of its negative factor, remission of original sin. The other, recognising its efficacy in adults, assert that infants are not qualified or capable of the conditions necessary for securing the grace of the sacrament either in its positive or negative characters. A third sort entertain absolutely destructive views, as the Manichæans and their followers in all after ages, who ignore or deride water baptism altogether, and rest in mystical notions of a spiritual baptism.

I.—PELAGIAN OPINION OF INFANT BAPTISM.

The Pelagians practised infant baptism, since it had confessedly been the custom of the whole Church from apostolic days, but they denied original sin in the infant on two grounds, (1) because it seemed to place everyone, as soon as born, under a necessity of sinning; and (2) because it thereby appeared to cast reflection on the divine honour and justice.

They further argued, that “if original sin be the cause why infants are baptised, then the child who is born of Christian and baptised parents would not need to be baptised, as being born of those who were cleansed of that sin and of a mother whose body is a temple of the Holy Spirit.” *

We are told that when pressed by the argument of the Catholics, some of the Pelagians used for evasion to reply, that “the peevishness and fretful crying of the infant, as soon as born, is a sin and he may be baptised for the forgiveness of that and such like.” †

Not pretending, however, to deny the necessity of infant baptism, the Pelagians said that baptism in the case of an infant is not for the

* S. Augustine *Contra Julianism*, lib. vi., c. 5.

† S. Augustine *De peccatorum meritis*, lib. i., c. 35, sec. 65.

forgiveness of sin but to procure the child an entrance into the kingdom of heaven.

It followed also from their views, there being no forfeiture of the divine favor from original sin, that "infants dying unbaptised, should have an eternal and happy life, not in the kingdom of heaven indeed, because our Saviour, John iii., 5, had determined the contrary, but somewhere, they knew not where." *

Their view on this subject is better defined in another place of S. Augustine, where he says that "they held that an infant dying unbaptised shall be raised again, and live eternally in a certain middle state, without punishment, as having no sin, but not enjoying the kingdom of heaven, as being not baptised unto Christ." †

The Pelagian distinction between the salvation which the unbaptised infant might enjoy, and the kingdom of heaven which was the inheritance of the baptised, was adopted by Vincentius Victor, A.D. 418, who was no Pelagian, since he acknowledged original sin in infants. "I may venture," he says, "to say, that those designed for baptism, and are prevented by death before being regenerated in Christ, may

* S. Augustine De Heresibus, c. 88.

† De Gestis Pelagii, c. 35.

obtain forgiveness of original sin, and yet not be admitted into the kingdom of heaven. . . especially when our Lord says, that his Father has 'many mansions,' by which are meant the many different merits and rewards of them that shall dwell in them, the unbaptised being admitted to pardon, and the baptised to the crown which is procured by grace." *

Pelagian opinion at first got a more kindly reception in the East than in the West. The notion of a middle state is found in many of the Greek fathers. Gregory Nazianzen thus expresses a very prevalent sentiment, "Some have a value for baptism but delay the receiving of it. . . . Others have it not in their own power to receive it, either because of their infancy, or by reason of some accident utterly involuntary, so that though they desire it, they have no opportunity to obtain the gift. . . . The last sort will neither be glorified nor punished by the just judge, as being without the seal, but not through their own wickedness, and as having suffered the loss rather than having occasioned it." †

S. Ambrose, A.D. 391, mentions the opinion

* S. Augustine De Anima, lib. i., c. 11.

† Oratio De Baptismo, sec. 23.

of a middle state then current in the East, and “calls it *opertam*, a thing not certainly revealed or known, but hidden and uncertain. His meaning is that since our Saviour’s sentence of the necessity of baptism for entering into the kingdom of God is general, and does not except infants, it is very questionable whether an infant unbaptised can have the said kingdom. And as for the middle state between heaven and hell, it is for us a thing hidden or unknown whether there be any such state.” *

The notion of a middle state afterwards became the received opinion in the West and notably amongst the schoolmen.

Peter Lombard, A.D. 1150, described the proper punishment of original sin as *pœna damni, non pœna sensus*, the punishment of the loss of heaven and the sight of God, but not the punishment of sense or positive torment. †

Innocent III., A.D. 1200, confirms this opinion, characterising the punishment of original sin as *carentia visionis Dei*, the deprivation of the sight of God. The meed of actual sin is, according to him, *gehennæ perpetuæ cruciatus*, the torments of an everlasting hell. ‡

* Wall’s Baptism, Part I., c. 13, p. 140. † Sentent. Distinct., lib. ii., c. 33.

‡ Decret., lib. iii., c. De Baptismo, lan. Majores.

Alexander Halesius, A.D. 1245, Thomas Aquinas, A.D. 1275, and all the other schoolmen adopt this distinctly pelagian notion of a middle state, to which they give the name, *limbus* or *infernus puerorum*, the worst torment or condemnation of which is loss of heaven. They suppose this receptacle of unbaptised infants to be located somewhere in Hades.

Wickliffe, A.D. 1380, re-echoes the sentiment of S. Ambrose. He "counts it rash to determine the damnation of children, that have by unavoidable mishap missed of baptism, but on the other hand says, that he who affirms that such an infant will be saved, a thing pious to be believed, puts himself more than he needs or shall profit him upon an uncertainty." *

The Hussite opinion was that unbaptised infants will be saved by the mercy of God, accepting their parents' faithful desire of baptising them instead of the deed.

Cardinal Cajetan, A.D. 1525, one of the more moderate of the Romanists, agrees with this view, and says that baptism in the desire of the parents is sufficient to save infants who have died unbaptised.

* Trialog., lib. iv., c. 12.

The Calvinists and Reformers generally incline to think that the child of a godly believing parent shall obtain the kingdom of heaven, though he do by sudden death miss of baptism.

Archbishop Whitgift, A.D. 1603, a decided Calvinist, disputing with Cartwright, a zealous Puritan, says, "I do dislike, as much as you, the opinion of those who think infants to be condemned which are not baptised."

Archbishop Laud, A.D. 1637, makes the happy remark that "baptism is necessary to the salvation of infants, in the ordinary way of the Church, without binding God to the use and means of that sacrament, to which he has bound us."

There is much to sympathise with in Jeremy Taylor's invective against the ultra calvinistic opinion of the condemnation of unbaptised or non-elect infants, notwithstanding his semi-pelagianism. "Of itself it seems so horrid to impute to the goodness and justice of God to be the author of so great calamity to innocents, namely, the making them heirs of damnation. . . . Unless infants be senseless and inapprehensive after the resurrection, it is not to be imagined that all who know they are by way of punish-

ment deprived of the glorious face of God, must needs have an horrible anguish of soul to eternal ages. . . . Against those who say that infants dying in original sin are eternally tormented, I call to witness all the economy of the divine goodness, justice, and truth," with much else in the same strain in his well known treatise on Repentance.

In opposition to the unrestrained laxity of pelagian opinion, the orthodox view finds a succinct expression in S. Augustine. "It may well be said, that infants, departing this life without baptism, will be under the mildest condemnation of all,—so gentle that it will be preferable to be under it than not to be at all. But he who affirms that they will not be under condemnation, does much deceive us and is deceived himself, when as the Apostle says, 'judgment came on all men to condemnation.' " *

The second Canon of the Council of Carthage, A.D. 418, determines the whole matter, "Whosoever does deny that infants may be baptised, when they come fresh from their mother's womb; or does say that they are indeed baptised for forgiveness of sins, and yet that they derive no

* De Peccatorum Meritis, c. 15.

original sin from Adam, let them be anathema.”

“If anyone affirm that our Lord did therefore say, ‘In my Father’s house are many mansions,’ that it should be meant that there will be in the kingdom of heaven any middle place, or any place anywhere, in which infants may live in blessedness that have died without baptism, deprived of which they cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven, *i.e.*, eternal life, let him be anathema.”

Thus the clause in our Article, that “original sin in every person born into this world deserveth God’s wrath and damnation,” is happily relieved of its apparent harshness, whilst it makes sure that we be preserved intact from the laxity or licence of the opposite error.

2.—ANTIPÆDOBAPTIST OPINION.

The Antipædobaptists reject infant baptism whilst professing to retain the doctrine of original sin, an inconsistency quite contrary to that of the Pelagians.

The logical consequence of antipædobaptism, is of course denial of original sin, since, according to its manner of thinking, there is nothing in the infant of the nature of sin

requiring remission, which is the main end in scripture for which baptism was instituted.

Absence of radical evil in the child would afford a good ground for the neglect of infant baptism, but adherence to the doctrine of original sin to the rejection of the remission which is conveyed in baptism to infants as to others who participate in that rite, is a contradictory position.

The Antipædobaptists assume apparently on the sole ground of their own private judgment, that all who die in infancy, whether children of Christian or heathen parents, will be saved in spite of remission vouchsafed in baptism according to the Lord's ordinance. But such a position can alone consist with absence of original sin or perfect innocence and integrity in the child.

In the opinion of these sectaries, baptism is valid and efficacious only for adults, who repent them of their actual sins and exercise saving faith in the Lord Jesus, though it be hard to see how true belief in the divinity of Christ and the atonement can be really maintained with such slight views of original guilt or practical unbelief of it altogether.

They claim Scriptural authority for their

practice, since (1) baptism undoubtedly has such conditions attached to it; and (2) although regeneration is as undoubtedly associated with baptism in the language of the Apostles, there is no express command of the Lord to baptise infants, nor any clear rule in regard to it set down in any part of the inspired writings.

T. B. Mozley, it is apprehended, concedes far too much to the antipædobaptists on this point. He not only says that "there is no mention made in Scripture of the baptism of infants at all," but that "there is no statement from which the obligation to baptise infants can properly be inferred." *

Now, though there may be no categorical statement, yet it is a first rule of hermeneutic or interpretation, that the commands or other sayings of Christ and his Apostles must be understood in the light of the events and customs of their time and country. The primary question is, what is the only legitimate construction of their words to one placed in the midst of Jewish usages and surroundings? The answer to this question will form the subject of the following sub-section.

* Baptismal Controversy, p. 20.

In regard to the other point, "no mention made in Scripture of infant baptism," what becomes of the fact that at least six households are expressly said to have been baptised by Apostles? Does it not seem utterly incredible that there were no infants or young children in those households?

It will thus be seen, that in the interest of conciliation, Mozley's "formal admission, that infant baptism is not proved in Scripture and is therefore not to be considered a necessary practice," goes further than there is good warrant, although, as he remarks, "we rightly use the liberty which Scripture does not deny of baptising children." He regards infant baptism as wholly "supplementary and additional to Scripture," and a practical adaptation of adult baptism to those of immature years. "Infants and adults stand upon the same ground, one and only one qualification being mentioned in Scripture, namely, that of faith and repentance." *

The claims of Antipædobaptism to patristic or mediæval support are of the slenderest character.

Tertullian, A.D. 200, is cited, though the utmost

* Baptismal Controversy, p. 30.

that he grants is, that baptism may be delayed, where there is no danger or likelihood of death, till the child grow up to years of discretion and have opportunity of instruction in the Christian mysteries. His own words will be given in the sub-section allotted to this department of proof.

Gregory Nazianzen, A.D. 350, is misquoted in the interests of antipædobaptism, as if the expression “those that are not baptised *διὰ νηπιότητα*, by reason of infancy” meant that infancy did incapacitate for baptism, whereas the meaning from the context is “those who have missed of baptism by reason of their infancy.”

Adult baptisms were very frequent in the early centuries, from the fact of numerous converts from heathenism casting in their lot with the Christians. Some had grown up into manhood in neglect of baptism, simply because their parents were heathen. Instances of distinguished Church teachers, as S. Basil, Nectarius, S. Chrysostom, S. Ambrose, S. Jerome, and S. Augustine, and certain Emperors, as, Constantine, Constantius, Valentiman the Second, and Theodosius, who were all baptised when grown up, are cited as if making for the cause of antipædobaptism, in ignorance of the fact that

their parents were not Christian when they were born, nor some of them for long after. But doubtless baptism was frequently also deferred from dread of contracting defilement after having been once cleansed in the water of regeneration.

But it is usual for the antipædobaptists to call in the whole troop of schismatics and heretics of the early centuries to the support of a bad cause, upon very slight ground.

It has been seen already that the Pelagians baptised their infants for inheritance of the kingdom of glory. Other sectaries of those times, such as the Donatists and Arians, were also pædobaptists, *i.e.*, they baptised their own infants, though they insisted on rebaptising those who came over to their party from the Catholics, so much did they try to disparage in the eyes of others the baptism of the Church. They may therefore, as possibly also the Novatians and some others be called *rebaptisati*, if that will in any way suit the purposes of antipædobaptism.

In the dark ages, Hincmar, A.D. 860, Bishop of Laon, for a considerable period excommunicated his clergy, and prevented the administration

of baptism and other offices of the Church in his diocese, from which circumstance the anti-pædobaptists claim him as laying small stress on the necessity of infant baptism. He was remonstrated with, without effect, by his metropolitan, Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, and afterwards condemned at the synod of Attigny, A.D. 870.

Berengar, A.D. 1035, is the next authority relied upon, not because there occurs anything in his writings disparaging or contradictory to infant baptism, but because the low view which he took of the other sacrament as a merely commemorative ordinance, and his strong antipathy to the incipient transubstantiation of his time, led many to surmise that he held similarly low views of baptism ; and there seems to be no doubt that some of his followers, called after him Berengarians, fell into rationalist excesses on this subject.

If the disparaging the institutions of the Church be regarded as any support to anti-pædobaptism, there are a multitude of sects, some of them very obscure, during the dark and middle ages, who fell into strange aberrations, and were not any more opposed to infant baptism

than to the idea of Church baptism in general, *i.e.*, they rejected all water baptism whatever as a religious rite. These sects will presently be referred to under the head of destructive theories.

Some of the more respectable of them, as the Petrobrusians, Henricians, and Albigenses may rightly be regarded as precursors of the antipædobaptists of the present day. It is certain that the Waldenses as a body were pædobaptists, though erroneous and fanatic notions may have at times gained prevalence amongst them. The Lateran Council, A.D. 1139, under Innocent II., condemned Peter of Bruis and Arnold of Brescia, his follower, for rejecting infant baptism.

The Anabaptists of the epoch of the Reformation, whom Luther and other Reformers strove to suppress, amongst other extravagancies, rebaptised those who had already received baptism at Church, from which practice they derived their name.

The Antipædobaptists in England, who since the time that Cromwell patronised and fostered them, have grown into a somewhat influential community, sprang from the scattered and persecuted sect of Dutch Anabaptists, who found

their way into England during the reign of Henry VIII., and for many years after everywhere met with very bitter treatment.

3.—MANICHÆAN AND OTHER DESTRUCTIVE OPINIONS
OF BAPTISM.

It will be necessary to do little more than to enumerate some of those *quasi* Christian sectaries, who entertained absolutely destructive views of water baptism.

The Cainites amongst the Gnostics derided baptism.

The Manichæans said that “baptism in water does nobody any good, neither do they baptise any of the proselytes, whom they delude into their sect.” *

The Cathari, a numerous sect of the twelfth century, who cherished Manichæan views, used to practice what they called a ‘baptism with the Holy Ghost and with fire.’

“In a close room they light candles or torches, as many as can be placed round the walls and everywhere. The company stand in order with great reverence. The person that is to be baptised (*sivi catharizandus* or puritanized) is

* S. Augustine De Heresibus, c. 46.

placed in the midst. The archcatharus, standing by him, with a book used for this purpose, lays the book on his head, and pronounces certain benedictions, the rest praying the while. This is called baptism with fire, because of the lights around, which make the room look almost as if it were on fire." *

The Cathari went by various names in different countries, such as Bulgari, and Gazari (Chazars in the Crimea).

Amongst the sects who, more or less identified in principle with the Cathari, propagated dualistic and pantheistic views, during the dark and middle ages, might be mentioned the Paulicians, the Paterini, the Tisserands or Texerants, the Bogomiles and Beghards. All these scorned water baptism and the other positive ordinances of the Church.

This utterly licentious tendency came to a head toward the end of the twelfth century in the sect of the Holy Spirit, which held the impious doctrine of the incarnation of God in every believer, just as in Christ and no otherwise. This sect was the genuine precursor of the Familists of a later age.

* Eckbertus Schonaugiensis, as in Wall's Baptism, p. 487.

Henry Nicholai, of Amsterdam, A.D. 1580, one of the most distinguished Apostles of the Familists, is selected by Henry More, the most distinguished of the Cambridge platonists, as a fitting representative of the antichristian excesses of the individual spirit, since he made as arrogant pretensions as any to the inner illumination or the mystical deification of the true believer, and claimed that the subjective Christ and his revelations in the inner man should supersede the Christ of history, and the other objective phenomena and appliances of Christianity. It is not to be wondered at that water baptism should be regarded by him with the utmost indifference and contempt.

One regrets to have to place so respectable a sect as the Quakers, as distinguished for charity and good works as for unassuming humility, amongst such a rabble, yet it is well known how much water baptism, as well as other external apostolic institutions of the Church, is disparaged by them.

The Socinian too would have baptism abolished in all communities or nations after the people have been once admitted to Church membership. The children of baptised parents

are born into the covenant and inherit the blessings and privileges thereof. Baptism is therefore henceforth superfluous excepting in the case of new converts from heathendom on their first admission into the Church. The rite once performed on the parents holds good to all after posterity descended from them. The Socinian institute of baptism is thus the perpetuation in a quasi Christian community of the Jewish idea and practice, which is now to be commented on, it is hoped, to sufficient purpose as well as adequate extent.

SUB-SECTION III.

*DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF BAPTISM
IN THE JEWISH CHURCH.*

The subject of proselyte baptism amongst the Jews is a very vexed and difficult one.

Greater proficiency in Rabbinical learning, as well as easier access to Rabbinical writings, seems necessary to the thorough clearing up of this question.

In the obscurity that thus exists, it is not to be wondered at that the most opposite views have been entertained as to the validity or

strength of the testimony which the practice of proselyte baptism furnishes.

But it may be premised, that however confirmatory of the argument for original sin infant proselyte baptism amongst the Jews may be, still were the evidence for it reduced to a mere nothing, our argument does not depend on it, but has ample support in the infant baptism of Apostolic and early patristic usage.

Those who most depreciate the Rabbinical testimony, grant that there exists sufficient evidence of infant proselyte baptism amongst the Jews in the period immediately following the destruction of Jerusalem, and the contrasted views on such ground would appear to resolve themselves into the question 'whether it is more likely that the Jews borrowed the practice from the Christians, or the Christians from the Jews.' Reduced to this shape the question is easy of solution, and all talk of 'reflex action in this matter from the Christian to the Jewish Church' is likely to be satisfactory to the rationalist only, pleased and cozened with every novelty.

A candid view of the testimony, such as it is, will, it is conceived, be sufficiently conclusive.

For who could know better about Jewish usage from the earliest times than the Jews themselves? Surely on the supposition of proselyte baptism being a prevalent and well understood use, it is not more to be wondered at that there are no allusions to it in the earlier Targums than that there are no allusions whatever to the well known rite of circumcision in the Hebrew inspired literature for many hundreds of years together. The matter being generally known, needed therefore no description or definition.

The conservative character of the Eastern mind in regard to religious or other uses is proverbial. The Jew has not been less tenacious of olden customs and traditions than other Orientals. The necessity of explanation of an antique religious use would arise with remoteness of time from its first institution, when probably there might be danger of neglecting or departing from it.

To disparage, for example, the very particular as well as comprehensive testimony of Moses Ben Maimon or Maimonides, A.D. 1160, whom the Jews venerate as a teacher next to their great lawgiver, on the ground of his late age is, it is apprehended, hardly ingenuous, since being

the most learned man that the synagogue has ever produced, and having known all that had ever before been written on the subject by reading and extensive travels, both in Spain where he was born, and in Egypt and Palestine where he spent great part of his life, he was in an exceptionably favourable position to describe accurately what had been the custom of his forefathers on this point from the earliest times down to his own day. He is the mouthpiece of the whole nation in its wide dispersion. He has been called by his countrymen "the glory of the West," "the light of the East," as also "the great eagle." And are we easily to be led to believe that a whole nation of pre-eminently conservative character has all along been deceived as to its primitive and cherished usages in baptism? For previously to his time did not both the Jerusalem Gemara, A.D. 300, and the Babylonian Gemara, A.D. 400, the two received commentaries of unequal authority indeed, on the Mishna, A.D. 200, an authoritative digest of oral law and traditions, which were considered by the Jews to furnish perfect explanations of the whole law, give forth a consentient and uniform testimony? Further, have not the other Jewish

Rabbis, who have ever spoken before or since the time of "the doctor" Maimonides, so far as known, agreed together? Besides there is patristic evidence of weight which will be presently adduced.

The Jewish writers, who are thus consentient in their testimony, carry back the institution of proselyte baptism to a very remote antiquity, and find Scriptural authority for it.

Aben Ezra interprets Gen. xxxv., 2, of baptism. Jacob was on the eve of going to Bethel to erect an altar on the spot where God had before appeared to him, when he gave command to his household and to all that were with him, "Put away the strange gods that are among you, and cleanse ye yourselves, and wash your garments," baptism or washing being in its nature a most fitting symbol of moral purification.

There is general agreement amongst Jewish authors* that Moses, Ex. xix., 10, intends baptism, when he consecrates or sanctifies the people, previous to their entering anew into covenant with Jehovah at Mount Sinai. "Jehovah said to Moses, Go thou to the people, and do thou

* Selden "De Synedriis" quotes Mechilta, Nachmanid, R. Bichai, Moses Mickvash, etc.

make them holy (*lit.* cause them to be clean or pure) to-day and to-morrow, and they shall wash their garments."

It has thus become a fixed tenet of Jewish belief that their fathers by this ceremony of washing or sanctification of themselves at Sinai, entered into covenant with God. Baptism has thus come to be ranked co-ordinate with circumcision as an initiatory rite, necessary to the first admission of converts, but, once performed holding good of all those afterwards born in the covenant of these converts.

Does not this Jewish understanding and interpretation of that particular passage throw light into S. Paul's proposition, "All the fathers were baptised unto Moses," which otherwise would remain obscure?

The early church fathers, who had peculiar interest and opportunities of knowing Jewish customs, speak of this Jewish baptism.

S. Gregory Nazianzen says "Moses gave a baptism, but that was with water only. And before that they were baptised in the cloud and in the sea. But these were but a type or figure of ours." *

Similarly S. Cyprian remarks "The Jews had already and a long time ago the baptism of the law and of Moses, and were now to be baptised in the name of Jesus Christ." * S. Basil has similar allusions to this initiatory rite of baptism amongst the Jews.

Tertullian in reference to certain old heathen rites of baptism in the worship of Apollo and Ceres, which they pretended to be for regeneration and forgiveness of sins, says "Here we see the aim of the Devil to ape or imitate the things of God; since he also sets up a baptism for his disciples." † He means of course the imitation of Jewish baptism which was contemporary with that old cultus of heathen divinities.

The Jews of our Lord's day expected baptism to be the initiatory rite of the new covenant, just as it had been of the old. They were to be baptised unto the Messiah as they had already been unto Moses. No one else had a right to make pretensions to baptism. Accordingly they remonstrated with John Baptism, 'Why baptisest thou then if thou be not the Christ nor the Elias who was to be associated with him at his advent?'

* Epistola 73, ad Jubaianum.

† De Baptismo, c. v. 55.

“By three things,” says Maimonides, “did Israel enter into covenant, (1) by circumcision, (2) by baptism, and (3) by sacrifice. Circumcision was in Egypt, as it is written ‘No uncircumcised person shall eat thereof.’ Baptism was in the wilderness just before the giving of the law, as it is written, ‘Sanctify them to-day and to-morrow, and let them wash their clothes.’ And sacrifice, as it is said ‘And he sent young men of the children of Israel which offered burnt offerings.’”*

Leo Modena gives this account of a proselyte’s admission into covenant, “They take and circumcise him; and as soon as he is well of his sore, he is to wash himself all over in water: and this is to be done in the presence of the three Rabbins . . . And so from henceforth he becomes a natural Jew.”†

Having established the position that Israel entered into covenant by baptism as well as by circumcision, the application of the rite to the case of proselytes found Scriptural authority in such passages as Num. xv. 15., where Moses orders thus, “One ordinance shall be both for

* Maimonides Issuri Bia, c. 13, 14.

† History of the Rites, etc., of the Jews, Part V., c. 2.

you of the congregation and also for the stranger (or proselyte) that sojourneth with you : an ordinance for ever in your generations. As ye are, so shall the stranger be before the Lord. One law and one manner shall be for you and the stranger."

Accordingly the Talmud in speaking of Jethro, Moses' father-in-law, says, "He was made a proselyte by circumcision and immersion in water."*

"And so in all ages," remarks Maimonides, "when an ethnic is willing to enter into the covenant, and gather himself under the wings of the majesty of God, and take upon him the yoke of the law, he must be circumcised and baptised and bring a sacrifice ; or if it be a woman be baptised and bring a sacrifice."†

Infants and children were baptised as well as adults, just as they had been a few days previously circumcised, at the parents' desire or else that of his teachers and guardians. The child's consent to be cleansed by this baptism or washing from the unclean and accursed estate in which he was born, was not looked for, as it was not possible from immaturity, but the rite

* Talmud Tract Repudii.

† Issuri Bia, c. 13, 14.

was performed on him simply because beyond reach of doubt or controversy it was for his good. "If with a proselyte his sons and his daughters be made proselytes, that which is done by their father redounds to their good."

"The Jerusalem Mishna says that if a girl of heathen parents, be made a proselyte, after she be three years and a day old, then she is not to have such and such privileges there mentioned."

"The Babylonian Mishna says, that if she be made a proselyte before that age, she shall have the said privileges." *

Both editions of the Mishna therefore agree that a child of ever so little age might by their custom be made a proselyte.

Where the child had lost father and mother, as for example, exposed infants or captives in war, the three witnesses who acted as his teachers, became sponsors or god-parents. "They are wont," as is read in the Gemara, "to baptise such a proselyte on the profession of the house of judgment, *i.e.*, the three who have the care of his baptism, according to the law of the proselyte, who so become to him as a father. For this is for his good." †

* Selden de Synedriis. lib. i. c. 7.

† Selden *ibid.*

The children of proselytes after baptism, being born within the covenant, were not baptised. They were like the children of Jewish parents in that respect. The ceremony was only thought necessary at the first admission of the parent, and was understood to stand good for all those born of him in after generations, but those born before his baptism had to be baptised.

A multitude of other testimonies to the same effect might be cited.

But what is most of all to the point of our argument is that this Jewish baptism of proselyte infants or children as well as adults, is called a 'new birth' or 'regeneration.' This is a very common phrase for it in Jewish writers.

"If any one becomes a proselyte, he is like a child new born." *

"He receives the Holy Spirit." †

Maimonides in his "*Issuri Bia*" repeats the same thing.

"The other Rabbis," says Wall, "do much enlarge on this privilege of a proselyte's being put into a new state, and putting off all his former relations; those that were akin to him

* Gemara, tit. Javamoth, c. iv., f. 52, 1.

† Ibid. 92, 1.

before are now no longer so ; but he is just as if he were born of a new mother, as the Talmud often expresses it . . . The Christians did in all ancient times continue the use of this name for baptism, so as that they never use the word 'regeneration' or 'born again' but that they mean or connote by it baptism." *

An interesting parallel between the Jewish and Christian baptisms, may be easily drawn out at leisure. A few suggestions are subjoined.

1. The Jewish stipulation to 'keep the covenant and renounce idolatry' answers to the Christian renunciation and vows of faith and obedience.

2. The interrogatories as to profession of faith, whether to the proselyte as he stood in the water, or to the three grave persons who acted as god-parents, are similar to the questions put to adult Christians or to sponsors in behalf of infants to be baptised.

3. As the Jews pronounced such proselytes to be transferred from an unclean state into a state of sanctity or holiness, so the epithets 'saint,' 'holy,' 'sanctified,' were thought proper to all baptised Christians.

* History of Infant Baptism, p. 19.

The term 'regeneration,' or 'new birth,' whatever particular meaning may be denoted by it, was used both of Jewish and Christian baptism.

The change of state or relation, which was effected in baptism, had as its normal result entire change of nature or thorough sanctification. 'Regeneration' is perhaps wide enough to cover both meanings.

There are a multitude of minor though very curious resemblances which do not have a direct bearing on the argument in hand.

The sum of the proof adduced, which may be deemed sufficient is (1) that in regard to their own nation, baptism was considered a rite necessary once for all to the initiation into covenant of their whole people, infants as well as adults; that (2) in regard to proselytes of whatever age, how young soever, it was none the less necessary at their first initiation into the sacred mysteries of the Jewish religion in order to regeneration or sanctification from their Gentile state; that therefore (3) since regeneration implies remission of sin, and a child new born or a few days old could have no actual sin, he must be heir by inheritance of an original or hereditary corruption inevitably transmitted,

according to Jewish theology, by natural birth from one generation to another ; of which regeneration or moral cleansing from radical evil, baptism was the most fitting and divinely appointed symbol or sign amongst them as amongst us.

SUB-SECTION IV.

*THE DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF BAPTISM AS
TAUGHT IN THE NEW TESTAMENT SCRIPTURES.*

That the New Testament Scriptures, interpreted in the light of existing Jewish uses, are sufficiently replete with proof of infant baptism ; and that one main object of this baptism is the remission of sin, original as well as actual, according to Scripture, are the points now before the reader. It will however be necessary in the first place to indicate the various positions of the different classes of interpreters, each of whom see their own views clearly reflected in, or corroborated by Scripture.

I.

First then it is to be distinctly understood that there is no question of the general connection of regeneration with baptism in the

language of Scripture. The Antipædobaptists grant that the connection is undoubted.

In the second place, there is to be quite as clear an understanding that no question is made of the necessity of baptism, except on the part of Quakers and others with whom we have nothing to do at present, those, namely, who put up with nothing short of 'Spirit baptism,' and some of whom in their ecstatic frenzies regard water baptism as an ordinance of the Devil.

The question now in hand is not of the necessity of baptism but of the extension or limitation of its efficacy. The Antipædobaptists limit that efficacy to adults, who in their opinion are alone able to be qualified for the reception of the grace conveyed in it.

That baptism is necessary to adults, and that regeneration is always associated with baptism in scripture language, are two matters therefore of which the Antipædobaptists make no question.

The matter of dispute with them is, 'Whether infants may not have in them certain definite qualifications for baptism?' Just as of adults, there is required explicit faith and repentance as conditions of efficacy of the rite, so the question is, may there not be in infants some

other qualifying disposition as innocence of actual transgression, which entitles them to the privileges and blessings of the ordinance? It is certain (1) that an infant has no actual sin to repent of, and (2) that from immaturity he cannot have the other condition of the antipædobaptist, namely, explicit faith.

Now supposing that the infant cannot have any other qualifications for baptism than the two specified, and it is certain that, in the nature of the case, he cannot have these, may he still not be baptised *conditionally* on the understanding, that, when he comes of age, he is bound to those conditions, and that the efficacy of the sacrament depends on their fulfilment? That is the question apparently which the antipædobaptist has most seriously to consider. The mere bringing the infant to the font by way of presenting him to God and dedicating him to his service, with full consciousness of the conditions of faith and repentance and other obligations to holiness, to which the baptised infant when grown up is bound, and with confiding trust on the fatherly love and infinite mercy of the Almighty for Christ's sake, is a practice so devout and commendable in itself,

that, were there no original sin to be remitted in the child, might have endeared the traditional practice of the Church to every Christian heart. But the fact of original sin in the merest infant makes baptism absolutely imperative where it can be had, since remission, as will be evinced from Scripture, is one main object of its institution at all.

The precise point of difference with the antipædobaptist having been stated, the other lesser differences of opinion amongst those who accept infant baptism for the remission of sin fall to be indicated.

First it must be premised that all are agreed that remission of sin is an essential part of baptismal regeneration.

And in the first place what is the qualification of the infant? Is it the infantile condition and freedom from actual sin? Or is it the prevenient grace of God, vouchsafed to every son of man born into the world, for Christ's sake, if he will avail himself of it?

In the second place there is the ambiguity attaching to the word regeneration, which has occasioned an untold amount of misunderstanding and angry controversy.

There are two great schools: the one takes regeneration in its primary sense of actual goodness and affirms with the schoolmen that a habit of piety and virtue is infused in the infant at baptism: the other speaks of a potentiality or capacity as being implanted, a mere germ of grace which contains, however, the manifold possibilities of a thoroughly matured goodness in after life, if carefully cultivated. Regeneration in the one case consists in an actual infusion of goodness or holy habits of soul: in the other, an undoubted implantation of a latent and seminal root of holy and virtuous character constitutes the regeneration of baptism.

Two things have to be distinguished in order to clear conceptions of the subject. The more outward or objective change of condition or relation, which baptism effects, namely, the bringing the baptised infant into covenant with God and sealing him with the mark of election, is something altogether different from the more inward change of nature, or renewed frame of disposition and character, the subjective moral transformation which is the normal result of grace, where the conditions are complied with. The former is frequently called the baptismal

‘character’ or stamp, from the fact of this initiatory sacrament being the seal of God upon us that we are his children. The latter is not unusually called regeneration proper.

Waterland and Bethell are amongst those Anglican divines who were formerly regarded as the most skilled expounders of correct views on this subject, and who used the word regeneration in its technical sense as a synonym for baptism, the outward visible sign being identified with the thing signified. Baptismal regeneration was simply equivalent to the rite of initiation into the covenant of grace or the relation of sons to God. It conveyed to the baptised infant or adult forgiveness of sin and the gift of the Holy Ghost. The latent germ or potentiality of all virtue and goodness was thereby conferred.

These divines distinguished between (1) regeneration in baptism, which they maintained to be, an objective work of the Spirit and which perhaps is more correctly styled the baptismal ‘character’ by the other school of Anglicans, and (2) renovation of the whole nature and disposition which was normally consequent, and which implied the active co-operation of the will of the baptised in the formation of habits of goodness

by repeated acts and careful culture. This subjective process of renovation, which sometime is called conversion, is very much what the other school mean by regeneration proper.

Regeneration, as associated with baptism in Holy Scripture, being thus comprehensive or ambiguous, *i.e.*, capable of signifying both the outward or objective change and initiation into covenant as well as the inward or subjective transformation of character and disposition, the one change standing toward the other very much in the relation of cause to effect, it will appear that the bulk of warm and elaborate controversy over it has been for the most part idle logomachy. The very idea of infusion of habits of holiness in the child, which received well defined shape in the scholastic age, so detested and held up to scorn by certain heated sectaries, is perceived after all not to be so far from the truth, since the holy habit of the scholastic is simply the baptismal 'character' of the Anglican, which holy habit may afterwards be developed or not developed according to the bent of will or want of will in the baptised person.

Returning again to the point at issue with the antipædobaptist, if we go so far as Mozley

and his school in conceding to them that infant baptism is a doctrine additional and supplementary to Scripture, they must on their part grant that the prohibition of infant baptism is equally additional and supplementary, since neither the one position nor the other finds logical statement in any of the inspired writings.

But now let us see how in fact it falls out, since we are bound to interpret Scripture, as we would do any ancient book, according to the existing usages of the time and country, when and where written as well as the peculiar forms of thought and language which have contributed so powerfully to mould the character of the Hebrew people. We cannot interpret otherwise unless we set at nought or infringe the first rule of all accurate hermeneutic.

2.

It is objected by the antipædobaptist (1) that in the parting command of the Saviour to his disciples, "Go ye unto all the world and make disciples of" which is equivalent to the phrase "proselytize" then in common use, "all nations, baptising them, etc.," there is no special mention of infants or injunction to infant baptism. It is

replied, that if a special injunction had been needed, it would have been the contrary way, namely, that no infants henceforth be baptised, seeing that infant proselyte baptism had been the use from time immemorial down to gospel days. The deviation from usual custom alone demanded specification.

It is objected (2) that there is no distinct case of infant baptism in the New Testament. But will the antipædobaptist kindly bring forward a single case of a neophyte whose baptism was postponed by the Apostles or Evangelists, until he came to more mature age or greater ripeness of understanding?

Is not the silence of the New Testament Scriptures as to infant baptism altogether analogous to the silence of the Old Testament for many centuries together in regard to circumcision, both institutions being familiar and well known? Was it not precisely one of those things that are implied or taken for granted?

But are the antipædobaptists quite sure that there were not both infants and children of immature years in those half-dozen households mentioned in scripture as having been baptised?

Take the case of John Baptist. From what Scripture says, it is plain that the Jews of that time expected the Messiah and Elias who was to accompany or precede him, to baptise. "Why baptisest thou then if thou be not the Christ nor Elias?" Baptism was to be the rite of inauguration of the whole people into the new covenant just as it had been of old, and as it was then to proselytes. They were therefore surprised at John baptising in any other capacity.

Now how would a Jew of that time naturally have interpreted the words, if some one had brought the tidings, that "multitudes flocked to John's preaching and were baptised of him in Jordan, confessing their sins"? Why the thought of 'regeneration' or 'new birth,' according to his theology, would be at once suggested, and the case of infants with their sponsors or witnesses would be called up. John would be put down as a zealous proselytizer, successful in making converts to his religion, admitting the most immature children, together with their parents or guardians, into his communion as matter of course.

The case is much the same as if a missionary went forth from our own communion to convert

a community of heathen, and tidings of his success were sent home to us in similar general terms, namely, that large numbers were savingly impressed with his teaching and were baptised. Should we for a moment doubt that infants and other tender children were amongst that number?

As to the necessity of regeneration, where it may be had, when the infantine intelligence is incapable of faith and has no actual sins to repent of, can the antipædobaptist doubt that the proposition of the Saviour (John iii., 5) holds good, being of a universal or unlimited character? "Except any one (*τις*) be born again of the water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven."

The Saviour expresses great surprise in this narrative that Nicodemus, a master in Israel, should not know of those deep things of regeneration and new birth, which, as associated with proselyte baptism, were so familiar to the Jewish mind.

To those who on the first Whit Sunday of the Christian Church were sorely pricked in their hearts on hearing S. Peter's speech and were saying to him and to the rest of the Apostles, "Men and brethren what shall we

do?" The answer is as articulate and categorical as possible of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. "Repent and be baptised every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost."

That salvation is annexed to baptism, we have S. Paul's word, Titus iii., 5. "According to his mercy he saved us by the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Ghost."

This text forms the main ground for the distinction between regeneration and renovation, which D. Waterland and Bishop Bethell elaborate with great ingenuity, and make a main prop of their special views of baptismal regeneration.

When S. Peter asserts, "The like figure whereunto baptism does even now save us," can anyone doubt of its unlimited saving efficacy, to infants as to those grown up?

S. Paul's conversion is a case in point. Although he exercised both faith and repentance, and had betaken himself to prayer, he was not saved until he had done what Ananias had said to him, "Arise and be baptised and wash away thy sins."

S. Paul says "All were baptised unto Moses," infants and little children inclusive. The proposition, like the others, is universal. The antipædobaptist would require a particular proposition "some," "few," "many," not "all."

The Catechism description of baptism as a "death unto sin and a life unto righteousness," is taken from S. Paul and has the same unlimited signification. "Therefore we are buried with him by baptism unto death, etc."

When baptism is called "the circumcision made without hands," the reference to infants is direct. If circumcision under the olden economy was necessary to initiation of infants as of others unto the covenant and the "putting off the sins of the flesh," or remission, baptism must be as necessary for these purposes under the new dispensation.

The word sanctification or making holy, from the time of the consecration of assembled Israel by baptism at Sinai previous to the solemn ratification of the covenant, had been associated in the Jewish mind with 'regeneration' or sacramental purification. The same meaning of separation from the world and dedication to God's service is suggested by the epithets

“saints,” “holy,” “sanctified,” applied to the promiscuous Christian assemblies of the Apostolic age, inclusive of infants and all other baptised persons. “Such were some of you,” says S. Paul, “but you have been washed, but you have been sanctified, but you have been justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God.”—I. Cor. vi. 11. This is such a description as to a Jewish mind, with its peculiar associations on the subject, would be graphically descriptive of the change of relation or condition effected by baptism.

SUB-SECTION V.

*DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF INFANT BAPTISM
IN THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH.
UNIFORM TESTIMONY OF THE FATHERS.*

In this sub-section Wall's admirable “History of Infant Baptism” will be closely followed. It is perfectly learned in this branch of proof, as well as trustworthy. Its author devoted a great part of a long life to its elaboration. The original quotations are given side by side with the translation. The translation with reference to source will suffice for our purpose, and from the limits of our design we must be content with

but a few out of a very large number of passages all equally pertinent and decided, at least after the time of S. Irenæus, A.D. 167, as to the practice of baptism of infants for remission of sin and regeneration in the primitive Church.

Before S. Irenæus, there is no special mention of infants being regenerated by baptism. The evidence therefore previous to his day is of the following sort.

S. Clement, the third bishop of Rome, who is called by Eusebius a fellow labourer and fellow soldier with S. Paul, speaks of original sin as affecting infants. "Again, of Job it is thus written, that he was just and blameless, true, one that feared God and eschewed evil. Yet he condemns himself, and says, no one is pure from pollution though his life be but of the length of one day." *

Hermas, also usually regarded as a contemporary of the Apostles, speaks of baptism in his favorite allegorical and mystical manner. "Why is the tower built on the water? She answered, I said before that you were wise to enquire diligently concerning the building; therefore you shall know the truth. Hear then why the

* Epist. I., ad Corinthios, xvii.

tower is built on the waters : because your life is saved and shall be saved by water." *

Justin Martyr, A.D. 140, speaks of baptism as being to Christians instead of circumcision. "We also who by him have had access to God, have not received this carnal circumcision, but the spiritual circumcision, which Enoch and those like him observed. And we have received it by baptism, through the mercy of God, because we were sinners ; and it is allowed to all persons to receive it by the same way."† S. Cyprian concurs with him in calling baptism 'Spiritual circumcision.' S. Basil, S. Chrysostom, and S. Augustine, adopting the language of the Apostle, call it 'the circumcision made without hands.'

S. Irenæus, A.D. 167, born about the time of S. John's death and probably of Christian parents, uses particularly the word regenerate for baptise, and mentions infants as being regenerated. "He, the Master, came to save all persons by himself : all, I mean, who by him are regenerated (*renascuntur*) *i.e.*, baptised unto God ; infants and little ones, children and youths," etc. ‡

* Pastor. lib. i., visio 3, c. 3.

† Dialog. cum Trypho : sec. 43.

‡ Adv. Hæreses, lib. ii., c. 39.

Origen, A.D. 210, expressly affirms that the baptism of infants was ordered by the Apostles and practised from their time downward. Both his father and grandfather being Christians, his testimony is undeniably of great weight. "The Church had from the Apostles a tradition to give baptism even to infants. For they to whom the divine mysteries were committed, knew that there is in all persons the natural pollution of sin, which must be done away by water and the Spirit." *

Clemens Alexandrinus, A.D. 192, who preceded Origen, speaking of the rings then usually worn on the fingers and the seals engraven on them, remarks "if any one be by trade a fisherman he will do well to think of an Apostle and the children taken out of the water," plainly intimating infant baptism. A fish, a dove, a ship under sail, a harp, or an anchor, were some of the figures then current. S. Ambrose and S. Augustine are quite as explicit as Origen in regard to the Apostolic use of baptising infants.

Tertullian, A.D. 200, who, because in one place he advises delay, is cited by the Antipædobaptists as a great authority for their practice, yet at the

* Comment, in Epist. ad Romanos, lib. v., c. 9.

same place speaks of infant baptism as a use customarily received. "They whose duty it is to administer baptism, are to know that it must not be given rashly. . . . Therefore according to every one's condition and disposition, and also their age, the delaying of baptism is more profitable, especially in the case of little children. . . . Our Lord says indeed, 'Do not forbid them to come to me.' Therefore let them come when they are grown up ; let them come when they understand ; when they are instructed whither it is that they come ; let them be made Christians when they can know Christ," etc. *

But in a previous part of the same passage that Father uses the strongest possible language of the necessity of baptism in order to the receiving salvation at all. "I will here give an answer to those men who deny the Apostles to have been baptised. For if they received only the baptism of John as of a man, and had not that of our Lord, inasmuch as our Lord himself had determined that there is to be but one baptism, saying to Peter when he desired to be washed, "He that has been once washed, has no need again." . . . Here again these impious men

* De Baptismo, c. 18.

raise cavils and say, baptism is not necessary for those that have faith, which is sufficient. . . . But in all matters the later injunctions bind, and the following rules take place of those that were before. Though there were salvation formerly by bare faith before our Lord's passion and resurrection ; yet when the faith is enlarged to believe in his nativity, passion and resurrection, there is an enlargement of the sacrament, the sealing of baptism, as it were a garment to our faith ; which formerly was bare, but cannot now be without its law, for the law of baptising is given, and the form of it appointed. "Go," says he, "teach the nations, baptising them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." And when to this law that rule is added, "Except one be regenerated of water and of the Spirit he shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," it has bound up faith to a necessity of baptism. *

A passage from his treatise "*De Anima*" will appear decisive. "The children of the faithful are designed for holiness, and so for salvation. . . . The Apostle knew well enough what our Lord had determined "Except

any one be born of water and the spirit," etc., he shall not be holy. Thus every soul is reckoned as in Adam, so long till it be new enrolled in Christ, and so long unclean, till it be so enrolled, and sinful because unclean."* The passage, I. Cor. vii. 14, "Else were your children unclean but now are they holy," or sanctified, is also interpreted of baptism by S. Jerome, S. Paulinus, S. Augustine, the term "holy" or "saints" or "sanctified" being held equivalent to "baptised."

A decision of S. Cyprian, A.D. 250, and sixty-six other bishops in Council, determined, "It is not for us to hinder any person from baptism and the grace of God. . . . which rule as it holds for all, so we think it more especially to be observed in reference to infants or persons newly born."†

Speaking of those who went to the capitol or idol temple, S. Cyprian says "There were also a great many who thought it not enough to procure their own damnation. . . . but that nothing might be wanting to the measure of their wickedness, their little infants being led or brought in their parents' arms lost or forfeited

* De Anima, c. 39.

† Epist. 66.

that gift or grace which they had obtained presently after they were born." *

After the time of Cyprian the testimony to the practice of infant baptism is as overwhelming as it is uniform. It is unnecessary to quote S. Gregory Nazianzen, S. Basil, S. Chrysostom, S. Ambrose, S. Jerome and the others.

Wall thus sums up the testimony of S. Augustine. "He mentions infant baptism among the things that have not been instituted by any council, but have been ever in use. And says 'the whole Church of Christ has constantly held that infants are baptised for forgiveness of sin.' And, that 'he never read or heard of any Christian, catholic or sectary, who held otherwise.' And expressly says, 'That no Christian man of any sort (*nullus Christianorum*) ever denied it to be useful or necessary.' " †

The salvation of unbaptised martyrs was a received opinion of the early church, with one or two references to which this division of proof may be concluded. "We have also," says Tertullian, "another baptism, namely, that of blood. This is a baptism which will either

* *Liber de Lapsis*, p. 183.

† *History of Infant Baptism*, vol. i., p. 641.

supply the place of water baptism to one who has not received it, or will restore it to one that has lost it." * Both S. Cyril † and S. Fulgentius ‡ in laying down the position that "if one do not receive the seal of water, he cannot enter the kingdom of heaven," except martyrs, "Exceptis iis, qui pro Christi nomine suo sanguine baptis-antur." S. Augustine and other Fathers give similar testimony.

SUB-SECTION VI.

*DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE OF INFANT BAPTISM
IN THE ANGLICAN CHURCH.*

There are two great schools in the Church of England, whose views on the subject of the regeneration annexed to baptism are widely at variance.

The point of difference of course is, whether baptismal regeneration is conditional or unconditional? Are all baptised infants and others regenerated, or only the elect, *i.e.*, those who conform to the conditions upon which the blessings of the sacrament are dependent.

The one party is persuaded that it occupies

* De Baptismo, c. 16. † Catech. 3. ‡ De Fide ad Petrum, c. 30.

the Catholic position, and has the consensus of the early Church in its support. The long chain of patristic testimony is thought to be conclusive as to the unconditional character of regeneration of infants in baptism.

This party is also persuaded that its opinions are conformable to what is taught in the Articles and other dogmatic statements in its standards of belief, as well as borne out by the strong and unequivocal language of the baptism offices of the Church.

Thus in the Article before us the word "renatis" in the Latin Article of 1571, which means regenerated, is translated "baptised" in the English Article of 1563.

There can be no doubt that the Latin translators here regarded regeneration as a synonym for baptism.

A clause in the fifteenth Article would also appear to indicate the equivalence of regeneration and baptism, "All we the rest, although baptised and born again in Christ."

The twenty-seventh Article "Of Baptism" seems to some to lean to the other side, since it speaks of those "that receive baptism rightly" as alone partakers of the benefits of the covenant.

Baptism is defined in a general way as “a sign of regeneration or new birth.”

The declaration at the end of the office for “Public Baptism of Infants,” is more pertinent and quite authoritative, “It is certain by God’s Word, that children which are baptised dying before they commit actual sin, are undoubtedly saved.” But it is contended in the interest of the other party that there is nothing in this statement which cannot be accepted, either by a Calvinist who regards the death of an infant after Baptism before he commit actual sin as a mark of his election, or by others who hold to the opinion of the salvation of all infants whatever on the ground of the divine goodness and mercy.

The main strength of position of the party who maintain that all infants baptised are unconditionally regenerate, lies in the literal statements throughout the baptismal offices as well as in the unanimity of patristic testimony.

The proposition “seeing now that this child is regenerate” might of itself be conclusive on this side of the question, since it is pronounced over every baptised infant, not to speak of numerous similarly decisive affirmations throughout the service.

All such declarations or implications of the regeneration of all baptised infants in the Church offices are admitted by the other party inasmuch as they are quite in accordance with the principle of charitable construction on which all devotional services are based, and can accordingly be explained quite consistently with the theory of conditional baptismal regeneration.

Whilst thus (1) primitive and uniform testimony, (2) some expressions in the Articles, as the equivalence of “renatis” to “baptised,” in our present Article, and (3) the literal language of the Church offices of baptism, would appear to give conclusive support to the unconditional view ; the other construction has so much reason in it as not merely to be tolerated, but to receive the sanction of most learned and skilled judges in ecclesiastical matters. Thus the Gorham judgment would appear to make the validity of the conditional view quite manifest and beyond doubt.

The question is not at all of baptismal regeneration, but of those who are the recipients of it. The Gorham judgment professes to make clear the wide and comprehensive basis of the Church, the Articles defining baptism, in a broad

general manner, and the devotional services all through, not merely in the baptismal offices, breathing a spirit of essential charity and contemplating an ideal rather than an actual case. Thus when the congregation in the daily public prayer confess together contrition for sins past, and trust in God's mercy, 'O Lord in thee have I trusted,' the words imply what ought to be, not actually what is the inward frame of the worshipper.

The large body of Calvinists may from this view of the frequent use of language, literal in form but hypothetical in meaning, which enters into the devotional offices of the Church, quite consistently and conscientiously retain their place in its bosom and have the satisfaction of feeling that their views have been contemplated in the construction of its doctrinal symbols and indeed enter fundamentally into the plan of its constitution.

The statement of opinion decided by the Gorham judgment, not to be contrary to the doctrine of the Church of England, is as follows : "That baptism is a sacrament generally necessary to salvation, but that the grace of regeneration does not so necessarily accompany the act of

baptism that regeneration invariably takes place ; that the grace may be granted before, in, or after baptism ; that baptism is an effectual sign of grace by which God works invisibly in us, but only in such as worthily receive it, in whom alone it has a wholesome effect ; and that without reference to the qualification of the recipient it is not in itself an effectual sign of grace ; that infants baptised and dying before actual sin are undoubtedly saved, but that in no case is baptism unconditional.” *

The name “*obsignatory*” has been given to the Calvinistic or other view that prevenient grace or other qualification, as seminal faith, may precede baptism and may ensure the salvation of which that rite is the sign or seal. The breadth of Catholic sentiment can comprehend this view as not inconsistent with the principle of charitable construction, though it is evident that in such matters we get beyond our line into a region of incomprehensible mystery.

Rather than lose ourselves in metaphysical questions of this character, it appears indefinitely better to adhere to the sober practical way of thinking of the Church in regard to this solemn sacrament, as set forth in its offices.

* Mozley's Baptismal Controversy, p. 227.

SECTION IV.

*CONTRASTED VIEWS OF THE UNIVERSAL
SINFULNESS.*

There is no one perfectly insensible of the moral powerlessness or radical evil of human nature, whatever varied construction thoughtful men have been pleased to put upon it. Differences of opinion of contrasted character very often have their origin in the variety of temperament, the gentleness or severity of natural disposition, the maxims or sentiments imbibed in education, or the extent of men's experience or knowledge of the world. There are three main views of the value of life, to which very significant names have been assigned, according to the particular construction put upon the existence and function of moral evil in the social economy. 1. Optimism is the outcome of a happy and hopeful temperament : 2. Pessimism is the natural product of a morose and desponding disposition : whilst (3) the Meliorism of the positive philosophy is an attempt to construct afresh under modern auspices a theory of happiness on an old heathen standpoint, by way of absolute negation of the Christian ideas of sin

and of redemption, whilst the other supernatural verities of religion are also ignored.

SUB-SECTION I.

THEORIES OF OPTIMISM.

The popular and instinctive forms of optimism precede the reflective and reasoned theories.

There are many people in ordinary life whose dispositions are habitually bright and cheerful. A spirit of love brings with it an inner content and serenity, whilst it is diffusive of joy and gladness around.

There are bright intermittent periods in the life of others, when sunshine lightens their path, success crowns their efforts, and the future lies before them invested with the rainbow colours of hope. At such times men are optimist in sentiment.

It is perhaps rare to find a man, who does not, like Shakespeare, feel disposed at such happy passages of his experience, to perceive and realize 'good in everything.' The very stones and flowing brooks breathe a spirit of quiet peacefulness, and are suggestive of sage lessons. These sunny spots occur even in the life of

persons whose prevailing temper is dull and melancholy, who usually pass their time under troublous cloud.

A great part of poetry is redolent with this impulsive popular optimism. The inspired psalmist sang with the exuberance of joyfulness, "The earth is full of the goodness of the Lord." "The year is crowned with goodness." "Goodness and mercy shall follow me all the days of my life, and I will dwell in the house of the Lord for ever." And similarly throughout Scripture, the national religion of the Hebrews, which developed into the brighter Christian economy, was predominantly hopeful and full of brilliant promise.

There is a sparkling and joyous element in the Homeric poems, and in the imaginative and radiant cultus of nature in old Greece, which presents human nature, in the absence of the peculiar blessings of revelation, under some of its most pleasing aspects. A similarly genial and appreciative spirit breathes through the *Æneid* of Virgil.

Keats and Wordsworth amongst modern English poets are considered two of the best exponents of instinctive or popular optimism.

To the latter suffering is replete with blessing. "If life were slumber on a bed of down, toil unimposed, vicissitude unknown, sad were our lot."

Optimist views are entertained by thoughtful men of the most different persuasions.

The Pelagian, who thinks that the suffering and death incident to our frail humanity, is not a punishment of sin but a token of the Father's love by way of drawing man's heart from what is perishable or transitory and fixing it upon the eternal and immutable realities of the spiritual world, may be rightly regarded as an optimist.

The Deist of last century as well as the typical apologetic theologian, his contemporary, was an optimist. Pope is well known as one of the happiest expounders of deistic optimism. At the conclusion of the first epistle of his "Essay on Man," you have the sum and substance of optimist argument as expounded by the elegant pen of a Shaftesbury or a Bolingbroke. 'Our proper bliss depends on what we blame. . . . All chance is wise direction which we cannot see. All discord is harmony not understood. All partial evil is universal good. In spite of pride, in erring reason's spite, one truth is clear, whatever is, is right.'

The philosophy of Leibnitz used to be regarded as the most perfectly systematised form of optimism. Every one is familiar with his theory of the 'best world.' Of all possible worlds, which the divine mind could represent to itself in the depths of the past eternity, the present, in which sin entered as a determining and moulding factor was the best. And yet God is not to be regarded as willing sin, though he permit it as a moment of progress in the history of the race. The divine understanding perceives it; the divine wisdom recognises it as an indispensable factor of the best world; and yet the divine will does not ordain or cause it. There is thus a distinction between the permissive and creative will of Deity, and a dualism between the divine intelligence and will. The contradiction thus involved can hardly be obviated by making sin a mere accident of the finiteness of the creature, and thus resolving moral into metaphysical evil, to which no blame can attach from a divine point of view. To God as the *causa deficiens* evil would still be attributable.

Schleiermacher who resolves sin into the relative weakness of the 'God consciousness'

in humanity and the unequal or overgrown strength of the sensuous consciousness, attributes this arrangement to the divine ordainment in order that the matured strength or perfection of the 'God consciousness' in Christ might be manifested as redemption. Thus between the old sinning humanity in Adam and the redeemed humanity in Christ, there is only a difference of degree of manifestation of the higher spiritual principle, not a difference of kind. The absolute causality of God is a leading idea in the theory of Schleiermacher to which the sense of absolute dependence answers on the part of man ; creaturely causality, however true as a subjective feeling, having no reality from a divine standpoint.

The full blown calvinistic optimism finds most appropriate expression in the devout exclamation, "*Ofelix culpa Adami quæ talem et tantum Redemptorem habere meruit;*" or perhaps S. Paul's proposition, may be thought to countenance that view, "God hath concluded all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all," sin being purposely ordained in order to the more illustrious manifestation of grace.

The supralapsarian calvinist thus traces sin

as the condition of redemption, to the divine decree. That decree, according to his conception, being unconditioned, the sin which forms the ground or occasion for salvation by grace, enters as a necessary part into the plan and government of the world. All factors of earthly history whatsoever, became in this way means toward the great end, namely, the revelation of the infinite holiness and love of God in all the intensity and extent of these attributes by the incarnation and atoning death of the eternal Son. Human history, according to this scheme of doctrine, becomes a mere dependent reflection of the will of God, no room being left for the exercise of created freedom.

The infralapsarian calvinist, on the other hand, recognises the provision made for self action or free conscious self determination on the part of man. The absolute decree of God is not incompatible with the exercise of creaturely freedom, since the operation of so many self dependent forces or free wills of men, enters essentially into the divine reckoning and determination from the first. The divine decree is in one sense therefore unconditioned, in another it is not so, since in its passage into history it is made contingent

on the self action of man and conditioned or determined accordingly. Upon man's will determining itself to sin, it behoved the divine will in relation to the human, to determine itself as a punishing or chastising and redeeming will. This ethical conception of the divine decree implies a self limitation on the part of the divine causality, which however does greater honour to and exalts our idea of omnipotence indefinitely higher than the unqualifiedly unconditioned decree or absolute causality of the supralapsarian, which indeed reduces the divine will very much to the rank of a mechanical force.

A curious inquiry arises. Supposing man had not sinned, would the incarnation still have been necessary for the full revelation of the attributes and character of the invisible God to finite earthly intelligences, according to the formula, "*Etiamsi homo non peccasset deus tamen incarnatus esset, licet non crucifixus?*" This certainly is an idea which proves very congenial to some thinkers, and is regarded by them as the main unconditioned factor of the divine decree, forming the end or goal toward which all nature and history would have tended and hastened, whether man had sinned or not sinned.

The ideas necessary to any reasoned system of religious optimism are therefore, *first*, the existence and providence, of an all good, wise, righteous and omnipotent Deity ; *secondly*, a future state of readjustment and compensation for the inequalities and sufferings of the present life. The speculative thinker must in all cases have both a prospective and a universal reference in his estimate of the value of life. He must heedfully regard how things, it may be the most apparently unpromising and grievous for the present, are tending and what results, happy or unhappy, they do conspire to. And he must also consider how the happiness and good of the greater number are affected by the ills and hardships of individuals, as well as the measure in which the moral improvement of the sufferers themselves is advanced by the severe trial and discipline they have to undergo. The present life certainly is indefinitely enhanced in value when viewed as a schooling for eternity.

Thirdly, to the optimist of the strict calvinist type, the incarnation and crucifixion of the Son of God is necessary, in order that men penetrated with a sense of their own nothingness and inability for good, and painfully feeling their

need of grace, might be ready and eager to betake themselves to the fountain of the divine mercies, and therefrom experience quickening and renewal.

SUB-SECTION II.

THEORIES OF PESSIMISM.

The name pessimism popularly denotes any theory of a preponderance of ills in human life, and conveniently covers all those opinions or sentiments which emphasise the dark side of existence. In this wide sense it is equivalent to a denial of happiness.

There are two main varieties of pessimism (1) popular or instinctive ; and (2) that which assumes a philosophic shape and professes to furnish a consistently reasoned theory of life.

Systematic or reasoned pessimism may be either (1) absolute and empirical ; or (2) hypothetical and prospective, the one being the denial of human happiness, the other the denial of human hope.

Absolute or empirical pessimism has two methods (i) *a priori* or deductive, and (ii) *a posteriori* or inductive.

The existing philosophic systems combine

both these methods ; but before giving some account of them, reference may advantageously be made to the instinctive or popular forms which preceded and prepared the way for them.

I.—POPULAR OR INSTINCTIVE PESSIMISM.

The impulsive or popular pessimism is not unfrequently ejaculatory. “How long! how long shall the wicked triumph!”

Whenever the bitterness and sorrows of experience are accentuated, and the wail of anguish and despair pierces the heart, the pessimistic mood is wont to be in the ascendency and to find suitable expression.

The poetry and literature of every people is replete with pathetic sentiments and representations of the manifold woes and suffering of our frail and transient existence.

The tone of Holy Scripture is indeed predominantly optimistic. Revealed religion breathes hope and consolation in the midst of the greatest trials and hardships of life. It promises deliverance from the worst ills. Still being true to nature, it gives touching expression to whatever is empty or evanescent, vain or perishable in life's joys or possessions.

The book of Ecclesiastes is one continuous and regretful moan over the illusions of earthly aim and pursuit. 'All things are full of labour. Tongue cannot utter it. Life is hateful because the work done under the sun is grievous. Pleasures and all else enjoyable or desirable eventuate in vexation and vanity. That which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; as the one dieth so dieth the other,' etc.

Quite as full of melancholy and anguish are many strains in the Psalms. 'Man is like to vanity. His days are as a shadow. We pine and consume away under the wrath of the Almighty. One generation after another is carried off as with a flood. Humanity at best is perishable as the grass.'

There is a deeply pessimistic, almost Manichæan ring in the New Testament expression, "the prince of this world," although it escaped from divine lips, and the similar expression of S. Paul "the prince of the powers of the air," but the darkness and pessimism is dispelled when we read that "the prince of this world shall be cast out."

The part of S. Paul's second epistle to the Thessalonians respecting the ascendancy of

Antichrist and his working in all manner of deceivableness of unrighteousness; the general epistle of S. Jude throughout, with the corresponding part of the second epistle general of S. Peter; the successive terrible plagues that in the Apocalypse are described as coming upon the earth, present us with very dark pessimist pictures of things.

Our own literature is suggestive.

Shakespeare gives a deeply affecting pessimistic representation of human life in 'King Lear.' Who does not know that it is severely true to fact? 'Macbeth' also is very dark, though lighted up at the close with righteous retribution on the guilty.

Never genius was more sympathetic than our great dramatist, and entered more entirely into all the contrasted moods of human character. What concentration of pessimist sentiment do we not find in such expressions as "the whips and scorns of time, the oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely," and numberless others.

Amongst modern English poets none has a keener eye to the emptiness and ill of life than Lord Byron. To him our nature appears 'false,' the 'taint of sin is ineradicable.' 'Plagues,

disease, death, bondage fall on men like dew from the boundless upas, the all blasting tree of evil.' Over and above visible ills, 'unseen woes throb through the immedicable veins.'

There is perhaps no finer outburst of pessimist passion anywhere, blended with loftiest indignation at the wrong the poet suffered, than when he speaks of the 'wound wherewith he bleeds inflicted not with a just weapon,' the terrible 'wrestle with his lot' in consequence, his 'brain seared, heart riven, hopes sapped, name blighted, life's life lied away.'

"From mighty wrongs to petty perfidy
Have I not seen what human things could do?
From the loud roar of foaming calumny
To the small whisper of the as paltry few
And subtler venom of the reptile crew
The Janus glance of whose significant eye
Learning to lie with silence would seem true
And without utterance, save the shrug or sigh
Deal round to happy fools its speechless obloquy."*

Such is a characteristic specimen of what has sometime been called individualistic pessimism, as distinguished from that which dwells on and emphasises social and national evils, or that other still more extended and comprehensive

* Childe Harold, canto iv., 136.

form which contemplates the manifold unhappiness of mankind at large and the various pestilent and destructive forces, physical as well as moral, at work in the world.

2.—PHILOSOPHIC OR REASONED PESSIMISM.

Of the reasoned forms of pessimism, the system of Buddha is at once one of the most ancient and most elaborately worked out.

Schopenhauer was wont to remark that there was more real wisdom in one page of the Rig Veda than in any ten volumes of the post Kantian philosophy.

The root idea of Buddhism is the inherent evil of all finite existence. Creation is evil from the very fact of the limitation and perishableness which cleaves to it. In emerging from the abyss of the Infinite, *i.e.*, at birth the creature suffers a fall and is by necessity the victim of illusion and error, of sin and suffering. Hence nothing in this world can satisfy, and the only possible bliss is the quiescence of the soul's insatiable desires which occasion ceaseless unrest, and re-absorption into the Absolute, a process which in this system is called Nirvana.

The name 'pan-satanism' has sometime been

assigned to this form of thought which has been revived in certain recent pantheistic systems in Germany, and fitly denotes belief in the essential evil of all finite existences whatsoever.

The Gnostic and Manichæan theories of the evil of matter and of the existence of an eternal evil principle which exercises dominion over the sphere of the visible and material, are so many modifications of pessimism in its most absolute character.

Amongst the Greeks the Stoic idea of an inexorable destiny which subjects both gods and men to its merciless tyranny is a profoundly pessimistic notion.

Plato, who with his views of the divine character, the beauty and harmony of the universe, and immortality of the soul, is pervadingly optimist in his writings, yet in not a few places broaches the pessimistic conception of the merely negative character of happiness, making it simply release from or absence of pain; and of course his other notion of the evil of matter is out and out pessimist.

In the "*De Finibus*" of Cicero, amongst divers other theories of happiness or the highest good of life, that of Hieronymus, which

maintains it to be freedom from pain, takes a prominent place.

The Neo-platonic and Neo-pythagorean schools at Alexandria imbibed many of the mystic and theosophic notions of the East, more especially the oriental sentiments respecting the inherent evil of finiteness. They proposed to rise above the limitation and hindrances of sensuous life by ecstasy or mystic contemplation. To have one's soul absorbed and ravished with wrapt visions of the divine nature was a bliss that more than counterbalanced all the manifold evils of life. Here is another instance of optimism bursting irrepressibly through very bad forms of pessimism.

Amongst modern thinkers in England, Hobbes by his reduction of benevolence and other higher feelings and affections to so many forms of self love is distinctly pessimist.

Mandeville and Swift are two other prominent names suggestive of pessimistic opinion.

Thomas Carlyle also should not be passed over in this connection ; whilst J. S. Mill in his posthumous Essays is a well known exponent of the pessimism supposed to be observable throughout the wide extent of creation in

manifold cruelties and calamities, 'nature being red in tooth and claw,' as Tennyson concisely expresses it.

But it was reserved for Schopenhauer to be the first in modern times to construct a really most elaborately reasoned system of pessimism.

His *a-priori* or deductive proof is of chief importance and is full of deep and abstruse thought.

He adopts the Kantian idea of the 'Noûmenon,' 'intelligible world,'—the *ding an sich*, 'the thing in itself,' as contradistinguished from the world of appearance or the 'phenomenon;' but whereas Kant meant by it the sphere of pure reason, and Hegel, something quasi intellectual, the combination of subject and object in idea, Schopenhauer understood by it 'the will.'

The title of his great work, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, "The world as will and mental representation," when understood, conveys the leading ideas of his system.

The phenomenal world, *i.e.*, 'the world as mental representation,' which however has no existence apart from the perceiving mind, is in every province and in its whole extent, inorganic and organic, material and spiritual, the 'objectivation' of the 'noumenal' will, which

is maintained to be the ultimate principle or real underlying essence of the world, the sole substantial basis of all phenomena.

The will as 'Noümenon' first 'objectifies' itself in a timeless mental representation of the 'universal ideas' or archetypes of things. According to these patterns which constitute an intermediate stage in the progress and development of the world, it further objectifies itself in the plurality and manifoldness of phenomena, finite will and intelligence being amongst the number of these phenomena.

But whereas the 'ultimate reality,' or the 'universal will,' or 'Noümenon,' is without the sphere of time and space and transcends causality and motivation, all phenomenal wills on the other hand are subject to the operation of the law of cause and effect as well as the other laws of change, progress, or decay, which are wont to regulate all things in the sphere of the temporal and evanescent.

And yet all phenomenal wills have their root in, and at bottom are identified with the universal will or 'Noümenon,' being so many diverse manifestations of the one absolute substratum of the universe.

There is a hierarchy or system of grades of phenomenal wills, corresponding to the universal and timeless archetypal ideas, according to which they are shaped or modified. There are the myriad atomic wills of inorganic matter, which remind us of the 'monads' of Leibnitz, since matter in every particle of it is, according to the fundamental principle of the system, instinct with will, an infinitesimal part of the grand 'objectivation' of absolute will in the universe. There are other parts, higher objectivations of the one will, namely, the organic wills of vegetative and animal life. Highest of all are the conscious wills of human intelligence.

There is a double 'objectivation' of will in man, first that which is immediate in the brain; secondly, in virtue of the cerebral functions, a mediate 'objectivation' is effected in self-consciousness. Intelligence thus really ranks as a tertiary product, since the phenomenal or instinctive will is first, the cerebral organism second, and self consciousness or intellect last.

The genesis of self-consciousness or intelligence is explained on the principle of shock or impact of the will inherent in material atoms with the will objectified in the brain, which

causes sensation, and also occasions a reactionary potency of will, which may be exerted to negative or otherwise check and control the operation of all inferior wills, whether of inorganic matter or of organised existences.

The root idea explanatory of the whole system is, that will forms the substance or reality in all notion of power whatsoever. Force of every sort, whether mechanical, chemical, electrical, vital, is an idea subordinate to will and implies will, the former being much less known and understood than the latter, and therefore to be explained by it. In fact we cannot think of any power whatever but as the outcome of will, according to the logical forms of the human understanding.

The world being an 'objectivation' of will, there is necessarily on all sides a ceaseless striving. Suffering is incident to desire and struggle. The insatiable needs of the phenomenal will or volition, every successive satisfaction of it affording fresh ground for renewed and increased striving, imply a condition of almost unintermittent misery and torment.

The higher the phenomenal will, the keener the sensibility and refinement, the more manifold

are the desires and needs, and the intenser the suffering. The pain of existence attains its maximum in the conscious volition and intelligence of man, becoming more piercing and acute with the increasing culture of the race. Man in accordance with his manifold nature is the concrete embodiment of countless needs, of which he becomes the more keenly sensible from improved education and enlightenment.

The self-conscious potency of will, however, can in large measure provide an alleviation or remedy by negating or controlling the mere instinctive striving of the natural desires or volitions. It is to be kept in mind all through, that whilst other psychologists distinguish (1) feeling, (2) understanding or cognition, (3) volition, and (4) will as fundamentally distinct forms of consciousness, Schopenhauer adheres to the two-fold division of (1) intelligence, and (2) will, including all modifications of feeling appetancy or volition under the latter.

The instinctive unrestrained will after the gratification of its restless unceasing desires constitutes egoism, since it runs counter to the impulsive wills of others, and, if unrestrained, will overbear them. Here a glimpse is obtained

of a right theory of moral evil or sin, if it were not for the basis of naturalism or necessity which is at its root, reminding one of Hegel's notion of sin being occasioned by the spirit emerging from its naturalness in self assertion and isolated independence. The spirit as spirit realizes its antipathy to naturalness and the other evils of finitude. By the conscious denial of the natural or impulsive will, therefore volition takes the form of self restraint, abandonment of individual claims, disinterestedness and philanthropy.

The asceticism of the recluse or anchoret, or the philanthropic communism, and self denying efforts by way of benevolence and education which distinguished the monachism of the middle ages, forms the moral ideal of this school.

The will, therefore, attains quiescence by severe mortification of the selfish impulses and self sacrifice for the good of others.

There is also a quiescence and bliss when the will pauses, overborne by the vigorous energising of the intellect in the contemplation of works of art, which are so many embodiments of 'universal ideas.'

Final rest can only be arrived at, when the

will in death ceases entirely from life's struggles, and merges or is absorbed into the bosom of the infinite or absolute, from which in the very act of creation it fell.

Death, therefore, which touches or affects only the phenomenal and not the real part of our being, is robbed of its terrors.

The suffering accompanying finite existence indicates an energy of retributive righteousness inherent in the 'Noümenon,' which forms the omnipotent potency or deity of the pessimist, but what sort of adoration or worship is it possible to pay to an impersonal power which forms the substratum of all phenomenal wills, whether of atoms, of organisms, or intelligences?

In concluding this short notice of Schopenhauer's pessimism, is not the key of all that undeniable longing and unrest and anguish of the human soul, which is made so much of in this system, to be found in its alienation and loss of fellowship with the personal God and Father of all? Our souls long and thirst for the living God. Therefore all other fountains of delight must prove barren and comfortless apart from the perennial fountain of spiritual refreshing and consolation which is ever flowing

forth from the throne of God. Peace and happiness are to be regained only by return to the Father's love, and reinstatement in his favor and communion through the merits and virtues of the blessed Redeemer. With the removal of this cardinal rupture between the creature and Creator, all lesser ruptures, whether of the parts of the soul amongst themselves, or of the creature with his fellows, will be in a fair way of being finally healed.

The ultimate issue of pessimism finds expression in Julius Bahnsen, who rejects the Kantian idealism, so prominent a feature in Schopenhauer, and thus denies the presence of reason and intelligence in the universe. He can see nothing but will everywhere 'rending itself in an endless self partition. . . . The world is a ceaseless self tormenting of the absolute. . . . The badness of things is final and irretrievable. . . . There is nothing anywhere but a vain moaning and no prospect of release.' *

E. Von Hartmann's pessimism adopts both the deductive and inductive methods of Schopenhauer and the results are substantially the same.

* Sully's Pessimism, p. 107.

While Schopenhauer calls 'the ultimate principle' will, Hartmann gives it the designation of 'the Unconscious.'

Eclectic tendencies shew themselves throughout in Hartmann's philosophy. There is decided sympathy, for example, with 'the absolute' of Hegel, or 'the subject and object' theory of being or ontology.

For whereas in Schopenhauer the will takes precedence of the intellect, 'the Unconscious' of Hartmann, combines in itself as eternally co-ordinate factors, (1) will, and (2) mental representation or idea, the former being the potential productive or creative energy, the latter furnishing its contents, its aim and end.

Accordingly the phenomenal world or sensuous universe is no longer as with Schopenhauer a merely subjective 'mental representation' having no reality apart from the intelligence which reflects it. It is an actual reality, the joint product of (1) pre-existent will or potency, and (2) pre-existent idea or form of working.

The atomic wills, the organic wills, the self-conscious wills have all definite purposes and ends, being regulated in their volitions by the pre-existent ideas of 'the Unconscious.' The

material universe, as well as all organized and conscious life, is thus instinct with intelligence.

But where 'the Unconscious' does not obtain special 'objectivation' in a brain, and thus arrive at self-consciousness, intelligence is present all the same in other parts of creation though it remain 'latent.' This 'latent' intelligence manifests itself together with will, in the forces and operations of nature as well as in the functions of merely organic or vegetative life. It is notably displayed in the play of the ganglionic nervous and motor system in man. There are above all innumerable latent and unrecognisable mental operations in the complex processes of observation, of memory, of association, of inference performed by this 'unconscious' intelligence.

The basis of Hartmann's system is professedly laid on an approximately exhaustive induction of such undeniable facts as above indicated, which are not however as instanced by him always founded on accurate observation or well verified comparison, recourse being often had for material of illustration to older and more effete systems of biology.

But the prominence assigned to the working of the intellectual factor of 'the Unconscious,'

furnishing in all cases the aim and content of the universal will, gives to their joint product, the the actual universe, the aspect of order, of beauty, of good and wise arrangement, which it possesses.

It is at this point that the eclectic tendency of the system of 'the Unconscious' further shews itself in making in respect to the actual state of things, Leibnitz's predication of the present as the best possible world practicable to itself.

Accordingly, if the system were consistent, the ills and unhappiness of life would be regarded very much in the light of mere shadows or conditions of good. Hartmann does go some way in denying Schopenhauer's position of the merely negative character of happiness, and asserts that it is something more positive than the absence of pain, considerable ambiguity however attaching to this part of his philosophy.

The endless wants and needs of life go on increasing as the artificialities of culture and civilization multiply. The insatiable craving and ennui, which contribute to make life incurably miserable, might, from the idea of purpose, which according to his system enters into this whole scheme of things, have led to the recognition of good in those very insatiable cravings,

since the deep root of human anguish and torment itself might appear to furnish an indispensable and abiding stimulus to further effort, resulting in indefinite onward progress and higher future happiness of the individual and of the race, if resort be not at the same time prompted to a present repletion or satisfaction of soul in fellowship of God, in whom is the fulness of bliss.

There are, says Hartmann, three stages of illusion on a large scale, (1) that of childhood and of the infancy of the race, in which happiness and final satisfaction is looked for in the present life ; (2) that of adolescence of the individual and of the mediæval age of human history, where the scene of man's bliss is transferred to the sphere of a future life ; and (3) that of the full grown man and of the modern epoch when humanity has attained to its maturity, and has transcended both the mythic or theologic and the metaphysical stages of growth, and seeks its good in the elaboration and development of material resources, the boasted eudæmonism of positive science.

And thus Taubert, whilst he recognises with the progress of the individual and of the race, a growing sensibility to the ills of life, still keeps

in prominence the cheerful side of pessimism, and thinks that a conquest and triumph over numberless evils may be obtained through the combined self renouncing efforts of the many. By the suppression of the selfish impulses, he thinks a very large portion of evil and suffering might be eliminated.

“The much decried cheerlessness of pessimism,” says Taubert, “transforms itself on closer inspection into one of the greatest consolations which are offered to mankind ; for not only does it transport the individual beyond every suffering to which he is destined, it also increases the pleasures which exist and doubles enjoyment. It is true it shews us the illusory character of every joy, but it does not thereby touch pleasure itself, but simply encloses it in a dark frame, which makes the picture to stand out with greater advantage.” *

It will thus be apparent how far capable of reconciliation in many respects, and how far complementary are the two contrasted views of the optimist and pessimist, the one being an ideal of life postulated by our better feelings and emotions, the other the product of cool

* Sully's Pessimism, p. 109

reflection on the painful and sad realities of temporal existence.

Thus, too, it can be understood how on the one hand the optimist in the exuberance of joy and hope rightly enough characterises pessimism as a 'form of diseased melancholy,' or the 'consciousness of disease confessing itself'; whilst a gloomy and morose nature like that of Schopenhauer, penetrated through and through with the acutest sense of life's suffering, could represent optimism as 'a truly wicked mode of thought, a bitter contempt for the numberless sorrows of mankind,' and consistently pronounced 'the world, as it is at present, to be as bad as it possibly can be in order to exist anyhow.'

It will be further apparent that, in the absence of the fundamental notion of sin, which consists essentially in the alienation of every man from God, the torment of unrest and insatiable longing after a good adequate to his spiritual necessity, which is at the root of all his inner discord and misery, cannot be satisfactorily explained, nor obtain that solution by way of repletion and contentment which it requires.

SUB-SECTION III.

*POSITIVISM IN ITS PRACTICAL AND
SPECULATIVE ASPECTS.*

The various names that have of late been given to positive science are certain indications of the increased attention it has been receiving.

Each votary seems more anxious than another to dignify it with some high sounding appellation.

Thus George Eliot, who is more conversant with the practical side of positivism than with its speculative, and has done not a little to make it attractive, gives it the engaging name 'Meliorism.'

'Eudaemonism' is a term of older use, applied to the utilitarian theory of ethics, and simply means 'the science of happiness,' being derived from the Greek word *εὐδαιμόνων*.

'Hedonism' has come into recent use and is suitable to a theory which makes pleasure, *ἡδονή*, the chief aim and object of life. In a properly scientific shape it will be called 'Hedonics.'

The old term 'Utilitarianism' points out use or profit as its standard of moral value—pleasure or happiness, it may be future, or that of the

greater number, being the main advantage or end in living. The utilitarianism of Paley is not contemplated here.

It is strange that a moral end should be held to constitute the main advantage and the real value of life in a system that denies all supernatural beliefs. It is still stranger that a contradiction so fundamental should not be perceived and understood by its votaries.

It will be seen even on a cursory review that the moral value of life which is thus assumed by it for practical reasons, must consistently with the very first principles of positive speculation be denied, since anything of a moral value cannot have a physical test. Thus free will or the ability of free conscious self determination, which plays so prominent a part in the positive theory of happiness, must be negatived on the assumption of a merely physical development and determination of life.

If all higher life be the natural growth and outcome of forces and energies inherent in a very complex and well attuned corporeal organism, there can really be no freedom ; man is a mere automaton shaped and determined by influences from the outside.

The root contradiction of the system, therefore, is the necessary denial of freedom of will on its speculative principles, and yet on practical ground the postulating a moral order as essential to the true value of life. This contradiction will appear the clearer from further consideration, which will come in due course of our historical statement.

*1.—HEDONICS OR THE PRACTICAL ASPECT OF
POSITIVE SCIENCE.*

MELIORISM.

The moralising of the positivists as to the true theory of happiness, suggests the learned and grave discussions of Cicero and his friends concerning the supreme good.

Throughout the discussions of Cicero there is an absence of the supernatural element, just as in the case amongst the positivists of the present day.

The erudition of Cicero is very admirable, and the variety of contrasted opinions elegantly expressed and perspicuously arranged form principal charms of the writing.

The positivist of the present day is eclectic in his theory of happiness, and resembles the Peripatetic perhaps more than even the Epicurean.

The name 'Hedonist' would certainly imply epicurean opinions. It has been said already that 'hedonism' is a synonym for 'eudaemonism,' which is just another name for epicureanism. Epicureanism, however destructive from a speculative point of view it may be of moral distinctions, is not practically understood, strictly antagonist to the Stoic philosophy, since it recognises the advantage of honourableness and integrity of character. The full weight of the negative (or 'freedom from pain') theory of Hieronymus is also acknowledged in the construction of the 'hedonist' theory of happiness.

Cicero's statement of the Peripatetic opinion will illustrate our subject. "Some people consider the first desire to be a desire of pleasure, and the first thing which men seek to ward off to be pain: others think that the first thing wished for is freedom from pain, and the first thing shunned pain: and from these others proceed, who call the first goods natural ones; amongst which they reckon the safety and integrity of all one's parts, good health, the senses unimpaired, freedom from pain, strength, beauty and other things of the same sort, the images of which are the first things in the mind,

like the sparks and seeds of the virtues. . . Prudence, which we have called the art of life, is always conversant about some one of these three things, from which it derives the beginning of the whole life : and from that which it has pronounced to be the original cause by which nature is excited, a principle of what is right and honourable will arise, which can agree with some one of these three divisions ; so that it is honourable to do everything for the sake of pleasure, even if you do not obtain it ; or else for the sake of avoiding pain, though you may not be able to compass that ; or else of getting some one of those things which are according to nature even if you get it not. And thus it comes about that there is as much difference between the chief good and the chief evil as there is in their natural principles." *

There will be found little really new in the modern scheme of 'hedonism.'

The so called science of 'Hedonics' professes just to be in process of formation, and from the difficulty of the problem is not likely to be completed for a long time to come. Indeed it will be found that it cannot be completed so long as

* De Finibus, Book v., c. 7.

the supernatural is not only not excluded, but is not fully accepted as the principal element.

Indeed it is the supernatural which confers on life its richest colouring, its most beautiful and diversified tints, its most brilliant lights and deepest shadows, its sublimity and grandeur.

The positivist moralist in dereligionising life would render it tame, flat, insipid, without zest, but the truth is he cannot dereligionise life, since after the suppression or abandonment of creeds and positive institutions, religion would be found to enter as an irrepressible element into man's practical character and activity, and confer upon it whatever earnestness of purpose, rich colouring and generous, noble and disinterested sentiment and aspiration it might retain.

The moral value and import of life, which the positivists in practice cling to as tenaciously as if they felt their supreme interests were involved in it, must be (1) inward in its character and independent of external circumstance; (2) of an importance indefinitely great, as a man's honour or a woman's chastity; and (3) absolute in its character, encompassing life, and claiming our highest reverence and submission as well as the unqualified obedience and reverence of all

others. Otherwise it is of little or no worth, and judged from an outward test of pleasure or happiness it is certainly nothing. And so fares it unhappily with the positive scheme of morality, which, being in principle a mere calculation of profit or loss, has none of the three genuine characteristics above specified. Still, practically, the sense of duty continues to influence the scientific unbeliever, and from the sacred name of duty it is impossible to sublimate the very inmost essence of religion.

Although morality by being referred to an outside standard or test, whether utility or happiness, really loses its sacredness and authority, or its unconditionally binding power, the positive proves better than his creed, since he retains in practice unconsciously some of the sweetest aroma and inmost substance of religion, and professes that the earnestness of life is not lessened to him.

Thus Dr. Tyndall having thrown aside the cherished religious beliefs in which he had been brought up, says ' There is no spiritual experience of his early days, no resolve of duty, no work of mercy, no act of self renunciation, no solemnity of thought, no joy in the life and

aspects of nature, that would not still be his.'

Professor Huxley tells us that 'come what may to our intellectual beliefs and even education, the beauty of holiness, and the ugliness of sin, will remain no mere metaphors, but real and intense feelings.'

This is the implicit teaching of George Eliot * and other modern positivists, shewing us that in abandoning the beliefs of their early days as creations of the imagination or the fairy figures of dreamland, they have not been able to dereligionise their own lives, but from the power of association continue to carry about with them unconsciously many of the most sacred influences of their younger and less sophisticated days. And it is precisely this power of religion which will not forsake them, notwithstanding the disintegration of their early creed, that constitutes life's worth, whatsoever it is to them.

But let us consider as dispassionately as possible this positive scheme of ethics or morality, so far as it has been systematised.

And, first, the positivist fails to define, and since he rejects the three characters of the supreme good or moral value of life mentioned

* Malloch, 'Is life worth living,' p. 29.

above, cannot define 'without ambiguity and according to the requirements of exact thought' what happiness really is. Like Cicero and his friends he lays down certain conditions of happiness, external and internal, and he prescribes certain rules, but happiness itself not having been accurately defined, and all the elements of moral value being referred to a utilitarian test or standard, the whole scheme proves in the end superficial, vicious, and unsatisfactory. We will not, however, say that there is not much of useful suggestion in it, just as in Cicero's work, though it lacks his erudition.

Amongst the external factors of happiness or natural goods of life, which constitute, as it were, a hierarchy of conditions necessary to real enjoyment, forming permanent sources of pleasure, 'sums' or 'aggregates' so to speak, one sort being of higher character and to be preferred to another, though none are to be rejected unless obstructive of greater benefits, there are enumerated health, wealth, possessions, freedom from pain or embarrassment, friends, private and public services, the varied ameliorations and comforts of art together with the other outward accessories of progressive civilization.

(2) The internal factors of happiness are more manifold and complex than the external, amongst which may be mentioned grateful alternation of intellectual and moral function and activity.

The general and well verified 'rationale' of happiness of course is, that proper pleasure or delight in any shape is a necessary and invariable accompaniment or result of normal energising of the faculties, whether of the understanding, of the affections, or of the will: the higher the energy exercised the intenser and more expansive the happiness.

Thus the intellect has delights proportionate to the quality and strength of its several powers. Akenside writes an elaborate poem on the pleasures of the imagination; Samuel Rogers another on the pleasures of memory; and Campbell a third on the pleasures of hope. The exercise of each faculty is accompanied by an enjoyment peculiar to itself.

Science which is the fruit of the logical energy of abstraction and comparison exercises so great fascination over some minds as to amount to a passion. Absorbing predilection or taste may in like manner be acquired for

philosophic speculation, for painting, for music, for mathematics, or for philology. In some shape or other mental culture, as broad and intense as possible, must enter as an essential ingredient into any adequate theory of happiness.

The exercise of prevision and attention in selecting permanent sources of enjoyment or continuous lines of useful, honourable, and therefore delightful activity, is considered a moment of first importance in the construction of a science of 'Hedonics.'

The unspeakable advantage and comfort that results from the formation of right and virtuous habits, is a fact generally understood and acknowledged.

Amongst the emotional facts that contribute to make life happy, there is none of greater value than the 'priceless treasure of affection.'

This affection, expanded into benevolence and philanthropy, is thought to be indefinitely fruitful of self denial and disinterestedness, of pure and heroic actions and characters. When it becomes generally diffused it is likely to exert almost an omnipotent energy for good.

Humanitarianism and co-operation or 'band

work ' are thus two main forces in the prospective regeneration and reconstruction of society.

Enlightened legislation, the ' phalansteries ' of C. Fourier, good social institutions will cause many of the greatest miseries of life to disappear.

The progress of medical science and improved sanitary reform will conquer disease and prolong life.

The will, or rather the co-operation of wills, is the main instrument relied on in the accomplishment of all this shaping and rehabilitation of human life. Its function is twofold (1) negative *i.e.*, avoiding whatever is injurious, detrimental, or blighting to character or prospects, and (2) positive, selecting and following out strenuously whatever may be salutary or promotive of the higher satisfaction and delight of life, whether social or individual.

The religious and most important factor of human life has of course been altogether left out of the positive scheme, though it is essential to the construction of a perfect theory of happiness.

The fundamental need of regeneration or renewal of the whole inner life by divine grace is of course wholly ignored.

' Godliness with contentment is surely the

greatest gain' and advantage, whatever may be the position in which God may have placed each.

Religion too affords the highest and grandest sphere of intellectual and moral energy and therefore of supreme happiness.

The expansive influence of the study of religion has been frequently remarked on by great men, since nothing more enlarges the sweep of man's comprehension, as well as strengthens his varied capacities, whether of understanding or of heart.

The bliss of religion proportionately exceeds all others, but of it positivism will make no account.

2.—SCIENTIFIC NEGATION OR THE SPECULATIVE
ASPECT OF POSITIVISM.

It has now to be seen that according to his speculative principles there can be no real moral value of life to the positivist, however much he may try to cling to morality as a practical necessity.

As a philosophy or speculative system, positivism is as old as Democritus or Epicurus, whose materialism took the shape of an atomic theory, the whole universe of mind as well as

matter being explained on the supposition of a fortuitous concourse of atoms.

There is no more eloquent expounder of this 'dirt' philosophy than Lucretius in his masculine and ornate poem '*De Rerum Natura*,' the design of which, like that of the positive philosophy of the present day, is to free men's minds from all lurking dread of the supernatural, and dispel for ever the portentous apparitions superstitious terrors or other apprehended evils and excesses of religion.

It will be granted that if there be nothing in man that does not fall under the law of physical sequence, and all within him as without him be under the iron necessity of an absolute determinism, there can be no faculty of independent will or self action, and consequently no morality or moral value in life. And such is the logical outcome of speculative positivism.

If man be a mere automaton, a thing of nature like a plant or tree, however much more complex in organisation; if his self consciousness and self determination with their workings be similar to the mere whirr and noise of a machine; if the volitions and the other intellective and active principles be the result of certain

molecular arrangements in the brain ; if freedom, love, and sanctity can be accounted for by certain mechanical dispositions or arrangement of atoms in the cerebral hemispheres, which may be discovered by a spectroscope and laid so naked and open to the eye in the course of the further perfectionment of science that they may be read there, as the expression of amiability or anger may be detected in the countenance of a dog ; in short, if consciousness in all its varied moods of feeling, knowing, desiring, and willing be the mere spontaneous product of a highly elaborated organism, and the whole life of man be rigorously determined by physical or natural forces outside of him, his very will being a consequence of a certain movement of the cerebral atoms, he can be nothing but a superior animal, without morality and responsibility because without liberty.

It is true indeed that Dr. Tyndall and other more intelligent positivists are very sensible of this difficulty and feel themselves to have no firm footing. The connection and interdependence of the brain and consciousness is acknowledged on all sides, but it is felt to be a profound mystery even by positivists.

Dr. Tyndall asks the question, 'Do states of consciousness enter as links into the chain of antecedence and consequence which gives rise to bodily actions?' And he answers, 'I have no power of imagining such states interposed between the molecules of the brain, and influencing the transference of motion among the molecules. The thing eludes all mental presentation. But' he adds 'the production of consciousness by molecular motion is quite as unpresentable to the mental vision as the production of molecular motion by consciousness. If I reject one result, I reject both. I however reject neither and thus stand in the presence of two Incomprehensibles, instead of one Incomprehensible.' *

The fundamental self contradiction of positivism comes out in this admission of Dr. Tyndall. In order to morality and a moral value of life, it is felt after all that there must be in man a soul or spiritual entity, which in other places the votaries of the system affirm might be thrown out of the window without serious detriment or loss. On a practical account therefore they will not accept the only logical conclusion of their

* Malloch, 'Is life worth living,' p. 194.

scientific principles. Thus one egregious fallacy which strikes deep is made plain.

Now the spiritual entity which somehow or other is thus occupied amongst the molecules of the brain, and may for anything that the positivist knows produce all those arrangements of the cerebral atoms, which result in thoughts, feelings, and actions, is simply the personality, the functions of which in practical life are perfectly acknowledged by him. The brain is thus the meeting point of the visible and invisible worlds, the conscious and immortal spirit being wedded to inert and mortal flesh in the incomprehensible or mysterious manner described by the positivist. The will is the great wonder worker in this enchanter's palace of the brain, a sort of supernatural energy which subordinates to its own purposes the workings and forces of nature in manifold ways, which to a large extent guides and moulds at pleasure the material accessories and surroundings of life, and whose laws of moral liberty assert superiority over merely mechanical laws, as the conquests of science themselves testify, and place man in relation to a sphere above the world though so intimately connected with it. It will thus be seen by the

positivist that self dependence or self determination, which are essential to the moral value of life, belong to that spiritual entity or personality the soul which he would throw out of the window as a heathen apparition or phantom from dreamland, baneful and destructive than otherwise, from the superstitions and terrors that somehow inevitably accompany it.

Well, let a personality with its two factors self consciousness and self determination be granted as essential to a moral value of life, does not a moral value imply a moral order and law, which as it transcends all the particular circumstances and conditions of human life, and is absolute and unconditional in character, so it is felt as everywhere an encompassing and constraining power? The conscience of each one recognises it and confesses its right over him. So real and solemn and universal a fact is this moral sense, which forms an essential factor of that spiritual entity at work amongst the molecules of the brain.

The positivist tells us that a personal God, an immortal spirit in man, a heaven and hell are airy forms, as unsubstantial as other fictions of imagination, and belong to dreamland, because there

is no proof of them according to the positive method, and he will not recognise the validity of any other method, *i.e.*, there is no physical or tangible proof, and he cannot accept anything without such proof, indeed it is, as he expresses it, the 'highest immorality to believe what one has no reason to believe,' but what comes of morality on such a principle? Duty may be styled solemn, earnest, and sacred, but what proof is there of its sacredness or solemnity on the positive standpoint? There is no possible physical test that can gauge or measure either morality or its sacredness, since it is something inward and absolute transcending all scientific appliances of observation, having its seat in the very inmost bosom of that self consciousness or personality, which Dr. Tyndall styles his second incomprehensible. His first incomprehensible being 'the intimate and mysterious union of the brain with the intellect, his second incomprehensible is the equally mysterious action of consciousness upon the molecules of the cerebrum, and the re-action of the molecules upon consciousness.' Thus moral ideas alike with our specific supernatural beliefs belong to dreamland having no physical test, being in fact

themselves of a supernatural character, testifying to a power or stream of tendency, above nature whilst in it, conditioning and determining it according to moral law in the exercise of freedom from its control and consciousness of dominion over it.

Take the positivist's reverence for truth—love and devotion to truth for its own sake, as the supreme morality, the only principle worthy of a man, the shrinking from which is the deepest immorality, it is plain that it is not all truth that can form the object of his unqualified approbation, since there are many truths of social and domestic as well as of individual life full of shame and dishonour, which one blushes at and would fain throw a cloak over instead of making a clean breast of them and considering it a duty to proclaim them at the market or exchange. It must be truth of a certain order that is the object of devotion, the eternal, indefectible, and unchangeable truths and laws of nature and whatever else is eternal and immutable in human life, those moral truths, namely, which are practical certainties, and which 'one might as well try to upset by the help of the physical sciences, as rationally attempt to upset Euclid

by the Rig veda.' But whatever is eternal must belong to dreamland, since there cannot be any physical or positivist test for it, and so the contradiction in which their system is involved, is ever recurring with increasing emphasis.

In fact, religion of some kind or other is found to be indispensable. Science must become a religion to the positivist. 'The starry heavens without and the moral law within,' *i.e.*, cosmic order and moral order, the one a scientific certainty, the other a practical reality, both infallibly sure and equally incontrovertible, must somehow or other in the absence of creeds and positive religious uses, be made to fill up the yawning chasm in man's emotional being, and excite all those deep feelings of awe and reverence and admiring contemplation which form essential qualities of divine worship. Thus love and piety are directed towards those objects which are living attestations of the presence of a supernatural power which while in nature is above nature, the Supreme Intelligence which in most marvellous manner designs, supports and governs all things and creatures to the wisest ends and the happiest issues.

But perhaps it may be said that it is the collective will of humanity that is the source of moral law, not the will of a personal God at all. Then what is the result? Why, humanity in the abstract becomes the object of worship and of profoundest homage. Humanity with all its vices and wickedness supplants God the Father of all, in the heart of the true and loving devotee of positive science. Or, if he makes the will 'autonomous,' *i.e.*, its own lawgiver, then he falls inevitably into the worse evil of self worship.

Further, if nature be considered the source of moral as of physical law, nature, the fertile mother of manifold crimes and cruelties as pointed out by J. S. Mill in his essays, is made the idol of man's highest and purest affections.

Again, fear and hope are found in experience to be two of the most powerful principles of activity in the human breast. But if the supernatural judgments of conscience, the eternal nemesis of wrong, the everlasting guardian of right, assure us of nothing more than a heaven and hell which belong to dreamland and which are as unsubstantial as the airy fictions of the fancy, what is to supply the needed impulse when the hope and fear of these is taken away?

What other motive of sufficient strength is to be brought to bear upon the great majority of men, who in the mass are unsusceptible of and never likely to be influenced by disinterested considerations, such as the beauty and dignity or the intrinsic worth of virtue and the love of truth for its own sake? The hope of heaven and the fear of hell, supposing hell to be nothing but the loss of the presence of God, of which the moral sense has assured men everywhere, have hitherto been found to exert an unspeakable energy for good on society. What on the positive scheme is henceforth in absence of these phantoms of dreamland, to stimulate hope and fear to great and disinterested deeds in order to indefinite progress and improvement? Why, the heaven of the positivist which is to inspire the needed enthusiasm is just this glowing picture of the future glories and conquests of humanity, to which positive science is to be directly and indefinitely conducive. A paradise shall be realized on earth in the new era of socialism, for the inauguration of which the positivists are earnestly striving, and whose revolutionary reforms and regime will, it is confidently affirmed, confer happiness and

content upon all classes, diffusing indefinitely the manifold conditions of enjoyment. It is conceived that this merely outward prosperity and bliss will constitute a firm and true test of the moral value of existence, in forgetfulness of the fact that that value must be (1) inward, or independent of external circumstances ; (2) of eternal and incalculable value ; and (3) absolute in the character of its obligations.

SECTION V.

TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL OR BIRTH SIN.

Three main theories of explaining the transmission of original sin have been propounded in the Church. (1) Traducianism, (2) Creationism, and (3) Pre-existence. Before proceeding to an historical account of these theories, there are certain preliminary matters of speculative interest worthy of attention, which may serve to clear the way for a better estimate and understanding of them.

SUB-SECTION I.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE PROBLEM.

It is an axiom of divinity that all sin implies guilt.

Hereditary guilt therefore is a co-relative of hereditary sin.

But it is another axiom of divinity that there can be no guilt apart from self action or the free energy of a personal will ; that guilt attaches to persons not to natures or states of being.

It has already been proved that sin is as universal as the species, and our business at present is with the manner of its transmission, which however mysterious, cannot invalidate the guilt of it, for if there were no guilt there could be no sin. If our sinful actions were so many determinations of a power outside our own wills, whether of nature or of another person, no guilt could attach to them, and the epithet 'sinful' would have no meaning.

Now if mankind was made up of an aggregate of atoms, with the mere superficial and accidental band of union arising from the influence of example, association, education, or interest, as the Pelagians and others affirm, the will of each being an atomistic and arbitrary force in the working machinery of society, with no deep ground or basis in the generic character of the race, there could be no room for a doctrine of hereditary guilt.

There must in the nature of things be an identity of character and will in the case of the individual and the genus out of which all the individuals spring. Original sin is a common feature of the genus, of which the collective wills of mankind partake, just as they do any other characteristics in common. But in the very idea of independence and originality inherent in will, there is present the condition of accountability and guilt, however mysterious the Scriptural idea of the identity of the wills of individuals with the will of Adam may appear. Herein lies the kernel of the apparently insurmountable difficulty of this whole question, since without concurrence in his sin how can we be guilty of his act? If we be guilty of original sin, the condition of accountability in free will cannot be wanting, however impossible it may be to attain to a perfectly satisfactory explanation.

It is a fact of each one's experience that in manifold ways his character is shaped and moulded by the social or hereditary influences in the midst of which he has been brought up, apart from direct or deliberate willing on his part. But no one will say that a latent or so to

speaking unconscious will has not been at work all the time, assenting to and imbibing the moral tone, mental peculiarities and sentiments, and otherwise conforming to the associations and prevalent maxims or usages with which the individual life has been environed. And on that ground it is apparent that each is responsible for whatever vice or depravity may have been derived to him in that way.

If both the more spontaneous as well as the more deliberate outcome of our fallen moral nature be universally depraved, we are compelled by the category of condition and consequent to infer, that the nature itself is essentially depraved, and further that its basis in the genus is depraved also ; ‘man’ in the abstract ‘being very far gone from original righteousness and of his own nature inclined to evil.’ Conscience as well as reason compels us not only to condemn actual sins but the fountain thereof in the heart and in the collective wills of the species with which every individual will is indissolubly bound up.

It is felt that the sin which has penetrated our nature, and is so deep rooted in our will that it seems to have entwined itself inseparably around our inner personality, is yet no part of

our true selves, being alien to our ideal of humanity, a violation or contradiction of our moral constitution, and therefore something that we are bound to condemn and put away. We cannot believe that our nature is depraved without our will, although we have no recollection of the earliest self determination of ourselves to evil; and certainly we can have no consciousness of direct concurrence in any act prior to and beyond our temporal life, whatever extra temporal existence may be conceivable. It is plain that we cannot in thought separate our individual existence or will from the deep basis of race or genus from which we sprang; and it is perceived that the general concurrence of all individual wills to sin is most satisfactorily understood and explained on the scriptural supposition of the essential unity of the genus and identification of individual wills with the will of Adam, whose transgression corrupted human personality at its very root, and gave it an inevitable determination to evil.

Three explicit explanations, as has been already said, have been offered by way of solution of the difficulty.

First, there is the idea of the natural headship

of Adam, in whom the whole race was comprised as in germ, and from whom has been derived by ordinary generation that depravity and corruption of nature, consequent on his sin, which has penetrated and been at once the active spring of perversion, and the passive material of evil, '*fomes peccati*,' in every individual of the race.

This view has been called the mediate or consequent imputation of Adam's sin, '*imputatio peccati Adamatici mediata vel consequens*,' and is the particular aspect most prominent in the ninth Article, where original sin is defined 'as the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam ; whereby he is of his own nature inclined to evil.' Not that a further view is excluded, since plainly the proposition 'it deserveth God's wrath and damnation' implies some other and higher idea. The mere transmission of qualities common to the species, amongst the rest, radical moral deterioration, will be further considered under the second sub-section, which is allotted to Traducianism.

Secondly, the idea of the moral headship of Adam, implying the unity of the collective wills

of mankind, is necessary to correct views, so far as attainable from Scripture. This moral or federal headship has as its basis the natural headship, since thereby the blending of wills and personalities as well as whole natures becomes as comprehensible as it can possibly be ; and without this blending of wills and personalities of the race in Adam, it seems impossible to conceive how each can be held responsible or guilty of his act, and ‘subject to God’s wrath and damnation.’ He was the representative of all mankind in the transaction. All their manifold personalities met together in him and consented in his act. This is a paradox of thought that attaches, and must attach to things universally according to the present constitution of nature, since men are not an aggregate of individual atoms, but form a solid and compact unity of spiritual organism, in which the weal or woe of every member is directly concerned. This view has been called the antecedent or immediate imputation of Adam’s sin, ‘*Imputatio peccati Adamatici antecedens vel immediata*,’ and is very consistent with ‘Creatianism,’ which will be the subject of the third sub-section ; since the personality wherein reside will, talent, and responsibility is

the divine element in man, whatever in each individual is original as well as moral shewing a special creative impress.

Thirdly, it will be seen in the fourth sub-section how a keen interest and anxious concern to secure perfectly satisfactory conditions for accountability and guilt led to the construction of the theory of Pre-existence, which from the time of Origen downward has received considerable countenance and has been revived with renewed earnestness and trenchant force of argument in our days.

In the concluding sub-section certain rationalistic explanations will claim some share of attention.

SUB-SECTION II.

TRADUCIANISM.

The theory of Traducianism, *i.e.*, the propagation of the soul 'per traducem' is most intimately associated with the name of Tertullian, A.D. 200, and is quite in keeping with his realistic and sensuous mode of apprehension.

In more modern times traducian opinions have in the interests of the doctrine of original sin been espoused by Gerhard, Calov, and other eminent Lutherans; whilst Calvin and other Reformed divines, Bellarmine and the Romanists advocate Creationism, which will be found perfectly reconcilable with that doctrine.

The great Anglican theologians of the seventeenth century, Jeremy Taylor for example in his able treatise on Repentance, inclined strongly to the 'creation' side of the question though the framers of our Article in the preceding century had a decidedly Lutheran and traducian bias.

The truest and best conception of traducianism will be obtained by direct reference to Tertullian, its most thorough and ablest expounder.

Turning to his learned treatise 'De Anima' we meet with the following passages, which will convey a full description of the propagation of the soul as of sin, *per traducem*, '*tradux animæ tradux peccati.*'

He quotes the Stoics as being of his opinion that "the soul is a corporeal substance generated with the body." Such was Zeno's opinion.

“Cleanthes, too, will have it that family likeness passes from parents to their children, not merely in bodily features, but in characteristics of the soul. . . . It is therefore as being corporeal that it is susceptible of likeness and unlikeness, and also of intercommunion of pain, suffering or distress.” *

“In the Gospel itself, there is the clearest evidence for the corporeal nature of the soul. In hell the soul of a certain man is in torment punished in flames, suffering excruciating thirst What is that which is removed to Hades after the separation of the body? I imagine the souls of the patriarchs to be there. . . . But whatever is incorporeal is incapable of being kept and guarded in any way : it is also exempt from either punishment or refreshment.” †

Certain appearances of souls in bodily shape amongst the Montanists are adduced by Tertullian in a following chapter by way of confirmation of his theory.

Again, “the soul we define to be sprung from the breath of God, immortal, possessing body, having form, simple in its substance, . . . developed out of one original source.” ‡

* *De Anima*, c. 5.† *Ibid.*, c. vii.‡ *Ibid.*, c. xxii.

“Those who profess the truth care nothing about their opponents, especially such of them as begin by maintaining that the soul is not conceived in the womb, nor is formed and produced at the time that the flesh is moulded.” *

“How then is the living being conceived? Is the substance of both body and soul formed together at one and the same time? Or does one of them precede the other in natural formation? We indeed maintain that both are conceived, formed, and perfected simultaneously, as well as born together. . . . For although we shall allow that there are two kinds of seed, that of the body and that of the soul, we still declare that they are inseparable, and therefore contemporaneous and simultaneous in origin. . . . The law of their combination ought to assure us, that the severance of both substances by means of death happens simultaneously. . . . These two different and separate substances, the clay and the breath, combined at the first creation in forming the individual man, and ever after communicated to the human race the normal mode of its propagation. . . . Accordingly from the one man comes the entire

* *Ibid*, c. xxv. "

overflow and redundance of men's souls." *

"Every soul by reason of its birth has its nature in Adam, until it is born again in Christ ; moreover it is unclean all the time that it remains without this regeneration, and because unclean it is actively sinful, and suffuses even the flesh, by reason of their conjunction, with its own shame." †

"Besides the evil which supervenes on the soul from the intervention of the evil spirit, there is an antecedent and in a certain sense natural evil, which arises from its corrupt origin " etc. ‡

Traducianism, when thus carefully surveyed, appears to fall little short of pure materialism. At best it is but one side of this very interesting question. It explains that the individual is like a mere shoot out of the parent stock, an organic link in the succession of the development of the species.

A very easy explanation of the transmission of sin is thus presented. Man as a product of the natural activity of the species inherits from his progenitors hereditary vices or corruption, and in turn hands over to his descendants the

* Ibid, c. xxvii.

† Ibid, c. xl.

‡ Ibid, c. xli.

peculiarities of his race, nation, family or personal constitution. Moral qualities are thus made to inhere in the organism and to be transmitted by ordinary propagation from parent to child in indefinite succession.

But if sin be a vice common to the species, like the natural vices of irrational creatures and propagated in the same way, *i.e.*, if sin has become since the fall of its first progenitors a natural quality, there can be no guilt, since guilt cannot attach to natures as such; and moral evil is therefore converted into a metaphysical defect.

Or, if the sinful tendency be a force derived to us mechanically from the act of our first parents, the self decision of our wills having no imaginable part in it, the condition of accountability is altogether wanting.

On such a one-sided scheme, would not the natural recoil from the imputation of hereditary guilt be justified? And would not the Pelagian position, '*Deus qui propria peccata remittit non aliena imputat*' hold good?

Yet traducianism is not wanting in Scriptural support, as is well instanced in the familiar passage, "Behold I was shapen in iniquity and in sin did my mother conceive me."

SUB-SECTION III.

CREATIANISM.

According to Creatianism the soul of each one comes directly from the formative hand of God, pure and undefiled, and is at a certain moment united with the body, soul and body developing simultaneously in the womb.

Each one bears in his character some distinctive impress or other of his divine origin, certain particular features of the 'Logos' after whose image man is made. The creative moment is more conspicuous in men of great originality and talent. In those of a less primitive type, mere off-shoots or links in the succession of the development of the genus, it is less discernible. Still it is present in the peculiar idiosyncrasy which marks each one out from all other.

Scripture is apt and pertinent in some very suggestive passages. The text "my substance was not hid from thee, when I was made in secret and curiously wrought. . . . Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being imperfect ; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned," would appear to form quite a description of creatianism.

But the word of the Lord, which struck the

ears of Jeremiah, gives utterance to a still more explicit statement. "Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee; and before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee, and I ordained thee a prophet unto the nations."

In giving prominence to the principle of freedom, that 'eternal particularity' in each, whereby the 'individualizing activity' of the Creator is more conspicuously manifested, and the image of God displayed in humanity, creationism has been thought by some to be less consistent with the doctrine of original sin, than the '*tradux animi tradux peccati*' of Tertullian; still it soon became more generally adopted, being judged by the majority of Church teachers more conformable to the truth of Scripture, and more conservative of the higher interests of Christian doctrine.

It is true that Pelagius adopted this opinion, since it seemed to suit his theory of the 'atomism' of the will better than any other. "We believe," says he, "that souls are given by God; we say that they have been made by him; we anathematise those, who" like the Gnostics in their theory of Emanation, "say that souls are a part of the divine substance."

Creationism is quite as much opposed to the identity or monism of the pantheism of the present day as to the 'emanation' of souls from the 'pleroma' of the theosophist of the second and third centuries.

But it is not at absolute variance with Traducianism, since the error of either view consists in too exclusive contemplation of its own particular side of truth, to the negation of its antithesis, truth having here as elsewhere two poles of contrasted character. The notion of inherited depravity and the necessary dependence of the individual on the genus may seem to some more difficult to explain from the point of view of creationism, just as the distinctive divine impress in the endless originality and individuality of human character, the 'eternal germ of freedom,' may appear inexplicable by a one sided traducianism.

S. Augustine, though traducianism seemed to be more congruent with his views of original or hereditary sin, shrank from it, because of its sensuous or materialistic tendency. He refused to decide one way or other without express warrant from the word of God. "Where Holy Scripture," he says, "does not express itself

clearly on an obscure subject, human presumption must be checked. Though I do not know how all things are to be explained on this point, yet I believe the Scripture would have been explicit, if we could not have been left in ignorance without injury." *

Lactantius, A.D. 320, very explicitly taught creatianism. "The manner of the production of souls belong entirely to God alone. In fine, we are all sprung from a heavenly seed : all have that same Father. For nothing but what is mortal can be generated from mortals. . . . Souls are not given by parents but by one and the same God and Father of all, who alone has the law and method of their birth, since He alone produces them," etc. †

But such statements are not inconsistent with traducianism since, as S. Augustine in reference to S. Jerome who inferred creatianism from the text "My Father worketh hitherto" remarks, "God gives the souls even if he give them through the medium of natural descent," the continuous agency of the Creator being co-extensive with the natural activity of the species.

* De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, ii., sec. 59.

† De Opif. Dei., c. xix.

S. Jerome, A.D. 420, in rejecting the other views, speaks of creatianism as the orthodox opinion, even though the greatest part of Church teachers in the West up to his day clung to traducianism.

Leo the Great, A.D. 461, also pronounced it to be the true Church doctrine.

The Council of Constantinople, A.D. 540, decided, in opposition to the pre-existence theory of Origen, that "the soul is created contemporaneously with the body." The Church following the divine Scriptures so understood it.

This formula of simultaneous creation adopted by the Greek Church, *τὴν ψυχὴν συνδημιουργηθῆναι τῷ σώματι*, is found in Theodoret.*

In opposition to the 'emanation' of the Gnostics, the value of creatianism had all along been understood in the Eastern Church, and accordingly this form of opinion became generally adopted after the time of S. Jerome. Indeed S. Gregory of Nyssa, and S. Anastasius Sinaita, were the only eminent orientals who ever espoused traducianism.

K. R. Hagenbach gives a concise summary

* Fab. Hær., v. 9, p. 414.

of the opinions of the Schoolmen. Anselm defended creatianism negatively. . . Hugo of S. Victor pronounced positively in favor of it. . . Robert Pulleyn brought forward some very singular and abstruse arguments against traducianism. . . Peter Lombard also espoused creatianism in decided terms. . . Thomas Aquinas on making a distinction between the *anima sensitiva* and *anima intellectiva*, says that the former is propagated in a physical manner, while the latter is created by God. . . Odo of Cambray designated creatianism as the orthodox doctrine." *

The supposition of a pure spirit, created by God and implanted in every man at the period of his first formation, certainly obviates the notion of necessity in one direction, inasmuch as each is thereby secured of a power or energy of resistance to evil as well as of a positive disposition and will towards goodness; but, as is easily perceived, the theory runs directly into another kind of necessity, since the spirit at its first origin is intimately united to a gross body and other earthly conditions which make sin inevitable. Creatianism is in this way subject to

* Compendium of the History of Doctrines, vol. ii., p. 2.

a charge of making God the author of sin; although the theory has the appearance of so decided an advantage over traducianism, in that it furnishes a sure ground of guilt by the recognition of a divine germ of freedom or self decision in the created personality, whilst the personality of each is adequately explained as a special and direct product of the individualizing activity of the Creator.

SUB-SECTION IV.

PRE-EXISTENCE.

Very strong objections to the two previous theories are met with in the writings of Henry More, to whom we have already referred as the most prominent divine of the Cambridge school of Platonists in the seventeenth century. 'The first opinion (Traducianism)' he says, 'is a plain contradiction to the notion of a soul, which being spirit is of an indivisible or indiscerptible essence. The second opinion (Creatianism) implies both an indignity to the majesty of God in making him the chief actor, in the most particular way in which the divinity can be conceived to act, in abominable crimes of adultery, etc., by supplying those foul coitions

with new created souls, etc. ; and also an injury to the souls themselves, which being made by the immediate hand of God, pure, innocent, immaculate, are imprisoned in unclean, diseased and disordered bodies ; where so very many of them seem to be so fatally overmastered and in such an incapacity of closing with goodness and virtue, that they must needs be adjudged to that extreme calamity which attends all those who forget God. Wherefore these two opinions being so incongruous, what is there left that can seem probable but the pre-existence of the soul.*

With the erudition of a Cicero, the theory of pre-existence might have been traced back many centuries previous to Plato, but certainly in his "Phædo" it is stated in a very argumentative manner. "Indeed according to that doctrine, Socrates, which you are frequently in the habit of advancing, if it be true that our learning is nothing else than reminiscence, it is surely necessary that we must at some former time have learned what we now remember. But this is impossible unless our soul existed somewhere, before it came into this human form. . . We admit surely that if any one be reminded

* Philosophical Works. Immortality of the soul, p. 111.

of anything, he must needs have known that thing at some time or other before. . . . For example, we must know abstract equality before the time when on first seeing equal things, we perceived that they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in doing so. . . . If, therefore, having this before we were born, we were born possessing it, we knew both before we were born, and as soon as we were born, not only the equal and the greater and the smaller, but all things of the kind ; for our present discussion is not more respecting equality than the beautiful itself, the good, the just, and the holy, and in one word, respecting everything which we mark with the seal of existence ; so that we must necessarily have had a knowledge of all these before we were born."

Origen, A.D. 210, is the most learned and distinguished expounder of this view in the Christian Church. "In Adam," he says, "is represented what relates to all human nature; not that we are to understand that he is a type of the good and evil tendencies of mankind, but inasmuch as the history of his fall in Genesis is a symbolic representation of the fall of souls. . . . The expulsion from Paradise

had a mystical sense ; paradise is a symbol of that heavenly region from which souls have fallen. The coats of skins denote the bodies which form the prison of souls." *

There is the less need to go further into the erudite speculations of this Father, or refer at length to the distinguished support it received from Duns Scotus and others during the succession of Christian centuries, since the theory has been revived under very bright auspices in modern times.

It is, however, well worth the while to refer once more to the Cambridge Platonists of the seventeenth century. " I shall not," says Henry More, " press the reasonableness of this opinion only from a comparison of it with others, but also from the concinnity that is to be found in itself. For it is no greater wonder that every particular man's soul which lives now upon earth, should be *a mundo condito*, than the particular matter of their bodies which has undergone many millions of alterations. . . . So that *de facto* they do bear the same date with the creation of the world, that the unavoidable certainty of the pre-existence of the souls of

* Contra Celsum, c. iv., sec. 40.

brutes does. . . . The attributes of God and the face of things in the world, out of which his providence is not to be excluded, are very strong reasons thereof to a mind unprejudiced. For, first, if it be good for the souls of men to be at all, the sooner they are the better. But we are most certain that the wisdom and goodness of God will do that which is best ; and therefore if they can enjoy themselves before they come into these terrestrial bodies, they must be in a capacity of enjoying themselves without them for long periods of time before they appeared in this age of the world. For nothing hinders that they may live before they come into the body, as well as they may after they go out of it. . . . Again, the face of Providence seems very much to suit with this opinion, there being no other so easy and natural account of things most harsh and evil in the affairs of men than this hypothesis, *that their souls did once subsist in some other state, where in several manners and degrees, they forfeited the favor of the Creator. And so according to that just nemesis, which he has interwoven in the constitution of the universe and of their own natures, they undergo the several calamities and asperities of fortune,*

and sad dangers of fate, as a punishment inflicted, or a disease contracted from the several obligations of their apostacy, which key is able to unlock the recondite mystery of some particular men's almost fatal averseness from all religion and virtue, their stupidity, dulness, and almost invincible slowness to those things from their very childhood, and their incorrigible propension to all manner of vice; . . . which sad scene of things must needs exceedingly cloud and obscure the ways of divine providence and make them utterly unintelligible, unless some light be let in from the present hypothesis." *

As brief a historical account as possible will now be given of the ingenious super-structure of argument of Julius Müller in defence of the opinion before us, which is likely to play a prominent part in all future speculations on the subject, giving fresh and increased impetus to the study. It will be best to describe it by way of abstract in his own words.

‘The derivation of original sin from a fall preceding man's temporal life does not surrender either of the fundamental principles or axioms of Hamartiology, which must be maintained

* Immortality of the soul, p. 115.

inviolable, namely, first, the universality of sin in the human race, its deep rooted presence in the nature of the species ; and, secondly, personal responsibility and guilt arising from the wilful self perversion of the creature, there being no such thing as a necessity to sin, whether from divine ordainment or otherwise.

‘ On the one hand, the true notion of sin, as a disturbance or discord which ought not to be precludes the idea of it forming a necessary element in human progress or development : on the other, the conception of guilt implies an act of free self decision on the part of the sinner, apart from which there can be no accountability.

‘ Holy Scripture, at least in one passage, Eph. ii., 3, declares that every human being is guilty, as he is by nature, and therefore from his birth. The Church too has ever recognised inborn guilt in its practice of infant baptism.

‘ It comes to the same thing, if we attach guilt only to actual sin and yet allow that all actual sin inevitably springs from inborn sinfulness. An inborn sinfulness, which makes every one guilty, is itself indissolubly connected with guilt. Thus we are driven to the idea of a sinfulness LYING BEYOND OUR INDIVIDUAL

EXISTENCE IN TIME, a sinfulness which either directly or in its consequences involves guilt and therefore must have its origin in our personal self-decision. It affects our conduct, our entire development from the very beginning, and yet it can only have its origin in our own act.*

Müller argues that 'if there be any unconditioned freedom, any pure outgo of self-decision from the undecided in human life, it must be found at the commencement of the development, since a constant reference to a past, which contains in its bosom the germ of the present, sends us continually back from one stage to another, till we reach the very beginning of conscious moral development in the individual.

'But if there were at the outset of our conscious life any such individual fall, wherein the will emerged from a state of pure indeterminateness into a decision to commit sin, this first dark deed, casting its ghastly shadow over our whole life, would surely leave an indelible mark on our memory. Who can definitely say when and how he for the first time acted in opposition to his awakened moral consciousness? We discover previously to the earliest of our conscious

* *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, vol. ii., p. 358.

transgressions other things which prepared the way for them, and accordingly a primary act of sinful decision cannot in this manner be arrived at.

‘It is not at all conceivable that this most important decision as to the character of the moral life would be left to the weakness of childhood. No one doubts that a lower degree of accountability attaches to the act of a child. Is the decision of the will on the part of the child to be exclusively that on which the whole weight of accountability is to rest?

‘The attempt to find a spot in our present life wholly unconditioned by anything preceding it, compels us in the course of inquiry to LOOK BEYOND THE REGION OF THE TEMPORAL IN ORDER TO FIND THE ORIGINAL SOURCE OF OUR FREEDOM. If the moral condition, in which we find man, apart from redemption, depends upon himself, the result of his own self-decision; if the testimony of conscience, which imputes to us our transgressions; and if the witness of religion, that God is not the author of sin, but hates it, be true, human freedom must have its beginning in a sphere beyond the range of time, wherein alone pure and unconditioned self

determination is possible. In this region we must seek that power of original choice which precedes and conditions all sinful decision in time.'

The key to a very obtrusive mystery involved in pre-existence, may be found in what Müller repeatedly insists on, 'that an extra-temporal self decision on the side of evil cannot be the object matter of our empirical consciousness, because being extra-temporal, it lacks that determinateness, necessary to its being conceived as an act. As reflected in our present consciousness it appears not as an evil *deed* but as an evil state, a permanent and sinful condition, and as a state involving guilt on our part.'

Our author in a mystico-speculative manner not unusual to him speaks of the 'silent, timeless realm of shades, the womb wherein all personal beings lie concealed in embryo. Here are the simple undetermined rudiments of our being, which precede its concrete realization. We must look here for the power of deciding either for free union with God by submission to his will or for the assertion of self dependence.

'We do not possess any consciousness of this intelligible, ideal existence, conditioning our life

in time, nor of this primary decision, because (1) as Schelling remarks, it precedes and determines the nature, and therefore precedes consciousness itself; and (2) because the non-temporal beings, in whom it takes place, have not yet attained the full reality of personal existence. They can hardly be conscious of their own nature before they exist in the distinctiveness of each individual, save as they perceive in God, in the infiniteness of his nature, those elements which according to God's creative will are reflected in man. They recognise themselves, *i.e.*, humanity in its general features, in *the mirror of God*. Hence in their temporal life two facts appear; on the one hand they possess an intuitive and immediate knowledge of God; and on the other hand their knowledge of God is moulded and formed by means of the conception of man. Every real awakening of the God-consciousness, as it forms a necessary element of the inner life, every elevation of the soul to God, is a resort to its original and extra-temporal state.'

Thus, it is contended, there are 'facts indicative of this extra-temporal decision in the consciousness of every thoughtful and earnest

man, which are tantamount to a remembrance of an original act conditioning the moral character of his present life.'

It is also contended that 'our conviction of personal immortality can be established on philosophic grounds, and beyond the reach of doubt, only upon the recognition of the principle, that the germ of personality has its origin beyond the boundaries of time.'

'The natural corruption of the will is in its essence that inborn selfishness, to which the ego has inclined itself apart from and before all time. . . . Herein is revealed the unfathomable depth of our consciousness of guilt, and the mystery of that inextinguishable melancholy and sadness, which lies hidden at the foundation of all human consciousness, being most profound in the noblest natures.'

'The spiritual ego or self, which is the extra-temporal germ of conditioned personality, is the essential ground of solicitation to a decision which may be evil. . . . The possibility of such a decision becoming dominant, and a fall from God taking place, exists in extra-temporal consciousness only as something ever to be avoided, and thus the spiritual ego or self would

enter its temporal life in a state of purity. But as the ego emerges into self determination from the subjectively undetermined, there is nothing whatever to prevent its primary decision breaking through the eternal order of things, and realizing the possibility of alienation from God.

‘This extra-temporal self-perversion is not universal. If we were to transfer the universality of temporal evil into the sphere of the intelligible or real, that very metaphysical necessity, which has been got rid of by the theory, would reappear in its most destructive form, exactly where it should be overcome and resolved into pure freedom.

‘If we give due weight to the conception of freedom in the extra-temporal sphere, we shall be led to the belief which may be found in the religion of almost every nation, that a portion of the Spirit world has by original self-decision formed for itself a moral existence in undisturbed harmony with God, and thus develops its created innocence into free holiness.

‘If we have to allow that all extra-temporal beings belonging to the human species, and in whom the conception of humanity is realized, participated in that original decision and guilt,

how are we to avoid the inference that this guilt necessarily follows from certain elements included in the very conception of humanity? We know of one human will, whose original self-decision must have been in harmony with God's. May not innumerable essences of the same order with ourselves, by their original act, have resolved not to realize the possibility of evil, though we possess no definite knowledge of their consequent state?'

This view in its main points is maintained to be in harmony with Holy Scripture. 'The testimony of Scripture fails in one fundamental principle of the theory, namely, that concerning the extra-temporal self-decision of created personalities, but, it is asserted, that this amounts only to a want of direct statement. Holy Scripture is not intended to give us speculative knowledge; and experience abundantly testifies that it only hinders the fair interpretation of Scripture when the effort is made at all hazards to confirm by isolated texts and Scripture phrases what theological investigation has speculatively thought out. Each mode of procedure should be kept distinct. Apostolic development of Christian doctrine fulfils one purpose, systematic

and speculative theology another. All we need prove is that this speculative element does not contradict Holy Scripture. Moreover whatever Holy Scripture does teach, whether of fact or doctrine, is considered as implying and leading on thereto.'

This view has been charged by Dr. J. A. Dorner of Berlin, with being unduly 'atomistic' and overlooking the collective consciousness, whereby the personal consciousness is too much isolated from the sin and guilt of the species. J. Müller denies that he does so, and accordingly the question remains open and undecided, if indeed it be not insoluble.

SUB-SECTION V.

RATIONALISTIC EXPLANATIONS OF THE TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL SIN.

Reference has already been made in the second section of the 'Hamartialogy' to the realistic conception of sin in Pfleiderer's exegesis of Rom. v. 12. "The one act of the first man is obviously *not his mere personal*, individually limited act, but in the view of the Apostle, *at the same time that of the race*. It is conse-

quently by no means he who happened to be the *first* man, selected by chance from among the rest, but man in general, man as man, who has placed himself in the relation of a sinner to God. This at bottom means that the relation of man to God is, *a priori*, previously to all contingent individual action, therefore from the beginning and of necessity, that of alienation and contradiction." *

This realistic conception of original sin had been propounded before in another form, which however amounts very much to the same thing, by Odo of Cambray, A.D. 1113, and other schoolmen. The ground of it in each was conceived to be the merely organic or natural unity and identity of the species. Human nature in its entirety was bound up in Adam as the oak in the acorn, and shot out its branches and bore the fruit of its native and corrupt stock with the same spontaneity and necessity.

This naturalistic conception of original sin is explicitly enough expounded by S. Thomas Aquinas. Mankind shared the same physical nature which Adam corrupted by the fall, and hence by necessity became involved in the

* Pfleiderer's Paulinism, p. 44.

painful consequences of it. The fall consisted not in positive corruption of nature, but in the deprivation of original righteousness, and the consequent want of restraint of the principle of 'concupiscence.' This is merely a negative conception of original sin and cannot therefore involve guilt, since 'concupiscence,' unless carried out into act by the will, 'has not in itself (*vere et proprie*) the nature of sin,' according to the scholastic conception.

Bellarmino and other Romanists adopt these views. The '*pura naturalia*' remain in fallen man. Hereditary sin and guilt is virtually denied, being made simply to consist in the deprivation of supernatural grace. The 'golden bridle' of original righteousness having been removed, the natural will and reason lacked sufficient authority to check and control the impulses and passions or other '*pura naturalia*' which in themselves could have no sin.

Göschel endeavours to develop the true significance of realism. A self dependent personality, according to him, forms the essence of the species, which is realized in humanity collectively, but which existed personally in Adam as the subject of the fall. There, by its own

deliberate act, it was tainted with the sin and guilt which henceforth became a common characteristic of the race. Of course a main objection to this and other forms of Realism is that there could be no sinless Christ, He as man being *virtualiter* and *seminaliter* in Adam.

Schleiermacher and others explain the guilt of original sin from the point of view of divine Omniscience. God foresaw that all men would have sinned as bad or worse than Adam, if they had been placed either successively or collectively in his circumstances, a consideration which Schleiermacher thinks fit ground for imputation. This explanation evidently proceeds on the supposition of a previous or necessary defect or other evil inherent in the race, else how should not some or many of the swarming millions of mankind, in possession of real freedom, be conceived as able to preserve their innocence and integrity if they had been placed in as favourable a position as Adam.

It has been held by others that man in his natural state has with the loss of real freedom foregone true personality. He indeed possesses the 'velleitas' of an enslaved will, 'servum arbitrium,' and the capacity of true personality,

which however cannot realize itself, until freedom in its widest sense be supernaturally restored in redemption by Christ. Hence being able to exercise no really free personal acts, fallen man is sinful of necessity and can have no guilt attributed to him. Incapable of righteousness, he cannot even of his own will turn himself to Christ or come under saving influences. And when by the operations of irresistible grace he undergoes conversion and regeneration, *i.e.*, his real personality is restored in Christ, he can then only, as if by magical transformation, have self decision for good. This theory therefore appears very much to reduce man, whether in his natural or regenerate condition, to the position of an automaton or irresponsible creature.

In view of the moral enervation arising from the prevalence of merely negative views of evil which involve necessity, and the special pleading or apology with the Almighty on the ground of original sin put forward by truly devout minds in certain pious hymns and devotional exercises, a strong protest on behalf of duty and responsibility or an accountability in proportion to privilege is needed in our day.

SECTION VI.

*SIN IN RELATION TO THE ABSOLUTE
CAUSALITY.*

OMNIPOTENCE AND OMNISCIENCE OF GOD.

It is proposed in the present section to proffer certain considerations, with a view of obviating some very great difficulties that readily suggest themselves, and painfully exercise the thoughts of some serious and reflective persons.

SUB-SECTION I.

*SIN IN RELATION TO THE ABSOLUTE CAUSALITY
OF GOD.*

Sin is regarded by supralapsarian Calvinists as the negative pre-supposition of redemption, and therefore ordained by God. But if it be ordained by God, it cannot be evil in reality, though it may appear so to our finite consciousness. Otherwise God is the author of evil, which is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the argument.

If evil again on the hypothesis of identity, as in the pantheism of Hegel, has been ordained as an indispensable means of good, providing a

never failing incentive to exertion and development, apart from which there would be no fountain of moral life either to God or man, it is itself no longer evil, but perfectly eligible and good. This view has been characterised as 'the play of the absolute with itself.'

Thus, upon the above theory, the conscience which condemns the sinner, and the conscience which repudiates the sin, must be equally delusive, serving, it is true, the useful purpose of a spur or incentive to effort and progress.

How to reconcile the all-conditioning causality of the Almighty and the absolute dependence of the creature upon God, with the equally indisputable fact of independent causality in the creature, or a power of self action which renders sin and guilt as well as moral good possible, is the cardinal puzzle and paradox of this subject.

The all-conditioning causality of the Almighty, it is presumed, means that God prescribes certain bounds or limits to the working of his creatures, within which they are permitted to exercise certain preferences or free choices, which may be said to constitute the chief happiness of existence. Absolute causality cannot

be inconsistent with the ordainments of a moral character and will in the Supreme Being.

The difficulty will be further obviated, if we clearly distinguish the creative from the providential activity of the Almighty, because if we identify them as the theory before alluded to does, making providence a continuous creation, there will be no way of getting out of entanglement and error.

Creation implies the commencement or accomplishment of something new, and is co-extensive with, though perfectly distinct from providence, which is simply the sustaining and controlling by the Almighty of what has been already created, or exists in fact.

We know from science and Revelation alike, that from the beginning onwards there were successive re-arrangements of the inorganic matter of the globe and creations on a large scale of plant and animal life, probably myriads of years apart, and that during the further course of divine providence in the Church of God, there happened divers and manifold miracles, which were so many distinct workings of creative power, not to speak of regeneration or the recreative work of grace in the heart,

which looks forward to its completion in the new heavens and the new earth.

Now the creative activity of God ever effects what is distinctively good as well as new. 'All that God makes is good,' must be regarded as an axiomatic proposition, or first truth in divinity; whereas providence sustains and governs all things, indifferent as to their nature and properties. Whether good or bad, rational or irrational, wise or foolish, all are equally the objects of watchful solicitude, having their wants provided for, with strength sufficient ministered to fulfil their functions in the several provinces assigned to them. Sinner and saint have their own part to accomplish in the general economy of the world, under the guardianship of the Almighty.

It will thus be seen that the absence of sin from the universe is by no means necessary to the absoluteness of the divine causality, which within certain bounds hedges in the determinations and acts of created freedom. An impossibility of sinning in a state of imperfection and probation would be a contradiction in terms, a negation of human personality, apart from which man might be a passive instrument

of a higher power, but would have no capacity of moral good. There would on such an hypothesis, abstracting from the idea of the 'Societas Angelica' during its probation and other (unknown) kinds of moral creatures elsewhere, be no reflection or image in creation of the absolute self consciousness and self determination of the Almighty, no possibility of communion and fellowship of the creature with the Creator, which however involves the terrible possibility of the contrary.

SUB-SECTION II.

SIN IN RELATION TO THE DIVINE OMNIPOTENCE.

As surely as the divine law which condemns sin, and the redemption of Christ which destroys it, are ordained of God, so surely sin cannot have been ordained by him.

Sin is no negation but a reality which is directly contrary to the divine nature and working, and cannot fall in the way of God's decrees, since his will is essentially holy, and everything evil is everlastingly hateful and hostile to him.

Sin, therefore, can apparently have no other source than the independent or unconditioned

activity, or the consciously free self determination of the creature.

But how is this independence of the human will to be reconciled with the absolute power of God? Is such a self dependent causality of the creature not inconsistent with the divine omnipotence? Is omnipotence still omnipotence, if it allow such a power independent of itself?

It is futile to say that man's self decision is at the same time an act of God in us, in other words, that the efficiency of finite causes is identical with the divine working throughout the universe, because it is contradictory to attribute the sinful issues of creaturely activity to God.

Again, to affirm that a relatively unconditioned power of self action in man is a mere subjective feeling of the individual, having no reality in the divine apprehension, or that his 'free will' follows a law of sequence just as other natural forces do, would be to establish an omnipotence destructive at once of the divine holiness and of man's guilt.

Now let us inquire what is meant by omnipotence. Does limitless power imply a necessity of realizing every possibility; in other words, is

power, will, and working identical? If so, sin may enter into the divine ordainments from the beginning. But if God were under a necessity of realizing every possibility, sin amongst the number, what would become of the divine holiness and love, which cannot be divorced from omnipotence? Would not God really be sensible of a limitation from without, were he conscious of any necessity obliging him to realize everything which he had the power of realizing?

Omnipotence ought rather to be defined to be a limitless power to do what God wills, or whatever is not inconsistent with his nature. Otherwise the Deity himself would be the slave of a blind fatality. A brute, impersonal necessity, the 'fate' of the Stoic, would lord it over all things.

The very idea of will implies a sphere of possibility and of self limitation. We have here to do with an Almighty ego or self, whose omnipotence must be directed and controlled in its workings by the co-ordinate attributes of infinite holiness and love. Apart from the notion of absolute personality, omnipotence would be deprived of its moral and spiritual import, and reduced to a mere physical entity.

God wills nothing but what is good. But moral good is the product of free created wills. It springs from the deliberate choice and conscious self determination of the creature, and of course implies in it the possibility of the contrary.

It is necessary, therefore, in order to leave room for the exercise of created freedom, that the divine omnipotence shall out of love and for the perfection of creation limit itself in this sphere, and thereby in the truest and highest sense prove itself to be omnipotence, the absoluteness of that omnipotence being secured and recommended to us by the bounds or limits which itself has voluntarily assigned to the self conscious determination of the creature.

A principle of such independence has thus been created and placed in the breast of every human being, whereby each may voluntarily determine himself, either to live in communion with God and bring forth the happy fruits of obedience and holiness, or to withdraw from that blessed fellowship and surrender himself to be determined to evil.

Nothing of ours which is not the offspring of free will can be acceptable, or made account of by God. It is the hearty and willing self

surrender of one's self to him, which he expects and requires. Moral good has its spring in love, which is the principle of self limitation in the creature as it is in God himself, and freely determines us to holiness.

Perfect communion of the human personality with the uncreated personality of God, out of a spirit of unqualified renunciation and self surrender, is the final end to which the divine dealings in the economy of salvation conspire. Hence redemption is the main sphere for the highest exercise of the divine omnipotence. The reconciliation of the sinner to God, and the putting an end to sin, are its two crowning works. Thus the cross of Christ is appropriately termed by the Apostle "the power of God" as well as "the wisdom of God," it being the main means provided for savingly impressing and bringing about the final regeneration and sanctification of mankind.

SUB-SECTION III.

SIN IN RELATION TO THE DIVINE OMNISCIENCE.

If God from eternity discern all the self decisions of the human will, does such discernment not make every self-decision a necessity,

since all determinations of the will or self actions, discerned by God, cannot fail of accomplishment? Our consciousness of a power of self decision, or freedom, would thus be reduced to a subjective illusion.

But, in the *first* place, consider human analogies. From the character of any one, and from the circumstances and influences with which he is surrounded, you may have an approximately perfect discernment of the way in which he will act on a given occasion, but such discernment does not militate against, or interfere with, the independence or self conditioning power of the person.

Christ discerned accurately that S. Peter would deny, and that Judas would betray him, but his clear discernment cannot be said to have determined them to these wicked acts.

And so from prophecy, which is a miracle of knowledge, whereby the servants of God were enabled to see clearly the characters and events that were to pass over the stage of human history in the remote future, no determining influence can be said to have been derived to the actors, since until the accomplishment of the transactions, there was no key to open the

prophetical cipher. The fulfilment alone furnished the interpretation, apart from which fulfilment men could have the merest guesses, and could not have consciously and designedly contributed toward the result.

In the *second* place, the distinction between knowledge and will, so fundamental and cardinal in psychology, has an important bearing on the subject before us.

The philosophy of identity, so much in vogue in Germany at the present day, maintains that it violates the idea of the Absolute to attribute to God the consciousness of anything independent of himself and co-existing with him, and that therefore it is not allowable to make any distinction between his knowledge and will. His thinking and knowledge are creative and one with his will. "In so far as God thinks anything he ordains it to be, not as something distinct from himself, but as an element of his self realization in the finite, or as an immanent effect of his absolute causality."

The divine cognition and volition are in this scheme commensurate. Discernment of human actions on the part of God, or foreknowledge, is one with predestination. There is no room

left for self decision or free self conditioning on the part of man. Freedom of will is no reality but an illusion of the finite consciousness.

But there is no more primary distinction in the sphere of spirit than that between intellect and will. We have no other means of forming conceptions of the absolute intelligence, than from the created transcripts in the intelligence of man, and from Revelation vouchsafed in the language of man.

From analogy to human intelligence, there is no difficulty in understanding that the sphere of the discernment of the divine mind may be wider and more general than that of a volition, which however omnipotent, is yet conditioned by a love and holiness of infinite magnitude and intensity.

If the loving will of God require an objective universe for its manifestation, all the manifold excellences of the divine character must find in it a certain reflection and embodiment. Is it reasonable to suppose that wisdom, power, goodness, were to be clearly discerned in the works of the Creator's hand, whilst the higher factors of personality were to have no living transcripts in self determining and consciously free agents, although the possession of freedom

involved the terrible possibility of moral evil? The realization of evil through the perversion of the relatively unconditioned faculty of self decision in the creature might be discerned or foreknown by God, though the divine volition could not possibly have had any share in it. The will of God is essential holiness and therefore experiences self limitation in the sphere of self conscious and self determining creatures, who are left to the free exercise of their freedom.

The Socinian or Pelagian position is, that the future free actions of men, being contingent, are not knowable beforehand in their contents. It is allowed in a general way that God knows and wills the free and unconditioned as such.

But, in the *third* place, some light and help for the clearing up of this very difficult subject may be derived from a consideration of the great difference between the eternal and absolute character of the divine knowledge, and the subjective and temporal form of human conception, however analogous in other respects.

We cannot however conceive the absolute knowledge of God to be altogether extra-temporal and ideal, transcending the sphere of finite reality.

As a modern divine remarks, "if the reality of the world did not exist in the divine cognition, it could not exist by means of the divine will."

"As space itself, together with everything existing in space, is included within the divine consciousness, so is time itself, as well as everything developed in time, in like manner included."

"God in so far as we attribute to him a perfect discernment of the human mind in its intellectual activity, and therefore a perfect discernment of that form of thought, which we call time, in virtue of which everything is temporal, must recognise herein, as in a mirror, the sum of human actions as a succession in time."

God's extra-temporal or timeless, transcendental or ideal knowledge is thus not inconsistent with but rather includes a perfect discernment of time and the other forms or categories, by means of which the created mind forms its concepts and knowledge.

Omniscience, however, whilst embracing, transcends the limits of finitude, and this consideration obviates any supposed dualism between the divine knowledge and will. To the eternal mind time is not a succession of moments as

it is to us. To it the idea of the world in its entirety and fulness has been present from all eternity. If you attribute to God the vision of what is ever present, the difficulty of reconciling the divine omniscience with human freedom will disappear. Forms of human apprehension, past, present, future, are not necessary to the divine perception. God sees the end from the beginning. The thing which happens to-day is not better known to Him than it was myriads of years ago, and will not lose any of its particularity of incident myriads of years hereafter.

The representation, that God knows things in their causes, and from the merest germ and beginning can trace beforehand the ultimate issues, that is to say, can see through the long succession of sequences from the beginning to the end of time, just as every later action or new event sprang by necessity from that which preceded, would appear to bind all things together by the mechanical law of cause and effect, and leave no room for the operation of created freedom, which thus becomes a subjective illusion.

The absolute knowledge of God implies an

ever present intuition of the self decisions of all human wills, without any necessity of supposing a direct exertion of influence by him on these decisions. The whole panorama of earthly history may indeed every moment be reflected in the divine consciousness as in a mirror. The part which every one contributes directly or indirectly to the realization of the divine ideal, to which all things conspire, may be as an absolute reality, ever present to the mind of the Omniscient. But who will say that such eternal knowledge, however perfect, that is, true to objective reality, contributes any thing to the self action of individuals, whereby the ends of history are brought about, any more than the prophetic knowledge and word interfered with human freedom or contributed to the accomplishment of predictions however infallible?

SUB-SECTION IV.

SIN IN RELATION TO THE HOLINESS OF GOD.

This section may conveniently be concluded by the mention of an argument easy and ready at hand in controversy with the unbeliever, since really the burden of proof lies with him on his lower platform.

The question is of the co-existence and compatibility of wickedness in the creature with the principle of inviolable holiness in the Creator.

The two things certainly appear to be incompatible, but the same incompatibility meets us on the platform of the positivist, since goodness is realized side by side with wickedness in human experience, however inconsistent or incompatible the two principles seem to be.

Moral evil is found co-extensive with the whole province of human life just as physical evil is universal in the domain of nature. When the positivist can explain why and how they are co-existent and compatible with the goodness manifested quite as universally ; why and how the abnormal asserts itself often with mastering might side by side with the normal in human life and in the world at large ; then the theist will have an easy task in satisfying him that sin in the creature is not inconsistent with inflexible and unspotted holiness in God.

To infer that the Deity is malevolent or cruel, because wrong and violence too often have the upper hand in the moral world, just as rapacity and savagery exercise merciless sway in the domain of brute nature, or as cataclysms and

destruction prevail in the physical sphere, would be quite as irrational as to put forward a proposition affirming that goodness was of a hurtful and pernicious character because there generally went along with it some vice, an excess or defect of the several virtues ; and therefore it was seldom without some association or qualification of evil.

The fact that nature, the object of adoration to the scientific unbeliever proves such a harsh, savage and tyrannical step-mother to her children, as J. S. Mill represents her, ought to arrest attention, and stifle such horrible imputations against the holiness of God, from the prevalence of sin and the undoubted existence of a hell which has its sure warrant in the conscience, which however the sinner and not God, prepares and makes ready ; since similar difficulties recur and are not a whit obviated or removed on the ground of the materialist himself.

The canon of Tertullian "*Credo quia impossibile est*" appears to have much force and value in this connection, and may very appropriately be adopted by the positivist himself in reference to the various "*incomprehensibles*"

most patent in his own narrow and limited range of scientific scrutiny and verification, which yet he regards as practical certainties.

SECTION VII.

ANALYSIS OF SIN IN THE CHRISTIAN CONSCIOUSNESS.

The modern school of theology begins its studies from this precise point. It prefers to start from the facts of consciousness and experience as feeling a sure footing in what is so near and present. From an analysis of certain subjective states, namely, the consciousness both of the need and of the capacity of redemption, it seeks to ascend to the sublimer truths of Christian doctrine, verifying or testing its results by reference to the teaching of Holy Scripture : quite a reverse process to the old method which commenced with the most transcendental doctrines of Revelation, either the august mysteries of the Holy Trinity as in the creeds of the Œcumenical councils, or together therewith, as in not a few of the Reformed symbols, the divine decrees or purposes of God from eternity, deducing from this lofty standpoint of inspired

utterance, all the other dogmas of the divine works in the varied evolutions of creation, providence, and redemption. A true theology equal to modern requirements will combine the inductive or synthetic with the deductive or analytic method, the one process being necessary in order to the verification of the results of the other. Two fields of investigation lie open for the application of this twofold process ; on the one hand the inner sphere of Christian consciousness, and on the other the objective Revelation of spiritual verities in the Word of God. The present section proceeds from the standpoint of the modern method, the analysis of the fact of sin, a fact most obtrusive as well as most inmost in the experience of the Christian, whilst it is at the same time the centre or meeting point of many of the more profound and enigmatical facts of anthropological doctrine.

SUB-SECTION I.

SIN AS DISCORD.

In turning our thoughts inward perhaps the first thing that strikes us is the disturbance or want of harmony amongst the principles of our very complex constitution. There undoubtedly

exists a sad rent in our inner being, howsoever caused, a strange displacement and disproportion of the various intellectual and moral energies. This abnormal condition occasions the jarring and unrest which are universally and most painfully experienced. You may call this disorder a disease, since it consists in utter inordinance or perversion of faculty, a deeply penetrating 'wound of nature,' the turbulence of passion overbearing reason, the lower impulses outgrowing the higher. From the will being at variance with the conscience, and the sensuous element preponderating and crushing out whatever is of a more spiritual character, that appalling discord in consciousness arises, which demands further investigation. The contemplation of anything so disturbing, alien and repugnant, in a sphere where harmony and love ought to rule, may be painful and apt to induce melancholy, yet on such ground we may not turn away from it, since (1) by wilfully remaining in ignorance of the deeply-rooted evil, we should just be surrendering ourselves more entirely to its power; and (2) because the full discovery and diagnosis of the disease is necessary to the willing acceptance and application of the remedy.

SUB-SECTION II.

SIN AS TRANSGRESSION OF LAW.

Sin is a fact, which we condemn, wherever we meet with it, as something which ought not to be, which should be done away.

As a thing that ought not to be, it is broadly to be distinguished from limitation or other defects merely metaphysical. We may be pained at the spectacle of unavoidable imperfections or blemishes in any of our organs or faculties. We may grieve over the various hindrances to improvement, inward as well as outward, which environ our life, but we do not blame ourselves for them.

There may be a certain analogy or suitability between physical ugliness and moral deformity ; and from the mere outside features we are apt to have decided prepossessions or unfavourable opinions in regard to certain persons. Still all know how full of mistakes is such a criterion or standard of judgment, moral beauty being often in inverse proportion to physical.

In the 'ought' which sin violates there is disclosed a moral law and order, which claims

our uncompromising reverence and obedience, which forms indeed the norm of our true life.

The moral law which encompasses and lays claim to govern our whole being is absolute or unconditional in character. It clings to us even when violated, and with remorseless revenge pursues the sinner. A sense of its injured majesty does not forsake man in his deepest abandonment.

The unconditional character of the moral law depends partly on its form as an authoritative command ; partly on its contents which are nothing else than the moral good.

It is idle to talk of different moral laws, as if there existed one for the deist or Mohammedan, another for the Jew, a third for the Christian, and so on. There can be but one moral law, more or less clearly apprehended according to the particular degree of culture or intelligence of different peoples. It is impossible to deprive it of the predicates of universality, equality, and unchangeableness.

The moral law, which thus unconditionally claims our reverence and obedience, is raised indefinitely above the minute circumstances of individual life, while prescribing accurately

enough their general form and measure. As has been happily remarked, it is great in its reserve as well as in its uniformity. Whilst it presents the simple and majestic outlines of moral duty, it leaves to the conscience of each one to apply the principles of the law, as exhaustively as possible, to the manifold minutiae of every day life, according to each one's peculiar idiosyncrasy and the special relations or emergencies of his condition. The application of the law to the practical details of life is therefore regulated partly by each one's distinctive character, and partly by the varied complications of social relations, and the collision of duties springing therefrom.

But this flexibility of the moral law in its application to practical details, does not mean a lowering of its demands, which are of unconditional obligation at all times and in every coalition of interests or circumstances. An accommodation to people's clearness or dulness of intellectual perception, or to the particular contingencies of their fortunes, as, for example, to the condition of the Israelites in the wilderness, is a different thing from adjustment of its august requirements to the varying standard of

merely subjective feeling or moral weakness. Duty is inviolable everywhere and always, since the authority of the law which prescribes it, cannot be compromised. Otherwise the dictum 'I cannot' therefore 'I ought not' would determine the measure in which the law is binding, and constitute it a fluctuating and uncertain quantity.

The 'ought' of the moral law, which so authoritatively and unconditionally places the will of the individual as it were under a holy necessity of obedience, has reference to human freedom and implies a possibility of variance and transgression. Man's moral ideal consists in conformity to the law : his actual moral condition is sadly different, arising from the principle of arbitrariness, which he has permitted to enter into the decisions of will, and the manifold evils that have been consequent. The exercise of arbitrariness is coincident with transgression of law, which is simply S. Paul's definition of sin.

There are several points of speculative interest in connection with the present topic, of which a summary may prove suggestive.

(1.) The moral law which is an expression of the moral good or ideal of humanity, adequate

to all the practical requirements of mankind, becomes embodied objectively in the civil legislation and social institutions of a people. But whether the law be a perfect expression of the moral ideal in all the subtilty of its spiritual character and relation is another matter.

Schleiermacher is of opinion that man's inner nature and moral sentiments cannot be defined nor measured by law. The function of the law, according to him, is the regulation of the outward conduct. Moral principle when put in the form of a command is thought to lose its breadth and capacity of application to the motives, dispositions or frames of the inner being. A commandment has express reference to outward action and does not pretend to present us with a perfect ideal of holiness, or to supply us with impulse necessary to its attainment. If therefore moral goodness belong mainly to the inner character, it cannot be defined by law; and sin in like manner having its seat in the motives, *i.e.*, being a subjective fact or violation of the moral ideal, cannot be adequately expressed as a mere transgression of a command.

(2.) Kant and some of his followers consider our moral ideal to be posterior to the law and

derived from it ; and accordingly with them sin no more than goodness can have any existence anterior to the law. The moral ideal, therefore, together with the violation of it, is made dependent on the law. This is plainly reversing the true order since moral good must be deduced prior to law, if from its absolute character it does not in large measure transcend outward expression and ordinance, having indeed its deepest seat in the personality and heart and being an essential embodiment of the principles of the law.

(3.) Others represent the consciousness of the law as consequent on sin. That which constituted the moral ideal attends the sinner after his fall as the consciousness of commanding law. The moral law is thus really a result of a fall not its presupposition.

S. Paul is quoted in support of such views. "The law is not made for a righteous man," simply because it is not needed, the principle of righteousness transcending law. It was not required in the estate of innocence, and will be abolished when that estate of innocence is fully restored in the process of redemption.

(4.) Is every coming short of the perfect

requirement of the law to be regarded as sin? Does the canon "*omne minus bonum habet rationem mali*," every less good contains in it the principle of sin, hold valid? Can there not be blamelessness or sinlessness apart from moral perfection?

Any non-conformity or falling short of the completeness of the moral ideal arising from the imperfections of the finiteness which attach to holy angels cannot be sinful.

The artlessness, simplicity, and limitation of moral faculty, in Adam previous to the fall, are consistent with perfect innocence and integrity. He was then as sinless as he would have been if he had persevered to the end of his moral development and attained to the highest pitch of moral perfection, incapability of sinning, "*the non posse peccare*" of S. Augustine.

Jesus Christ was as blameless at the beginning of his course as at its close; holy, sinless, undefiled all through from the cradle to the cross, though he was continually growing in wisdom and in favor with God.

From such considerations it is seen that sinlessness is not inconsistent with relative stages or conditions of moral development, and is not

to be confounded with the goal of perfect holiness.

(5.) The Roman Catholic opinion is to be distinguished from the above. The law indeed demands relative moral perfection ; but shortcomings from ignorance or weakness, when a man has endeavoured with all his powers to fulfil the law, are to be reckoned venial and not mortal sins. Hence arises the distinction between “obligatio ad finem,” obligation to perfection, and “obligatio ad media,” obligation to the most earnest and persevering efforts toward perfection. Where the latter is there can really be no sin imputed. There exists relative blamelessness of character. Hence also all duties, or works over and above the bare requirements which satisfy law are called ‘supererogatory,’ and belong to the esoteric or perfection stage of Christian development. Supererogation of course is one of the cardinal errors of Romanism.

SUB-SECTION III.

SIN AS DISOBEDIENCE TO GOD.

The argument of this sub-section when put into syllogistic shape is simply this. All transgression of the law is disobedience to the

Lawgiver. But all sin is transgression of the law. Therefore all sin is disobedience to the Lawgiver. That the moral law has a moral lawgiver is an enthymematic inference from the general proposition that all law postulates a lawgiver. The first inquiry is, who is the Lawgiver? Whence comes the moral law of which sin is the transgression. Three solutions have been proposed, (1) Autonomy, (2) Heteronomy, and (3) Theonomy.

I.—AUTONOMY.

The will of man is its own lawgiver. So Kant says, and such is the meaning of 'autonomy' in his philosophy. The moral law has its source in the 'practical' or pure reason, which according to that original thinker is the regulative and legislative factor of intelligence. Toward it all other principles, whether of the understanding or of the will, stand in the relation of subordination and subjection. The distinction between the governing and the governed factors of the human mind is thus clearly supposed to be made out. But can any such dualism between the rational nature on the one hand and the sensational and intellective nature on the other

establish its validity? Can it be verified on true logical principles as well as in experience? In the first place it proceeds on the contradictory supposition that "a man can separate himself from himself in order to submit himself to himself." Then, in the second place, the more passive side of human nature is made the seat of reverence and obedience to the law, since it is the sensational consciousness more especially which is ruled over and yields submission; whereas the will alone can respond to the moral imperative and render the obedience that is required. The autonomy of the will in such statements as 'the spirit gives the law in so far as it is cognisant of it; it submits to the law so far as it determines action,' is essentially evasive and self-contradictory. The giving of the law, as distinguished from the cognizance of it, implies an act of will, an energetic recognition of the authority of the law. The law clearly must stand above the being who is bound by it or is subject to it. Besides there is no warrant in experience for such a schism between the rational or regulative and the sensational or cognitive consciousness in the spirit itself. The hypothesis therefore of the rational will of man

prescribing laws to the other principles and activities of the human consciousness must be abandoned.

2.—*HETERONOMY.*

But since the moral law is an objective and universal power asserting its supremacy and authority over the reason and will of man, yea, even in spite of his opposition and rebellion, may there not possibly be some other source of it than the will and mind of God?

Can nature be the lawgiver after all? The positive philosophy would point to the endlessly exuberant and plastic forces of nature, blossoming into spirit in the higher regions of organized life,—duty and morality itself being one of its highest products. Nature on this supposition evolves a moral law from its own bosom, and realizes it in human consciousness. And so other laws are supposed to be inherent in nature, and to constitute the rule of working of its wonderfully varied mechanism. But does not this imply some such idea as the Stoic hylozoism, some soul of the world brimful and over-flowing with thought and intelligence as well as will, since without a self conscious will there could be

no law, such being the only conceivable source of law. Thought or intelligence without a subject, and law without a self-conscious will were abstractions without meaning. This leads to the conclusion of a personality present in the sphere of unconscious matter, moulding and directing its energies, which however from the authority exercised over it, proves itself a power above it while in it. And in the sphere of morals, human personality so far from being a mere outgrowth of nature, and an objective manifestation of its higher laws, exhibits a power not merely of submitting to but of resisting, subduing and modifying to a wonderful extent these laws at will.

May not then moral law and its authority have its origin in the collective will of man, or humanity in the abstract? But apart from a personal subject in which this will should reside, will would be a mere phantom. Besides to deduce duty and moral obligation *a posteriori* from social compact is manifestly contradictory, since in the civil and political institutes of a people all true law is recognised as having a higher original than human, and is revered as being in conformity with eternal moral

principle or the ordinance and will of the Most High. Herein the common sense of mankind must have great weight.

3.—*THEONOMY.*

The authority which is inherent in moral law points to an original above either nature or the collective will and reason of mankind.

Conscience, which is the organ of the moral law, has been regarded by one school of divines as carrying with it a delegated authority, revealing God intuitively as the supreme author of moral obligation, and acting as his vicegerent in the human breast.

The modern school, of which J. Müller is a leading representative, deduces the idea of God as lawgiver from the two essential elements of human personality, self-consciousness and self-determination.

These two constituent factors of created personality are not absolute or original but are conditioned and derived. Thus we cannot conceive of self-consciousness or an ego, apart from an object or non-ego determining its contents; neither can we think of self-determination, except in connection with the objective rule

of its self-determining, namely, the moral law.

But these conditions of personality cannot be found in nature since it is the region of unconsciousness ; neither in humanity in the abstract because of the contradiction involved in such a supposition. They must evidently find their originals in the unconditioned and uncreated factors of self-consciousness and self-determination in the divine personality, prior to and above nature, which sublime personality stoops to put the divine germ of freedom and of self-intelligence in the sphere of the conditioned and temporal.

Just therefore as the self-consciousness of man cannot find a reality answering to itself in nature, it must derive it from a source resembling itself independent of nature, even the self-consciousness of God ; so his self-determination, whose rule of action is the moral law, cannot find its sublime archytype in anything short of the divine freedom.

These two factors of personality form an indissoluble unity of operation. Every intuition of God in self-consciousness gives a fresh revelation of the will of God together with a corresponding impulse to fulfil it ; whilst every

renewed self-determination to duty and obedience strengthens the consciousness of God.

Conscious self-determination, therefore, or the real freedom of will on the part of man, is conditioned and derived not from nature, neither from its own inherent energy, but from God. It is regulated by the moral ideal or law which stands over it and claims its unqualified obedience, and which is nothing else than a revelation of the divine will and character. "God," says Leibnitz, "is the only immediate object of the soul," the descent into the inmost depths of our personality being an ascent to God, and all moral obligation being founded on this profound yet clear intuition of the divine personality.

The essential union between morality and religion is thus secured by recognising God as the author of the moral law and the surety for its validity. Every moral duty is distinctly and directly a duty to God. Obedience to the law is obedience to the living God. The morality of the positivist is unconscious religion, whilst religion is morality in its essence. The fundamental dependence of morality on religion is a most vital practical consideration.

God being recognised as the absolute source of the moral law, its universal import and unconditional authority finds an adequate explanation. The unconditioned command abides firm even in face of a will that proves perverse, because it is the expression of a higher will. This higher will, from the characters of authority and necessity that attach to the command, can be no other than God.

“As the moral law,” says Müller, “receives a higher sanction when it is recognised as a revelation of God’s will to a finite being, evil in the same proportion is enhanced, when we become conscious of it, not only as transgression of the law, but also as disobedience against God, as a violation of the relation of dependence essential to the creature.” *

SUB-SECTION IV.

SIN AS NEGATION OR ANTITHESIS OF LOVE. SELFISHNESS.

It was shewn in the last sub-section that the moral law is the expression of the character as well as the will of God.

* Christian Doctrine of Sin, Vol. i., p. 88.

There are some who make the principles of the moral law and indeed of all other laws of the world and even those of the pure sciences depend exclusively on the divine will according to the saying, "*Hoc volo sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas.*" This extreme view makes the law subject to the imputation of arbitrariness.

There are others who go to the opposite extreme and maintain an inherent metaphysical necessity of the moral law, making it altogether independent of the divine will. According to them it is eternal in its nature and would exist even if there were no God.

So far as the schoolmen appeared to advocate the existence of a "*lex æterna*" independent of the divine will, their meaning simply was hypothetical, that if the religious consciousness were to all appearance destroyed and clean gone, there still remains the moral consciousness, as an indestructible element of goodness and lever of recovery from evil in the wise and merciful constitution of things.

The true view, by keeping in prominence the fact, that the moral law is a manifestation of the divine attributes and intelligence as well as will, establishes its eternity and unchangeable-

ness on as secure a basis as possible ; and by tracing it up to the mind of God as its fountain it furnishes a perfectly rational and satisfactory explanation of it.

Our business now is with the inner principle of the law. What is the ruling and predominating feature of the divine character of which the law is the expression, which sums up, as it were, in itself all the other attributes ? Surely all the rays of the divine wisdom, goodness and truth, as well as his most righteous purposes, meet in love as in a centre. Holy Scripture tells us that love is the whole sum and substance of the law, objectively as well as subjectively.

The definition of the Apostle "God is love" expresses precisely the real principle of the law and furnishes the key for opening up the difficulties of this part of the analysis. For if love be the real principle of the law, the motive on the part of the creature which prompts its fulfilment will be a reciprocating love. Conversely the principle of arbitrariness which leads to transgression and disobedience can be no other than the negation or rather the antithesis of love, namely, selfishness. Here then, it is believed, will be found the real

principle of sin, which is the object of search in this sub-section.

The essential character of God, and our relation of dependence on him as creatures, plainly prescribe love to him as our primary duty, entire and unreserved love ; and it will be seen on consideration that all other love is holy and abiding so far only as it is embraced in this supreme affection, just as and because our relation to him is all embracing. Love to God necessarily implies corresponding love to all who bear God's image. All minor duties are therefore comprehended in the primary and absolute duty, just as on the other hand all sin whatsoever first proceeds from the antithesis of love or alienation from God.

All perfecting of character and happiness then depends on the maintenance of loving communion of each with God, since this involves loving fellowship with each other and the performance of all relative duties and the practice of the lesser virtues.

If the soul preserve its normal and right attitude to the Creator, all the other creatures will receive proportionate regards, and will occupy their proper and just place in its affection

and esteem. A right relation to the Creator is therefore essential to the maintenance of a right relation to the creature.

By preserving communion with and dependence upon God, a man continues also in other ways to assert his superiority to the world, and to make it the ready tool or instrument of his purposes ; whereas by withdrawing from the divine love, the relations of things are entirely reversed, and instead of exercising dominion he becomes hopelessly a slave. This happens even in the case of the grandest conquests of modern science over nature, which apart from the spirit of religion by the mere fact of multiplying our wants just proportionately lessen our self-dependence and increase our dependence on the creature.

Real freedom which is thus identified with love and is maintained by habitual fellowship with God, and is necessary for preserving superiority to the world with its entanglements and vices, will come in for further explanation in one of the following sub-sections of this analysis.

Now if moral good consist in love to God and the consequent fulfilment of his laws ; if its very root and substance depend on the maintenance

of true relationship to him as the absolute centre of that spiritual organism or mystical corporeity of which each forms a member, according to what Christ says in the Gospel, "I in the Father and you in me and I in you, that we all may be made perfect in one," moral evil or sin has as its essential innermost idea, withdrawal from divine fellowship and a false concentration of the life; upon which follow all the manifold other vices and disorders which invade the various relationships, whether individual or social.

Thus if a man make the world his centre, the creature in some or other of its forms as an idol usurps the place of God in the heart; the main current of the man's higher affections and energies is turned upon wrong and unworthy objects; perversion of all his other faculties and depravity of character takes place; his true personality is lost; destruction and misery is his portion.

The demands of a scientific spirit that all the manifold forms of sin or moral evil be reduced to the unity of a real principle, just as the varied aspects of moral good find harmony in love, may be satisfied in the way indicated.

It was just now said that when a man turns away from the love of God, he makes the world his centre. Now if what he really seek in the world be self, his own pleasure and gratification, the real principle of sin will be evidently manifested to be selfishness, which being the antithesis of love is something more than a mere negation, and will on further examination be found to possess a positive energy of evil.

Some may be disposed to dispute the correctness of this generalization. In certain systems of 'Hamartiology,' sensuality has been co-ordinated with selfishness as an equally original source of evil. But science demands unity, and it is plain that of two evil principles there must be a higher one to embrace both. The fact, it is believed, will easily be verified that sensuality can come conveniently under the head of selfishness.

There are others who carry generalization to an absurdity; such were Rochefoucauld and Hobbes who would reduce all our benevolent and virtuous affections together with our vices to forms of self interest or self love. "All lose themselves in self interest as rivers in the sea."

As a system of ethics is wanting which would

deduce all the moral virtues and excellencies of human character from their real principle in love; so a proper 'phenomenology' of sin, descriptive of its manifold and varied forms, interdependence, and common relation to their parent stock of selfishness, is still a desideratum in the science of our subject.

There are some happy remarks such as that 'falsehood is the cowardice of selfishness, just as hatred is its audacity,' which shew what good results might be arrived at by a properly constructed 'phenomenology' of sin.

Certainly falsehood and hatred are two of its worst forms, as is exemplified in the character of the Arch-enemy who is called in the Gospels a liar and murderer.

If to these be added pride, several of the main branches, not forgetting sensuality, of the real principle of sin have been pointed out. It will be remembered that the manifestation of Antichrist is to assume the form of pride. The 'man of sin' the 'son of perdition' is to take to himself the name of God, and enthrone himself in the temple of the Most High.

Such in general is the explanation of the real principle of sin with which the less scientific

spirit of former ages has been satisfied. S. Augustine and S. Thomas Aquinas, widely separated by a long interval of centuries, both expressly name “*amor sui*,” love of self, in contrast to “*amor Dei*,” love of God, as the source of sin; though in other places they make ‘*superbia*’ an overweening haughtiness or pride, the beginning or fruitful root of all moral evil whatsoever. In this latter opinion both the Fathers and the Schoolmen generally concur.

The Reformers set forth unbelief as the productive germ of all other sin, but as unbelief is essentially a turning away from the love of God and a false concentration upon self, it may be properly classed as one of the forms of selfishness.

Henry More the Cambridge Platonist already referred to, in the second division of his great work the “*Mystery of Godliness*,” traces sin to the presumptuous haughtiness of the human spirit, which has two main manifestations in history and experience, namely, (1) the spiritual self assumptions and insolence of the Papacy, as the most striking potency of perdition in the world, exalting itself above all that is called God or that is worshipped, sitting in the temple of God and shewing itself with the self assumed

prerogatives of God : (2) the pride and selfishness which is at the root of the great mystery of iniquity already at work, is no less discoverable in the Antichristian excesses of the individual spirit amongst those spiritual sectaries of 'familists' or of 'free love' or of 'the Holy Ghost' already referred to in a former section, of whom More in special instances Henry Nicholai of Amsterdam, who lived in his own age, as a notable and flagrant example, whose assumption of inward spiritual revelations and of an incarnation of Christ in the heart of each of these votaries of spiritualism, which virtually superseded or did away with the necessity of an objective Christianity, whether in the Word of God or in the Church, was quite as arrogant and overweening as the most towering and insolent pretensions of the Papacy had ever been.

SUB-SECTION V.

SIN AS GUILT.

THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT.

The word guilt, which may be defined as a conscious liability to punishment, denotes the way in which sin affects the sinner. It may be

described as the recoil of sin upon him who commits it.

Self reference is thus a *first* character of guilt. The sin is traced directly to the will of the doer. He feels that it is his own act.

But sin or opposition to the law of God might be traced to the will without necessarily involving guilt, provided the will were a mere instrument for the carrying out an impulse from without, it may be from some superhuman force.

In that case, the will being a passive instrument of a foreign power, conscience would speak false, since self imputation directly and invariably follows the commission of sin. To make our nature a lie in such a matter of universal experience would be a glaring "reductio ad absurdum."

A first characteristic of guilt then is self reference or direct intuition of the self determination of the will as the cause of sin. The organ of this self reference is the conscience, which further pronounces sentence and condemns the sinner.

A *second* and terrible feature of guilt therefore is the condemnation it involves. The judgment which the moral conscienciousness passes on sin

is, first, a negative sentence of unworthiness, a conscious banishment from the presence and favor of God, in other words a rupture of divine fellowship.

The positive results of guilt, in the second place, follow naturally and are twofold. (1) The wrath of God abides on the sinner. A sense of the condemnation of the Almighty hangs over him, from which he feels that there is no escape. And (2) sin becomes its own punishment inasmuch as the sinful act produces a sinful state, from which if unchecked may proceed the whole hideous multiformity of sins with their painful consequences, *i.e.*, the will becomes enchained by the power of sin with which it has formed alliance.

A consciousness of self degradation and feeling of wrong desert accompanies the sinner, which is the clearer and more distinct in proportion as the consciousness of God is not obscured. If the religious intuition be stifled or crushed the feeling of guilt is correspondingly diminished.

Is the consciousness of God ever entirely quenched? The contrary is found in the experience of mankind. The profound sense of guilt

cleaves to man in the depth of the greatest abandonment; it will not lose its relentless hold. After long years of troublous unrest it acts as a sort of spell over the criminal and compels him to a confession of his evil deeds.

To a full responsibility two things are required, first, a free act of self-decision, and secondly, a clear knowledge of the sin as sin. Where either of these are wanting there is a diminution of guilt.

Accordingly the division of sins into premeditated and unpremeditated is perfectly valid though defective as we shall presently see.

The Roman Catholic division into mortal and venial sins, the latter being sins of ignorance and weakness, is in like manner defective.

For the sinner is by his previous act of self decision the author of his own sinful state, to which both the ignorance and the moral weakness consequent on sin are part of the punishment attached. He is thus responsible for his condition of blindness and moral impotence.

It cannot be too distinctly kept in mind that sin is an objective fact, an act of the will or a state of personal character consequent on the

act. It is not necessary that the act be outside of us ; it may be an act of thought or desire. But though the sin differ endlessly in form or mode of consciousness, it is in all cases a distinct positive opposition of will or person to the law of God.

The guilt on the other hand is the subjective feeling which answers to the objective fact of sin and cleaves to the sinner in all changes of circumstances or development of character. And this guilt is proportionate in magnitude both to the matter and form of sin.

The matter of sin consists in opposition or enmity to God ; *i.e.* in its essence it is the negation of love, or the positive principle of selfishness which supplants love, and forms the substance of every form of immorality or vicious abandonment.

The distinction of the matter and form of sin is essential to a true conception of guilt, since through the dulling and blinding of the conscience, there may exist a maximum of the matter of sin, *i.e.* selfishness, without there being the form of sin, *i.e.* any clear consciousness of guilt, much less premeditation or deliberate attention.

The matter of sin in all its manifold varieties being selfishness, its form therefore will be characterised by a clearer or a duller self-consciousness, a more or less deliberate intention, or premeditation. Heedlessness or haste may be two of the forms it assumes, or it may even go under the guise of ignorance. Only it must be kept in mind that it is the very strength and preponderance of selfishness that overbears the moral self consciousness and produces the ignorance.

Now it is apparent that through the blindness or infatuation which is part of the penal consequences of sin, there may be no consciousness of the sin, but at the same time there may not be any diminution of the magnitude or extent of selfishness in the act or character.

The moral consciousness may be blinded or misinformed or perverted by prejudice or wrong maxims and education. Still a man is responsible, because conscience reveals fundamental moral principle clearly enough to every one. If from the beginning he had followed its promptings there would probably never have been any ignorance of the right and the good in any circumstances. The ignorance having

arisen through his own fault, he has justly to suffer for it.

Hence however conscientious a man may be, if his conduct be selfish, it has the matter though not the form of sin in it. His conscience may be ill informed and he may be thoroughly convinced that he does what is right when he is distinctly in the wrong, just as the Jews thought that they did God service when they slew Christ and his evangelists.

Thus the consciousness of sin is not always co-incident with the sin itself : but this want of knowing what one is about, having arisen from previous transgression, the difficulty is very great of deciding in any case how far ignorance may be an extenuation of guilt.

In jurisprudence there is the analogous well known distinction between ‘culpa,’ a hasty and unpremeditated act of wrong, and ‘dolus,’ intended and deliberate violation of personal right. In both cases there is guilt, though in the former it may be of an indefinitely mitigated character.

The distinction between guilt itself and the consciousness of guilt, which corresponds very much to the other distinction pointed out between the matter and form of sin, may be

followed out easily in the mind and reflection of the reader.

Conscience will not justify a man, if he has the matter of sin in his acts or personal character, however much the consciousness of guilt may be blunted or even lost.

SUB-SECTION VI.

SIN AS LOSS OF TRUE LIBERTY.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL AND FORMAL FREEDOM.

It was mentioned in the last sub-section that one of the fearful consequences of sin is the enslavement of the will to the sin with which it had become allied.

Sin therefore enters as an indefinitely powerful co-determining force into man's life since it has penetrated to the very root of human personality and taken possession of that sphere of man's inner being, where true self dependence and superiority to all the determining forces of evil ought to assert itself.

The depth of radical evil and its strong determining influence from birth is of course the riddle of existence, a profound mystery into

which it is felt we cannot penetrate, but which we are bound to accept as a fact, since there is no other satisfactory explanation of the universality of sin.

But it is a first truth of divinity that real freedom can have nothing to do with evil, but can be realized only in association with good ; that it consists in superiority to sensual and all other lower impulses ; that in short the free and true home of the personality is in a region above self and the world while at the same time most intimately connected with them.

Real freedom, *i.e.*, true self-dependence, being the normal condition of life, is maintained by uninterrupted love and communion with God, and is therefore coincident with a holy necessity of obedience and self surrender to the good.

Hence Bretschneider defines freedom as the 'power of the man to determine himself according to the law and will of God, or in other words to the dictates of right reason,' but from not recognising the distinction between real freedom which he defines properly enough and formal freedom which he does not at all take into account, he makes sin to consist solely in inability to comply with God's will, *i.e.*, power-

lessness to fulfil all the holy requirements of the law, a representation which amounts to saying that man is by necessity a sinner simply because he is man and not God.

Jacobi's opinion that 'freedom consists in the will being independent of desire' is also right so far as it goes. An ability to determine oneself according to the principles of reason independent not merely of sensuous impulses but of all other selfish and worldly principles would constitute real freedom; but it is another question whether this freedom can be realized fully in actual experience and does not rather belong to the sphere of the normal and ideal that has yet in the future to be attained.

There is no doubt that this is the freedom defined in Holy Scripture, which having been lost by sin becomes again the possession of man by redemption. As he who does sin is the slave of sin, so he who surrenders his members and faculties as instruments of righteousness is the Lord's free man. It would be needless to repeat the many passages of Scripture which readily suggest themselves in proof of the position that real freedom has nothing to do with evil, and that it implies a holy necessity

by way of self surrender to the good which is co-incident with love.

Unqualified dedication to God and self surrender to holiness, as has been said, is the normal or ideal state of creaturely freedom, never fully realized in actual experience, but which would have been attained to if man had abode in innocence and persevered to the end and consummation of his normal moral development; and which now is to be reached only by redemption and the completion of that work of grace and sanctification which is in process of making the elect ready for the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom.

The holy angels who fell not, and the company of the redeemed in heaven alone enjoy a holy security arising from an entire harmony of will with God and therewith complete exemption from those moral evils which attach to creaturely existence in its present state.

Real freedom therefore consists in most fixed and necessary determination of the will to goodness.

Formal freedom is no less a fact of consciousness and experience and expresses the power of

selection and choice which each one possesses, either one way or other in any given circumstances.

There is no one, whatever may be his conduct, who is not conscious that he might have been and done otherwise if he had chosen ; who does not approve and feel himself worthy of merit by one line of conduct, whilst he blames himself and is overwhelmed with a sense of demerit and condemnation for having followed an opposite course.

This conscious power of not acting or acting otherwise than one does is present to every one at every moment of his life. There is no scientific fact that can be better verified. It cannot be ignored excepting on the sceptical ground that consciousness is an illusion or a lie. It is the firm basis of responsibility, and of the judgment which each one is continually pronouncing on his own conduct or that of others.

However inconsistent therefore this formal freedom may appear with the real freedom described above, it is equally necessary since without it there could have been no free choice of good or moral election, just as there could have been no possibility of moral evil or sin.

A will self-surrendered to good implies an

equal possibility of the contrary ; else there were no moral element or meaning in love to God or in self decision for holiness, and consequently no blame in the opposite sort of character or conduct.

Thus in the normal course of things formal freedom was ordained to lead on to that which is real and to be consummated in it. Such is the end designed in our present estate of moral discipline or probation. All the appliances of grace and redemption go on that presupposition.

The loss of our real freedom and actual state of condemnation and guilt is recognised as the occasion of a Gospel and redemption by Christ. We want to recover our real freedom from the bondage of sin and guilt, but the supernatural means resorted to are of a moral character and addressed to moral agents who are conscious of possessing a liberty of choice and of willingly adopting one course of conduct in preference to another.

The Gospel throughout presupposes everywhere a freedom in man to hear or not to hear, to comply with or to reject its gracious overtures. Its precepts and exhortations, just as the commands and threatenings of the law, are addressed

to responsible agents, who feel that they can plead no want of freedom in extenuation of sinful opposition or non-compliance. As sure as a man blames and condemns himself for disobedience to any command of God, so sure is he possessed of that freedom of will that constitutes responsibility, and which, if rightly used proves the germ of better things, namely, of a holy character, and of a will most fixed and settled in its holy determination.

The element of arbitrariness or caprice implied in formal freedom which makes sin possible, and which in the actual moral state of mankind too often unhappily sets even the regenerate and better part at variance with or in opposition to the law and will of God, has sometimes been called the "atomism" of the will, and is that factor of indeterminateness which makes it so difficult or impossible to foresee how any one will act on any particular contingency.

But the objection may be made that the will itself is determinate being and that therefore the determinations that proceed from it are as necessary as itself is, that its workings are governed by the law of cause and effect just as other agencies in nature.

This is precisely the position of Schleiermacher who says that 'the freedom of the will is nothing but the lively activity of temporal causality in its highest stage,' differing only in degree from the vital energising of other creatures. Sin is thus made the natural outgo of the will or the product of a foreign, probably a supernatural force, *e.g.*, the absolute causality of God, which uses the will as its instrument. Such is the dangerous inference from a supralapsarian point of view. Two of the most contrasted opinions naturalism and predestinarianism thus meet in the denial of freedom.

The error lies in identifying freedom with will and reducing it to a condition of pure determinism. There is indeed as often an enslaved will, 'servum arbitrium,' as not. Will is capable either of normal exercise, which issues in love and real freedom, *i.e.*, a holy necessity to goodness: or it may by a perversion of its formal freedom end in enslavement to its sensuous impulses or other desires of a selfish and worldly character. So that you might, it is true, as well identify will with slavery as with freedom, if it were not that the one is the abnormal just as the other is the normal exercise and outcome of it.

A certain deterministic element must necessarily be recognised in all the operations of the will since will cannot be disjoined from the basis of each one's nature, the varied dispositions, desires, motives or characters, which contribute to incline it to one particular direction and course of activity rather than another.

The importance of the formation of good habits is hence apparent, since every fresh act of goodness or holiness gives the will an increased bent in this particular direction. Acts form habits as habits character. Everything in life therefore depends on the right or wrong exercise of free choice or formal liberty which is inherent even in sinful humanity, and which according to its normal working ought from the first to impart to the character a fixed determination to goodness, though we know that it does not do this in actual life, whether the failure arises from the primal determination of a vital energy of radical evil, or from bad example, imperfections of education, and vicious associations.

Two main elements are observable in moral growth or development. (1) A conservative principle which maintains the continuity of the

manifold threads of a man's idiosyncrasy and character; and (2) the progressive principle which can effect new beginnings, introducing fresh moments of energy and influence whether for good or evil at the successive stages of each one's history. The first of these is the strictly determining factor transmitting and consolidating the actual acquisitions of the past. The second the free or formative. Regarded each exclusive of the other, the one tends to inertia and sloth, the other to destruction and the restlessness of revolutionary change.

There are certain crises or turning points in individual history where the progressive or free force comes more prominently into action and prevails over the more torpid or conservative element. Such are the transitions from one stage of growth to a higher, as the passage of boyhood into manhood, when new courses are opened up and higher energies called into operation.

There is but one absolute turning point in human life, regeneration of one's inner being by the omnipotent energy of divine grace and the simultaneous or consequent conversion of the whole life from sin to holiness, or from the world to God.

SECTION VIII.

DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM.

These terms denote the two extreme positions or tenets in regard to the will. One class of thinkers makes it either the pure outgo of nature or the instrument of a force (it may be super-human) outside or foreign to itself. Another regards the aspects of the formal freedom of the will to the exclusion of all deterministic influences whatever, and promulgates a system of pure arbitrariness or "atomism" of volition, *i.e.*, indifference of all motives outside of its own free choice.

In actual life there is no pure indeterminism since each one's character and inner being is the product of manifold influences from the past as from the present, from outside of him as from within.

Every present moment or influence at work in shaping the character is in a measure a product of the past. The present grows out of the past by an unbroken continuity and natural sequence of cause and effect, if we except the fresh impress made on the course of things by persons of original talents or the cumulative, it

may be, infinitesimal influences of the peculiar idiosyncrasies of the persons singly or conjointly of every nation or race and of every successive age.

It was seen in a former section how the peculiar characters of family, race, nation were transmitted in course of ordinary generation ; that individuals were in one sense mere links in the succession of species ; that specific types of character and genius were constitutional and handed down through a succession of centuries ; and that amongst other moral qualities common to the race thus transmitted the traducianists included original sin.

External influences contribute to determine and shape the character of a people, such as peculiarities of climate, scenery, products, occupation, as well as their past history and traditions, the art, science, literature and civilizations of previous epochs. Nothing is more patent and familiar to the student of ethnology and history.

Internal influences peculiar to the individual as well as to the race and family are also ceaselessly at work. The mind has been happily compared to a closed volume of determining principles, amongst which, as already remarked,

is the peculiar idiosyncrasy of each individual whereby he is marked out from the rest of mankind: in special the genius and originality of others form distinct centres of often powerful influences which contribute largely to make a lasting impression on the national mind: the inventions of individuals may and often do stimulate and direct the energies of men everywhere over the earth into new channels: at all events the eternal germ of freedom is present in every bosom, and manifests itself not merely in the prevalent and universal sense of responsibility, but in particular at the transition epochs of the individual life, as has been before submitted to the consideration of the reader in a previous section.

This factor of indeterminism therefore cannot be lost sight of any more than that of determinism in any right opinion or theory of the will.

Our business now is with the extreme systems of (1) Determinism, and (2) Indeterminism.

SUB-SECTION I.

SYSTEMS OF DETERMINISM.

These systems make sin or moral evil a necessity either (A) of nature, or (B) of the divine

ordainment. Accordingly they may be classified as Absolute or Relative.

A.—SYSTEMS OF ABSOLUTE DETERMINISM.

I.—THE DETERMINISM OF POSITIVISM.

A thorough going sensationalism in psychology, which promulgates the doctrine, that sense is the germ out of which intellect is evolved and that therefore all knowledge grows out of sensation, is a familiar form of absolute determinism.

The full blossom of the sensational psychology is observable in the positive science of the present day. Man is the highest evolution of nature's forces, the most complex and perfect product of influences from without. He resembles a curiously constructed machine which has fixed laws and methods of working imposed by its step dame nature. Personality in both its factors of free will and self consciousness, is an illusion, since in all cases motives or fixed dispositions or divers influences extraneous to the will, determine conduct. The law of cause and effect holds tyrannous sway in the moral world just as it does in the domain of nature. The word 'moral' is in reality nothing but an

empty name, since materialism knows nothing of an 'ought' or the sacred imperative of the divine will in conscience.

It is allowed that on strict scientific ground, determinism has the advantage over indeterminism, since it is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to point to any act of self decision or putting forth of fresh energy which may not have its root in some antecedent motive or state of consciousness and disposition. Character exerts a steady determining influence in all cases, though character itself is very much a product of previous determinations of the will and of the formation of habits by repeated acts.

But whilst determinism will ever hold its ground against the indifferentism or 'atomism' of will in the system of the Pelagians and others, it is utterly invalid against a modified indeterminism, in which the most opposite factors and tendencies of the human consciousness are taken into account and are assigned a due place. It is impossible, for example, on any fair scrutiny not to recognise the strong determining influence of radical evil everywhere observable in very bitter fruits from the earliest years, as well as of other influences both from within man's own

basis of nature and character as from without ; but it is just as impossible to ignore the fact of responsibility, the sense that each one has of ability to do or not to do whatever he chooses, and that he must abide the consequences one way or the other. Unless our whole nature be a lie, and the moral value of life an illusion and not the practical certainty which the positivists admit, the fact of freedom in consciousness stands firm. Free conscious self determination and a moral sense securely maintain their ground as fundamental principles of the human constitution. To say therefore that man in the character of an elaborate organism of nature is a mere peg or wheel in the mechanical world gear is but the lowest and smallest side of the truth, which indeed holds good of his earthly associations and relationships.

II.—*THE DETERMINISM OF PANTHEISM AND DUALISM.*

Absolute determinism in another shape is met with in the pantheism and dualism of the great Oriental religions.

The Gnostic systems and some other wide spread heresies of the early centuries, such as Manichæism, which struck deep root in Oriental

religions and by a process of eclecticism or syncretism fused together dualistic and pantheistic notions with Christian ideas are well known forms of thorough going determinism.

The Oriental religions in their more esoteric and transcendental principles were not, as has been generally understood, systems of pure dualism. They were more akin to pantheism, since they traced up the eternal and contrasted principles of good and evil to the unity of the Absolute, of which the most antagonistic elements constituted essential aspects, forming the substantial polarity of universal being.

Thus in the Persian religion Ormuzd and Ahriman, the two original or beginningless principles of good and evil, everlastingly in antithesis and conflict, were the necessary factors of a supreme principle which embraced both in its own substance, which is occasionally designated Zeruane Akerene in the Zendavesta. Buddhism in like manner traces up the antagonistic forces of light and darkness, of good and evil to the unity of an original essence.

Manichæism, as already remarked, was a fusion of Zoroastrian and Buddhist theosophy with Christian notions. The dualism of principles

which harmonized in the Absolute, and which from the beginning emanated simultaneously and entered as constituent elements into the formation of the universe, penetrated all finite existences, and shared between them every province of nature. The elements of light and goodness are constantly striving upward from the realm of dark unconscious matter. Man is a microcosm, a mirror of the most contrasted powers at war in the universe. The wild forces of matter, the powers of darkness strive in him to hold captive the immortal energy of light and spirit which is ever struggling after freedom.

By the recognition of a primal essence or 'absolute' in these systems the demand of reason for unity is satisfied. But the essential dependency of evil upon good is not made account of, namely, that there can be no evil excepting by negation of or opposition to the good, although good is perfectly conceivable apart from evil, as a self sufficient independent potency with plenitude of energy and happiness in itself, without any incitements outside of itself of a contrary character.

It is apparent too that sin or moral evil is a notion foreign to these systems, since the evil of

life contemplated by them is a physical quantity, derived to each one by nature, an outside force which makes man the mere passive organ or instrument of its operation or transmission.

These ideas are vividly suggestive of certain modern systems of pantheism, as that of Blasche in Germany, which has not inappropriately got the name of 'pan-satanism,' according to which all evolution of finite and individual existence from the unity of the Absolute is represented as a fall. Inherent sinfulness attaches to the mere fact of creation or birth, *i.e.*, the issuing from the infinite into the limitations of finitude. But does not this extension of sin, constituting it an essential condition of all finite being, in fact do away with it altogether, since sin if it were an essential part of our constitution could not be an evil for which we ought to blame or condemn ourselves?

In a previous section the pessimism of Schopenhauer and his school was explained at some length. It was pointed out how upon a grim basis of necessity to evil certain ascetic principles and some very inadequate theistic notions had been grafted.

The platonic idea of the inherent evil of

matter has perhaps exerted untold influence on human thought throughout the succession of Christian centuries. To this more than to any Manichæan tendency or other influence of Oriental theosophy, the asceticism and monasticism of the Roman Catholic Church is probably owing. It is a strange attestation of the principle of extremes meeting, that the monasteries with their practical abuses of bodily penance, fasting, celibacy and manifold austerities, which all proceeded from a platonic or Manichæan notion of the evil of matter, should have become the home of pelagianism whose fundamental principle was the out and out negation of radical or inherent evil.

The more rigid Calvinism, as remarked in an early section, narrowly escapes the imputation of Manichæism. It is not surprising that Flaccianism is regarded by many as the logical outcome of predestinarian principles. A brief statement of this extreme form of Lutheranism will aptly illustrate our subject. In opposition to Pfeffinger, who spoke of the capacity in man of complying or not complying with the Gospel, Flaccius took up the position that "if the choice lies in man to comply with the divine will or

not, then there is naturally free will in man for spiritual things ; the doctrine of natural depravity is false ; and man can of his own power prepare himself for grace. But man much more by nature resists grace. If any one therefore be saved, it is a pure work of grace without the intervention of free will at any point." Again, in opposition to Strigel, who characterised natural depravity as a mere accident attaching to the substance of human nature, Flaccius put forward the proposition, that "original sin is a substance, because otherwise holiness would not be a substance : the soul is by nature a mirror or image of Satan, although not thus disfigured without the decree of God."

B.—*SYSTEMS OF RELATIVE DETERMINISM.*

According to systems of relative determinism moral evil or sin becomes necessary by divine ordainment in three ways at least, (I) as a contrast in individual life ; (II.) as a determination of our sensuous nature ; and (III.) as unavoidably incident to metaphysical imperfections or limitation of faculties.

I.—*SIN AS A CONTRAST OF INDIVIDUAL LIFE.*

The fundamental contrast of good and evil

in the inner sphere of personality has analogies in the physical world.

The contrast between heat and cold, light and darkness, attraction and repulsion, and divers others in nature which readily suggest themselves, are regarded as so many prefigurations of the deeper polarity which pervades the moral world.

This principle of polarity therefore so universal in nature has been made use of to explain the variance and discord that exist between the contrasted working of principles in man's moral constitution.

A figure descriptive of the system has also been drawn from the fine arts, since sin has been not unaptly compared to a dissonance in the world's harmony, or to a dark background of the picture of human life which serves to set out to full advantage the brighter colouring and more graceful delineation of the more prominent objects represented.

In poetry and the drama 'every bright deed is on a dark background traced,' an harmonious blending together of light and shade and of a variety of appropriate and distinctive characters, and a complication of interests and incidents being essential to the desired effect.

The violent wind whilst it wrecks the work of man clears the atmosphere of pestilential vapor that has been generated on the surface of the earth. The raging storm which upturns the ocean from its depths and engulfs fleets, prevents stagnation. War whilst it devastates the surface of the earth with merciless cruelty shakes the nations from moral and intellectual torpor and lessens their confidence in things temporary and transient.

And so in man's individual and social life the contrast of evil enhances goodness, and provides a constant stimulus to exertion. It presents a definite obstacle to be overcome in order to the attaining one's true end. Hindrances must be struggled against. Difficulties must be conquered. Vices must be subdued. This is what constitutes the battle of life. Though hard and arduous, it has certain immediate beneficial results over and above the satisfaction which it gives, namely, that it calls forth and strengthens the virtuous energies.

And so in the conflicting interests of mankind, the various active principles with their manifold excesses and defects as experienced in actual life, conspire in the working out of the general

well being. The virtuous energies meet with incitement from the example, rivalry or competition of others, as well as derive stimulus by way of contrast from the contemplation of the hideous features of moral deformity and crime. This two-fold impetus from emulation and repugnance which contribute to form a moral enthusiasm is necessary to impel men onward to their respective functions or ends in the social mechanism. The friction of the moral machinery tends directly and inevitably toward good and happy results.

The worst feature of the system is that it makes evil an indispensable condition of progress. At the successive stages of moral development there must be presented some new evil to be overcome, some fresh conquest to be made. Ceaseless effort is necessary. Otherwise the moral energies would languish or die out. Evil is thus ever being vanquished but never overcome. A progress 'ad infinitum' in the conquest of hinderances is presented. The most confirmed and advanced in virtuous energy and character is ever approaching and yet never nearer the goal of bliss or exemption from the pains and struggles incident to finitude.

But in the first place, goodness has in itself a plenitude of individual contrasts and an all sufficient fund of motive and energy apart altogether from evil. For what is the grand scope of the moral impulse? To exercise dominion over nature, to recognise the distinctive rights and duties of each, and to reconcile and harmonise individual interests in a spirit of love, binding into the unity of a spiritual organism the endlessly multifarious dispositions and contrasted characters, and constraining each to contribute his special part to the common well being. There is sufficient contrast and friction in the normal moral features, idiosyncrasies and aptitudes of the countless varieties of character to stimulate to activity apart from evil.

In the second place, evil is a positive hostility or opposition to good, not a mere contrast. The variance has rent asunder and perverted our moral nature to its profoundest depths. Sin has penetrated to the inmost recesses of our personalities and has radically corrupted our best affections and purest motives. It has taken possession of the will itself and enslaved it. So utterly perverted is our moral nature that we can hardly understand what a pure undisturbed

development would have been. However it is certain that the superficial contrast of good and evil contemplated in the system, is quite inadequate to impart the desired stimulus, and that in order to our emancipation from evil and recovery of requisite moral power a redemption is first needed. That redemption must be two-fold (1) objective from the guilt of sin by the atonement of Christ, and (2) subjective, by a justifying faith which is the very sum and substance of salvation, being the unfailing source of all virtue and goodness, and which leads on by a progressive course of sanctified experience to the extirpation of concupiscence and the conquest of the lingering power of evil habits.

In the third place, if evil is so necessary a part of us that there could be no good without it; that indeed evil is the eternal co-requisite of all good, with which the divine life itself could no more dispense than the human, what would be the consequence? Good minus evil would on such a supposition be an unknown quantity. All life and character would consist of a necessary fusion and mutual interdependence of the two. Good would be good only through the intervention of evil. Good without evil

would be no longer good and evil would be transformed into something perfectly desirable if not delectable.

This explanation of evil from contrast is a very old one.

Lactantius very pithily comprises it in the apophthegm '*malum interpretamentum boni*' evil the exponent of good.

Duns Scotus explained it in its more universal bearings, individual losses and sufferings, if not in the end personal benefits, reacting for good on the general well being, private evil being coincident with the public good.

This reminds one forcibly of the maxim of the deists of last century '*private vices are public benefits.*'

The Hegelian philosophy presents the most elaborate form of this system in modern times.

Naturalness in itself is not evil. But the spirit as it emerges from naturalness feels contrariety and antagonism toward it. Evil thus first finds its way into human experience. The ego isolates itself, and in order to realize itself as intensely as possible, drives towards the furthest pole of contrariety ; it exists for itself in

a spirit of unbounded arbitrariness of will ; it eats the forbidden fruit in order to know the difference between good and evil and to realize its manhood ; but finding that condition of selfish isolation as evil or a worse evil than the previous state of naturalism, it seeks by love to regain its lost peace and harmony and through self-denial and sacrifice to merge individual interests in the universal good.

The distinction between metaphysical and moral evil plays a prominent part in Hegel's theory of evil. The most plausible way of putting the matter is perhaps to say that metaphysical evil is necessary, so far as moral good requires it. When we can say that it ought not to be then it is not necessary. But in fact, according to the fundamental principles of the theory, it is always necessary as incitement to action and progress. Evil exists as a fact necessary to individual improvement and the onward march of history as well as for the awakening into vigor the energies of the Absolute, but still it ought not to continue, it ought to be done away and yet cannot, unless all things are to merge into nihilism. The system is thus involved in endless self contradiction.

One or two suggestive remarks may fitly conclude this sub-section.

What sort of morality can that be which may not dispense with evil as a necessary ingredient?

Does not conscience universally negative evil as that which ought never to exist?

What theism can tolerate a system which inevitably makes God the author of evil, nay, which requires that the divine personality itself be the actual product of the working of this primeval antithesis?

II.—*SIN AS A DETERMINATION OF THE SENSUOUS NATURE OF MAN.*

The essential idea of the sensuous system is that the flesh presents an insurmountable hindrance to the spirit.

The system is twofold according to the point of view of the ancient and modern schools.

The old school considered the flesh as possessing a merely mechanical relationship to the spirit, in other words, the two exist in juxta-position. The new school identifies them, regarding the spirit as the mere outgrowth and blossoming of the sensational nature, both together sharing a living and progressive development.

Sin in either hypothesis consists in the opposition or preponderance of sense over the spirit. In the one case the independence of the flesh presents a barrier or fettering power. In the other the greater vitality and disproportionate growth of the sensuous element effectually checks or crushes the spiritual energy.

Sin in this way comes to us inevitably from without, being simply incident to the possession of a fleshy nature and growth under temporal and sensuous conditions. It does not spring from within, *i.e.*, it does not originate in the free conscious self determination of the personality.

Such is the genuine character of the sensuous system, though other and eclectic elements have been sometimes joined with it. Thus the freedom of the will has not unfrequently been brought in as an arbiter to decide between the claims of reason or of sense, of the right and good on the one hand or of the pleasant and agreeable on the other. The will is represented as determining to which side the person should incline on every particular concurrence of circumstances. In that case you have the determining power from within, and the system is no longer a purely sensuous one.

If, for example, we represent man as the unity of spirit and nature, the meeting point of the two hemispheres of existence, one aspect of his nature being turned toward the world while the other enjoys the intuition of spiritual realities, namely, the verities and sanctities of faith ; and if in this dualism of existence the sensuous and temporal ego were to take the lead and gain superiority over the spiritual and supersensuous ego, by an act of free will and deliberate preference for selfish and worldly ends and pleasures, the sin would have its source in the spirit not in the flesh.

The fettering power of sense or the hindrance it presents to the free exercise of the spirit is undoubted, but this unhappy state of things is owing to the will having first freely yielded to the seductions of the flesh and enslaved itself. The will is fettered through previous acts of sin. The recognition of a faculty of primary self decision for evil is just what the sensuous system requires to establish the fact of guilt, but which it in its purer form ignores.

The disproportionate strength of the sensuous nature means a corresponding feebleness of the spiritual energy and inability to realize itself.

But in this position of things there can be no guilt because (1) there is no self decision ; and (2) the flesh is the mere passive instrument of the will and therefore sin cannot be attributed to it. If the will impart not its strength to the sensuous nature of man there can be no blameworthiness in it any more than in other parts of the sentient and irresponsible creation.

Sin therefore cannot be attributed to sense as to its source. But there are a variety of curious reflections suggested by the sensuous system of sin.

In childhood sense is predominant. Is sin proportionately strong at that period of life ?

Do we find sin to lessen on the increase of culture, refinement of taste, or intellectual superiority ?

Is superior education and the consequent freedom from the tyranny of sensuous appetite and from dependence for enjoyment on other things of sense to become henceforth according to some friends of enlightenment the panacea for all the manifold moral ills which afflict mankind ?

Will any one describe clearly and at length the genesis of ambition, or love of praise, or the strong desire for glory or posthumous fame, or

the self idolatry of the sceptical understanding from the predominant power of the sensuous consciousness ?

S. Paul in enumerating the works of the flesh mentions envy and hatred with some others closely allied to pride, which are the more insinuating and blasting forms of moral evil. It is hard to see what connection they have with an overgrown sensuous consciousness, other than the affinity possessed by all moral evil in common, their relation to a fundamental principle like selfishness which can probably embrace and explain all.

Does not the imputation of sin to sense which is a mere passive instrument of will amount to a calumny against what in us is innocent ?

Did not the apostate angels fall by pride or self will since sensuousness could have no place in them ?

The body in the economy of redemption is made a vessel of the spirit, its members instruments of righteousness, and at last it will be transformed into a glorified body. Could all this take place if its corporeal organism were the source of sin ?

Further, the sensuous theory must do one of

three things, either deny the sinlessness of Jesus, as Ebionism does ; or ignore his perfect humanity in possession of real flesh, as Docetism does ; or explain the sinlessness of his true human nature by the exercise of miracle on the part of the Almighty, as Töllner and others do.

The profound gloom or melancholy, and the almost Manichæan dread of the flesh, together with the austerities and penances of monachism to which it leads, are some of the more palpable practical abuses of this system of hamartialogy.

(*THEORY OF KANT.*

The system which derives sin from sense was very much in vogue during last century. Michaelis is a notable expounder of it in England.

The philosophy of Kant which gained so great ground on the continent was thought directly to favor it, according to the canon of its master, that ‘sin consists in the perverted maxim to subordinate the dictates of reason to the instincts of sense.’

But whence comes this power of inverting the true order of the rational and sensuous factors of the human consciousness? How is sense

able to exercise a power over the reason so as to make it the instrument of its purposes?

Kant shews in another place that real freedom can have nothing to do with evil; that freedom consists in absolute conformity of the will to the dictates of the practical reason or to man's true ideal.

Sin, which is a violation and perversion of the moral order, must therefore take its rise not from the practical reason which is solely the organ of the good, but from a principle of arbitrariness which is also inherent in the will occupying a place side by side with the faculty of freedom.

Thus Kant himself traces sin up to this faculty of arbitrariness which with freedom is native to the sphere of the 'noûmenon' or intelligible world, and does not derive it from the sphere of the sensuous or temporal at all.

The difficulty lies in the dualism of the will or the co-ordination of arbitrariness with freedom in the supersensuous or spiritual ego, the "ding an sich" of the Kantian philosophy.

THEORY OF SCHLEIERMACHER.

The most scientific and elaborate form that the sensuous system has assumed is that of Schleiermacher.

That theologian speaks of sin as 'the divorce of reason and nature,' 'an antagonism between the sensational impulses and the spirit,' 'a limitation of the determining power of the spirit caused by the independent action of the sensuous functions.'

The spirit being made a relative quantity is considered inadequate to subordinate the lower functions of 'the flesh.'

The 'God consciousness' which has its seat in the spirit, is in this system set over against the 'sensuous consciousness' which appears to embrace not merely the appetites or desires but all those more intellectual or volitional principles which are turned upon the world as their object.

There is an ambiguity in the word 'flesh' as used by Schleiermacher, sometime being understood in a narrower meaning of the purely sensuous or lower functions, at another time being synonymous with the 'phenomenal' as contradistinguished from the 'noumenal.'

The 'God consciousness' therefore is the

main factor of the 'noûmenon' as understood by Schleiermacher. This infinite and eternal element in human life according to him consists in a pious feeling of absolute dependence upon God, which is precisely the antithesis of the independence of the sensuous consciousness, *i.e.*, its isolation and variance.

The pious feeling of absolute dependence, in other words the 'God consciousness' which is the organ of all religious and spiritual life, ought to penetrate and introduce unity and harmony into the sphere of the sensuous consciousness. Sin consists in its inadequateness to do so.

A relative weakness of the 'God consciousness' is made by Schleiermacher a necessity of the world's history since it constitutes the need of redemption which all men experience.

The perfect plenitude and intensity of the 'God consciousness' in Jesus Christ is precisely what humanity wanted in order to salvation from the cramping and fettering influences of the world.

There can in this system be no sin from the standpoint of the absolute causality of God. Sin therefore has no objective reality, *i.e.*, in

God's sight, and is resolved into a mere subjective feeling and quantity, being synonymous with the consciousness of sin in man but being nothing more than an illusion which has its uses as an incentive to virtue and progress in the economy of human life.

III.—*SIN AS METAPHYSICAL IMPERFECTION.
NEGATION AND PRIVATION OF GOOD.*

Sin, in the systems now to be considered, is not regarded as a discord or disturbance, much less as a direct variance and opposition to the good, but as a relative weakness, defect, or want of energy, *i.e.*, it differs from the good not in kind but in degree. S. Augustine describes it as a perverted desire, a turning aside from a greater or the highest good to that which is less, "*conversio ab eo quod magis seu summe est ad id quod minus est.*"

Of those who thus regard sin as a metaphysical imperfection or limitation and restraint of being, there are two distinct schools inasmuch as the ideas of privation and negation characteristic of either, are distinct. Privation means the absence from a thing of what essentially belongs to it. Thus sin as privation

denotes the absence from its subject of the holiness and love which is normal to it. Negation on the other hand is the denial in regard to anything of that which does not belong to it. Thus the perfection of being virtue or holiness may be denied of the finite creature.

I.—*SIN AS A NEGATION OF GOOD.*

One or two examples will describe this particular aspect of the subject.

Bretschneider remarks "As human reason is not so perfect as the divine, man's will cannot absolutely coincide with God's. Man therefore, in accordance with the independence wherewith he is endowed, acts sometimes in perfect conformity with God's will, but sometimes contrary thereto." The only reason of his falling short of the perfection required is his powerlessness, *i.e.*, defect of a divine wisdom and strength. He is man and not God: he therefore falls short of perfect conformity.

"If," says Bauer, "freedom from sin be the removal of the limit of finiteness, it is clear that there must be an endless series of gradations leading on to the point where sin disappears as a vanishing minimum. If this minimum be

conceived as wholly done away, the being perfectly free must become one with God himself, because God alone is absolutely sinless. If again there are beings distinct from God, there must be presupposed in them, so far as they are not God, a minimum at least of evil."

2.—*SIN AS A PRIVATION OF GOOD.*

It is perhaps impossible to keep the two views altogether apart. The present division is therefore merely tentative.

In the systems of S. Augustine and Leibnitz there is a blending of the negative and privative forms of representation. There is however this difference between the Latin Father and the German philosopher that the privation contemplated by the former is active, a privative energy; that of the latter more characteristically passive.

Evil according to S. Augustine tends to non-existence "*tendit ad non esse.*" Good is the fulness of energy, evil is the defect of that good, a lesser good. Good and evil form the extremities of a continuous line stretching indefinitely in the opposite directions; the nearer the one

the further from the other, but neither being absent at any stage.

Very similar had been the opinion of Origen. He makes evil a "nothingness" a "depravation of real being." In another place he describes it as "a failure through negligence."

Just as Origen promulgated these views in opposition to the absolute determinism to evil of the gnostic systems, so S. Augustine in controverting Manichæan error, endeavoured by the same form of statement to remove sin from the divine causality. Evil is destitute of true being, says he, and tends to nothingness. "The good of creatures may be diminished or increased, but for good to be diminished, it is necessary, if the being is to continue, that some good should remain to constitute the being. . . the good which makes it a being cannot be destroyed without destroying itself." *

Non-existence is the "summum malum" since "to be thoroughly and completely corrupt, so as to have no good left, is equivalent to have no being." To be evil and wicked is thus made the highway to total annihilation of being, a weighty support by the bye from the authority

* *Encheiridion*, c. xii.

of a great Father of a curious eschatological theory becoming increasingly current at the present time.

In the *Theodiciée* of Leibnitz the theory gets a most thorough and philosophic statement. This classic work had in view the controverting the infidelity and materialism of the latter part of the seventeenth century, and accordingly its main point is the exemption of evil from the divine causality. A fundamental distinction is drawn between the divine will and intelligence. In the mind of God exist all possible forms of things. Amongst the variety of possible worlds comprehended by the divine understanding a choice is made by the divine will of the best, into the constitution of which the possibility of sin, contingent on the free exercise of the finite will, entered as an essential part. God does not will evil but he permits it. The limitations of creaturely existence, which enter into the sphere of man's higher energies of reason and will, make man insusceptible to a certain extent of the perfections which God is willing to communicate, and this limited susceptibility consequently becomes the direct occasion of sin.

A determination and necessity to evil from a force outside man's will is thus one of the cardinal defects of Leibnitz's system, since sin ensues from the very limitations which encompass his entire being. For if man in fact be determined by the limits of his nature, is not his subjective feeling of self determination or free will a mere instrument or form of a higher necessity ?

Leibnitz's endeavour in this way to vindicate the divine holiness in presence of the great mystery of evil in human life failed, because by making sin an inevitable consequence or determination of the metaphysical imperfections of the creature, he virtually did away with the true notion of sin and guilt, or, which is the same thing, caused evil to revert to God as its "causa deficiens" since man had not been made with the power, even if he possessed the will, of rising above his finite condition.

There are many other considerations conclusive against this theory.

The contradiction of trying to explain moral evil or sin,—a limitation of being so alien and repugnant to our nature, by a metaphysical limitation which is suitable and conformable to it, is apparent.

Another paradox of the theory, namely, that in all evil there is an element of good, whilst in no goodness of finite creatures, however angelic and saintly, is there wanting an element of evil, is palpably untenable in face of conscience which pronounces uncompromising condemnation of moral evil in every form as that which never should have been and ought not to be now.

There is at that rate no prospect in the future of entire freedom from evil or enjoyment of an unalloyed state of bliss. A continuous approach toward the goal of a perfectly holy and happy life is contemplated ; yet at furthest stage of progress, there still remains an infinite remove, no exemption from the painful sense of evil that cleaves inexorably to all finite existence.

Were there no sins but those of weakness, the system might serve to explain the facts of experience. The truth however is that evil in human life frequently assumes a terribly positive and rampant energy. The powers and capacity of the sinner are often called into the most vigorous exercise of hatred and destructiveness as of ambition and pride in prosecution of most lawless ends.

What for instance would become of the $\pi\alpha\sigma\alpha$

ἀπάτη ἀδικίας “the all deceivableness of un-righteousness” of S. Paul, and the βάθη τοῦ Σατανᾶ, “the depths of Satan” of S. John, if sin be a mere weakness or fatality?

If sin were a mere defect or failure, the feelings of abhorrence and detestation which we feel at the contemplation of it, would be altogether disproportionate and unsuitable. Evil would be an object of pity, rather than of blame. The result of such view would be moral enervation or paralysis.

The terrible denunciations of wrath against ungodliness and iniquity which fulminated from the lips of Christ and of his Apostles would be sadly out of place, if sin be a mere misfortune or accident of finite being.

If we affirm the sinlessness of Christ we must with the Docetæ, in consistency with this theory, deny the completeness of his humanity, since with the limitations or circumscriptions of man's nature he must have possessed at least a minimum of sinfulness.

SUB-SECTION II.

INDETERMINISM.

A rigidly extreme form of indeterminism may be met with in that vulgar idea of freedom

which amounts to unrestrained laxity of manners and free thought.

Pelagianism, inasmuch as it acknowledges a certain determining influence of example and other influences of a similar character cannot therefore be considered a form of the most thorough going indeterminism.

But although the Pelagians define original sin as 'consisting in the following of Adam,' yet as they recognise a freedom and ability not to follow him but to do otherwise if they choose, their opinion still comes under this head of unrestrained or absolute indeterminism.

In the sphere of dogmatic anthropology the term "monergism" has been found useful to denote at once the contrasted position of the various parties. In opposition to the "divine monergism," *i.e.*, the monergism of grace in the work of salvation of S. Augustine, Pelagius promulgated his "human monergism," *i.e.*, monergism of the will of individuals, in other words, absolute sufficiency of man's powers in order to attain to the perfection of sanctified character.

The term "atomism" of the will has lately come into use to denote the unrestrainedly arbitrary exercise of freedom, which the old

Pelagianism and the modern Unitarianism resolutely hold to. The terms "indifferentism" and "equilibrium" of the will are also significant of the same opinion.

The word "Synergism" denotes the co-operation of the divine grace with the free will of man. This is therefore a form of relative indeterminism. The semi-pelagians occupy this position.

A.—*ABSOLUTE INDETERMINISM.*

PELAGIANISM.

I.—*SPECULATIVE ASPECT.*

There are two main ideas which enter into the conception of freedom which are under-rated or ignored in the system now under consideration, namely, (1) that the will is determined by the subjective state or character of the individual; and (2) that the comparative value of the objects of choice also exerts a strong determining influence. A relative determinism does not imperil a true conception of freedom.

Now the principle of pelagianism is that the will at every moment and in any given circumstances is quite indifferent both as to the motives

and objects of its choice, and perfectly uninfluenced by its previous states or habits ; that it is as free to choose or reject evil as well as good.

“ Things please because they are chosen and are not chosen because they please,” “ *res placent quia eleguntur, non eleguntur quia placent,*” is a concise statement of the theory of absolute indeterminism in Archbishop King’s learned work on the “origin of evil.” The name “indifferentism” is used to denote this special form.

The famous “equilibrium” or balance hypothesis of Plotinus in the early centuries, and of the school of Wolf in modern times, is more generally known. By it the mind is represented as preserving a fair equipoise in the midst of the objects present to it at any moment, weighing and deciding deliberately conflicting motives of duty or of pleasure. The opposite considerations whether of good or evil must be placed in the scales of the judgment before the will makes its decision. The will is perfectly unfettered save by the impartial scrutiny that the reason makes in each case.

The objections to absolute indeterminism are as follows :

First, the indeterminism of the will is done

away with as soon as the differences of value in the objects of its choice, *e.g.*, the contents of the moral law are understood.

Secondly, the determining force of a man's character, with his peculiar idiosyncrasy and prevailing dispositions and motives, is an undoubted fact.

Thirdly, it would be impossible for men to act combinedly or form a harmonious society in the absence of the determinate principles of conduct which constitute character and make every man within certain limits perfectly to be relied on by his neighbours. There could be no co-operation or confidence if the will of the person was every moment, in all contingencies of circumstances, indifferent as to the object of its choice or in equilibrium between good and evil.

Fourthly, the security to each which arises from confirmed habits of virtue is done away with, for what on this theory is to prevent the greatest saint or even the holiest angel from lapsing into sin and sinking into perdition, since his will is supposed free to act in the most arbitrary manner? And in the same way what can hinder the most abandoned sinner from rising, if he will, at any moment by direct

personal effort to the sublimest height of holiness?

Fifthly, all endeavours to influence the will or shape the character by moral appliances such as education, preaching, government, by instruction, admonition, appeal to motives that usually contribute powerfully to shape conduct and character are practically useless on the hypothesis of absolute "atomism."

2.—*HISTORIC ASPECT.*

THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.

Pelagius, a native of Wales, called Morgan in his own country, mistaken by some as a Scotsman "*Scotorum pultibus prægravatus*," a monk by profession, came into public notice at Rome, A.D. 411.

He was remarked for his great learning and exemplary life, and respected on these grounds by his opponent S. Augustine; but he was inexperienced and without those profound emotions and experiences of which stronger natures are susceptible.

At Rome he formed the friendship of another monk named Cælestius, with whom in the year above mentioned he proceeded to Carthage.

Both became renowned for their zeal in behalf of the moral and practical aspects of Christianity. But whilst so zealous for good works and other outcome of the Christian life they unduly lost sight of the dogmas of faith and grace from which as its root all godly and really virtuous living springs. This one sided and exclusive tendency toward practice gave occasion to the controversy.

At a synod held at Carthage, A.D. 412, Cælestius, amongst other accusations, was charged by Paulinus, a deacon from Milan, of holding the tenet, that Adam in sinning injured only himself and not his posterity; that therefore everyone born into the world was pure and innocent as Adam previous to the fall. Refusing to recant he was excommunicated.

Pelagius in the meantime had proceeded to Palestine, where he was likely to meet with more sympathy for his particular bent, since creationism which was prevalent in the East gave prominence to the eternal germ of freedom planted in the breast of each by the creative hand of God. The writings of Origen too which laid great stress on the possession of freedom were there widely read. Indeed all

along the Orientals had been called on to insist on this aspect of anthropological doctrine in opposition to the materialism and fatalism of early Gnostic sects.

During his stay in Palestine he had a misunderstanding with S. Jerome who was then residing at Bethlehem, and he was accused by that Father, whose learning he perhaps too groundlessly disparaged, before a synod at Jerusalem, A.D. 415, presided over by John, metropolitan of that city, of the same errors as Cælestius had been at Carthage, namely, undervaluing the necessity of divine grace and exalting to undue prominence the doctrine of free will and man's part in salvation. Owing to difference of language or the laxer type of anthropology prevalent in the East he was acquitted.

At a synod held the same year at Diospolis, under the presidency of Eulogius, Bishop of Cæsarea, he was again accused by one Paul Orosius, a Spanish priest and strong adherent of Augustinianism, of the peculiar tenets which go under the name of pelagianism, and once more freed from the charge of heresy.

His opponents, however, zealous maintainers

of the 'divine Monergism' of S. Augustine, had grown all powerful in the West, and condemned the 'autonomy' of the will with the co-relative doctrines, of which both he and Cælestius had been accused, at two councils held in the following year, A.D. 416, at Milevis and at Carthage.

Innocent I., Bishop of Rome, approved of the sentence of condemnation, but Zosimus, who succeeded him in that See and who cherished the Oriental type of doctrine, shewed them much sympathy and reproached very strongly the African Bishops. Against this action of the Roman Bishop they protested and renewed their condemnation at the synod of Carthage, A.D. 418, in the sentence of which he was under the necessity of acquiescing, and to which he gave effect in an "epistola tractoria," whereupon eighteen Italian Bishops, amongst whom was the acute and erudite Julianus of Eclanum, resigned their Sees or were driven out.

The Emperor Honorius the same year, A.D. 418, issued a "sacrum scriptum" against the Pelagians.

The pelagian controversy may be said to have reached its close at the Œcumenical Council at

Ephesus, A.D. 431, where the opinions of Cælestius and Pelagius met with a final sentence of condemnation. Marius Mercator, a learned layman from the West and a devoted follower of S. Augustine, seems to have been a leading figure in this closing drama.

Pelagianism, *i.e.*, "human monergism," was the most complete recoil from Manichæism, of which its adherents accused S. Augustine and his followers, and which perhaps the tenet of predestination in its most rigid form might in some degree countenance.

The following are some of the leading tenets of Pelagius, (1) Adam was created mortal and would have died although he had not sinned : (2) The death he incurred by sinning was therefore not temporal but eternal death : (3) Adam injured only himself by the fall, not his descendants : (4) Every one is born as pure and innocent as he was previous to the fall : (5) Hence each is possessed of a power of will to keep from sinning and to persevere to the goal of moral development if he choose : (6) Original sin is resolved into following bad example : (7) There being really no original sin, infant baptism which was a universally recognised Apostolic

institution at that time, had as object, not the remission of sin of which there was no need, but the securing of the highest bliss in the kingdom of heaven.

B.—*RELATIVE INDETERMINISM.*

SEMI-PELAGIANISM.

The predestinationism of S. Augustine followed out in its most rigorous form was speedily productive of practical abuses in two opposite directions. These appeared in most manifest form amongst the monks of Hadrumetum in North Africa, A.D. 427, some of whom surrendered themselves to doubt of their election and a consequent despair. Others became heedless and thought it did not matter how they behaved themselves since salvation was purely of the divine election, and according to the Augustinian tenets in which they had been indoctrinated, they had become persuaded that they could contribute of their own free will nothing to the workings of grace.

The practical abuses of an extreme predestinationism were in this manner very terrible, and though successfully put an end to at Hadrumetum by the authority and painstaking

instructions of S. Augustine, broke out in other places.

The Massilians in the South of Gaul came forward as the opponents at once of the extreme forms of Pelagianism and of Augustinianism ; of the former because it excluded from consideration the divine grace and led to presumption ; of the latter because the element of free will and responsibility was unduly repressed. ' Atomism of the will ' and fatalism, mistaking the Augustinian predestination as a form of necessity to evil, were the scylla and charybdis, between which the semi-pelagians sought to direct their course.

At the head of the monks at Marseilles was John Cassian, A.D. 432, a disciple of Chrysostom and a sympathiser with the Oriental type of anthropology, who speedily identified an extreme predestinationism with Manichæism or necessitarianism, and put forth his whole learning and ability to counteract the practical evils such a grave misunderstanding of it was calculated to produce, and to spread abroad more moderate opinions, which should harmonise the workings of divine grace with the normal and independent operation of the human energies.

The co-operation of free will with the Spirit of God in the work of salvation, *i.e.*, semi-pelagianism, found another learned and able expounder in Vincentius of Lerins, the ablest pupil of Cassian, whose "*Commonitorium pro catholicæ fidei antiquitate et universitate*" was during the middle ages regarded as a standard book of sound doctrine. His famous canon "*quod semper, ubique et ab omnibus creditum sit*," applied as a test of Catholic doctrine, might at first sight readily appear fatal to the teaching of S. Augustine.

Semi-pelagianism or Synergism has been a popular form of doctrine not merely amongst the Schoolmen but in the Roman Church generally, and it even pervades largely a considerable section of our old Anglican divinity.

Into the particulars of the Synergistic Controversy in the Lutheran Church, A.D. 1555—67, it is not necessary to enter. Suffice it to say that Melanchthon and the more moderate school of Lutherans sympathised strongly with the semi-pelagian position, whilst Amsdorf, Flaccius and others of the extreme Lutheran party adhered to the most rigid form of predestinationism.

SECTION IX.

*BIBLICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN RELATION TO THE
DOCTRINE OF SIN.*

I.

The importance of Biblical Psychology may easily be understood from the fact that a dipartite view of human nature has by some been considered at the root of S. Augustine's extreme views as to the moral inability or powerlessness of the natural man to contribute anything to the work of divine grace in redemption.

The highest factor of the personality, the pneuma, according to this form of representation, was suppressed in the psychology prevalent in the Western Church, so that in the nature of things there could be no freedom or moral election in either of the other parts, soul and body, which were supposed to constitute the whole individuality, in the sphere of which the order of sequence or law of cause and effect reigns supreme.

Though S. Augustine did not declare for Traducianism, yet his leaning was in that direction, since with it the dichotomy of the

Western psychology of which he is accused, was quite conformable, as also it was very compatible with the Manichæism of his earlier days, and in general favoured a dualistic view of existence.

Pelagius on the contrary imbibed the spirit of Oriental theology from his native Church, since Eastern opinions together with ecclesiastical uses had passed from Asia Minor through Gaul into Britain. Accordingly having once adopted the trichotomy or tripartite division of man's nature together with the correlative tenet of creatianism, the pneuma which was marked with the divine impress and therefore reflected the main features of the image of God in the two factors of the created personality, self-consciousness and freedom, easily afforded a one sided support to his system. The exclusive consideration of the bright side of humanity drew his attention off the deep corruption that otherwise had permeated it and constituted a crying need of redemption. By the unaided efforts of the freedom inherent in the pneuma, Pelagius conceived he could save himself: redemption therefore in his system had no meaning.

Whilst thus on the principle of the trichotomy

ample provision is made for self decision and accountability, there could hardly be any room for other than necessitarian or negative views of sin on the hypothesis of dichotomy, the soul as well as the body apart from the spirit having no principle of self dependence or causality in them. There could accordingly be no ground for the imputation of sin.

2.

What, therefore, according to Biblical Psychology is the faculty whereby we commit sin? What is the way in which it works, and what are the instruments it uses? Such are some of the questions now before us.

First understand what are the component parts of human nature with their relations and interdependence between one another.

The Scripture facts in regard to the elements which make up the constitution of man are very simple, perhaps familiar to the reader. There is first the "flesh" *σάρξ*, not in its technical but literal meaning, signifying the material of which the "body" *σῶμα*, or organised corporeity is made up. Then there is the "soul" *ψυχή* which vitalizes the corporeity, forming a transi-

tion to the *πνεῦμα* "spirit" from which the life of the soul as well as of the body springs, and which relates the person directly to the super-sensuous world.

The soul is thus seen to preserve a middle place between the body with its various organs of sense and motion, and the spirit with its deep intuitions of the divine, and to be as it were the meeting point of both worlds, furnishing on the one hand a spiritual individuality to the body, and on the other providing a corporeal individuality for the spirit.

These three main factors (1) body, (2) soul, and (3) spirit, constitute the trichotomy of human nature, not merely in S. Paul's epistles but throughout Scripture.

Plotinus of the Neo-platonic school at Alexandria, adopted the virtually identical tripartite division into *σῶμα* body, *ψυχή* soul, and *νοῦς* which indeed is the faculty of moral reason in the spirit.

In the time of the Apollinarian controversy, A.D. 381, the terminology had slightly changed, and we read of *ψυχὴ ἄλογος* and *ψυχὴ λογική* together with *σῶμα* as forming a threefold constitution.

Plato's triple division (1) τὸ λογιστικὸν the reasoning principle, (2) τὸ θυμικὸν or θυμοειδής the irascible principle, and (3) the τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν the concupiscible principle, readily suggests itself together with the easy explanation it presents of the genesis of the most contrasted vices of pride and hatred, of effeminacy and lust from the disproportionate growth of either the irascible or concupiscible factors, and the corresponding weakness or inadequateness of the reasoning and governing power.

The question is what gives to the irascible or concupiscible principles that power over the reason which they so often possess? Is it some force from without, or do they derive their energy from within, namely, from the will of the person?

Similarly the "fleshly lusts" σαρκικαὶ ἐπιθυμίαι, of the Apostolic writings, which embrace all those principles which have the world for their object, cannot owe their strength so much to the alluring or attractive character of the varied objects presented to them as to a perversion of the Nous and consequent impotence of the spirit in which the moral reason resides.

But a comprehensive review of the relations

of the various principles of the human constitution toward each other as set forth by Biblical Psychology, on the threefold basis above mentioned, will not merely be curious but necessary to a clearer understanding of our subject.

The soul forms the centre of the ego or individuality. The contrasted factors body and spirit meet in it and blend together in unity. Hence the soul has been correctly described as having two sides, *ψυχὴ ἄλογος* the seat of the vegetative and animal instincts which work in the body, and the *ψυχὴ λογική (νοῦς)* the reasonable soul which works in and by the spirit.

The soul has been happily said to furnish a spiritual individuality to the body, just as it forms a corporeal individuality to the spirit. Through the soul spirit passes into body as well as influences from the body pass into spirit. The two permeate each other and form together one undivided personality.

Man forming the centre of two worlds is both receptive and active on either side of his being. On the one side he holds communion with God and has intuition of the spiritual realities of the unseen world and his will goes forth in aspiration and prayer. On the other side he is subject to

manifold impressions from the material world, which give rise to a corresponding diversity of impulses and desires.

The centre of the soul in which that influx and reflux of impressions and impulses from the sensuous and supersensuous meet is in scripture called the heart, *καρδία*, the reservoir of all knowledge and the workshop of all activity.

The heart is thus the kernel of the personality. Self consciousness and self determination have their seat there and radiate in all directions through the various organs or members of man's complex nature.

The psychic or formal personality which has its home in the heart is capable of a normal or an abnormal direction and activity. On the one hand it may follow the motions of the *Nous*, which combines reason and will, and of Conscience, *συνείδησις*. It will in this manner maintain communion with God, and preserve the subordination of all other cares and interests to the supreme duty of life namely love. Thus filled with spiritual replenishment the personality will become real or pneumatic. On the other hand the formal freedom of the psychic personality may follow the prompting of the lower impulses

and the depraved seductions of sense ; ‘ the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye and the pride of life ’ may exercise all their bewitching charms ; and the will may become enslaved to the false glitter of the world ; hence out of the heart, the inmost kernel of personality, by a misuse of freedom, according to the Gospel, will ‘ proceed evil thoughts ’ and illicit desires of the most hideous character together with the revolting excesses of outrage, hatred and destructiveness in which they terminate.

The genesis of all evil as of good in human life is in this manner traced to the will, the inmost centre of the personality.

But the subject ought to be followed out into its details in a calm and philosophic spirit.

Thus the soul on the side of the flesh receives a multifarious variety of impressions, every organ of sense being the inlet of manifold sensations, whether agreeable or otherwise.

These sensible impressions occasion a reflex energy of attention which results in perceptions corresponding to the sensations, *αἰσθήσεις*, which form the concrete material of all the sciences.

Upon the basis of perception proceeds the faculty of comparison *σύνεσις*, which elaborates

the material and reduces the endless variety of particular phenomena into the unity of general principles or concepts.

The faculty of representation is also exercised on the material furnished by the senses. Its abnormal exercise results in the fictions, superstitions and phantasms of idolatry. The votaries of a false cultus "become vain in their imaginations." *ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς.* Rom. i., 21.

Every perception of an object has an accompanying feeling or emotion pleasant or painful suitable to it. A desire or aversion springs up, which by the action of the understanding may become volition. When worldly desires, *ἐπιθυμίαι*, whether lust, covetousness, ambition, or pride exercise powerful bias on the will, they produce actual sin. Still it is a free act of will that first gives them that power.

The works of the flesh, *σάρξ*, *i.e.*, of the soul turned unrestrainedly on the worldly or carnal side of its nature, include not merely those of a sensuous character, but as enumerated by S. Paul, comprehend 'envy,' 'hatred,' 'idolatry,' 'schism' and 'heresy' with other outcome of pride.

When the "flesh" invades the sphere of spirit and makes it subservient to its purposes of pleasure or of selfishness in any of its other forms you have the *φρόνημα σαρκὸς* of the Article "the wisdom" *i.e.*, the conscious and deliberate purpose of the flesh realized. A carnal man is *σαρκικός* fleshly in contrast to the physical property fleshy *σάρκινος*.

In the same way the soul turned in the direction of its spiritual energies and the supersensuous objects that are answerable to them is the recipient of religious intuitions and the subject of corresponding emotions.

The spirit is the soul's organ for converse with God and for whatever communion or fellowship we are capable of with the saintly dwellers of the Unseen, the holy angels and spirits of just men made perfect.

The faculty of the spirit which apprehends the eternal side of things, namely, the attributes and character of God which are said by the Apostle to be plainly seen and understood from the works of the divine hand, and which also discerns the principles of moral law, the sublime image of the uncreated personality graven on the heart, is the *Nous*, or 'God consciousness'

already so much spoken of. The nous combines in itself reason and will. Its operation νοεῖν is characterised by deep penetration and moral earnestness.

Spiritual facts apprehended occasion answerable emotions ἐνθυμήσεις. Spiritual aspirations have their outcome in the works of faith, love and prayer. Σωφρονεῖν denotes the healthy and sound exercise of spiritual desire and feeling in opposition to all passionateness and extravagance. An emotion that violently transports is called ἔκστασις ecstasy.

Ἐννοια denotes the action of the νοῦς turned inward, in introspection and spiritual digestion : κατανοεῖν is the outward function of the νοῦς in spiritual discernment, recognising a divine meaning in sensible phenomena.

Νόημα is the product of νοεῖν or moral concept.

Conscience, συνείδησις, bears witness, whilst the thoughts accuse or else excuse one another. It is the legislative and judicial factor of man's spirituality.

The various faculties of the understanding, whether of comparison and elaboration or of suggestion, representation or association with the emotions that accompany them find the

noblest objects of their operation and exercise in the facts of the supernatural as discerned by the moral or spiritual intuition or revealed in Holy Scripture by the inspiration of the Spirit of God.

It has been said that the soul in virtue of the union in itself of the bodily and spiritual life forms the ego or personality. Self consists of the essential synthesis of the three main factors of humanity. So inseparable is this union that death itself, whilst for a season it may suspend, cannot finally disannul it. The pneumatical or resurrection body will be thoroughly permeated by the spirit, but it will be our present one only wonderfully transformed and glorified. All the redeemed in bliss must necessarily assume corporeal lineaments else how should they be recognised and distinguished from each other. Biblical Psychology teaches us that as the body, though ceaselessly undergoing a variety of changes, forms yet an essential part of our identity from infancy to old age, so it will continue to do so after further change at death to all eternity.

SECTION X.

*DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF SIN
IN HOLY SCRIPTURE.*

It is intended here only to indicate briefly the true historic method of investigation which is now being applied to the sphere of revealed truth.

Scripture ideas and doctrines are first traced to their source. Their more primitive or rudimentary forms are carefully marked. The successive steps of their growth in clearness and definiteness of character are then scrutinized, until in the course of a development extending, it may be, over centuries, they assume mature and full shape.

A better conception is thus arrived at of the truth or doctrine under discussion. The help which the new historic method is likely to render to exegesis as well as to dogmatics is obvious, since the faultiness of the olden procedure is being increasingly understood, and it is felt both illogical and unhistorical to apply the later and full grown meanings of words to them at the earlier stages of their development in the more primitive literature.

The growth of the idea of sin might in the first place be advantageously traced in the various religions and cultus of heathenism from the rude apprehension of the savage who traces it to a demoniac power in nature, through the loftier philosophising of the Oriental theosophist who identified it with the metaphysical imperfections incident to all finite existences, onward to the dark shadows or moral blemishes of the ideals of gods and heroes which throw such an indescribable charm of naturalness and reality over the earlier creations of Grecian art, or to the conscious infraction or violation of moral order and of the divine righteousness and truth on the part of single persons, with the inexorable punishments that follow,—the eternal Nemesis, which plays such a striking part in the Greek drama; but an historical review so extensive, however inviting, scarcely falls into the scope of this treatise.

Our concern at present is summarily with the idea of sin as unfolded in the inspired writings from the earliest utterances of Hebrew Scripture to the latest compositions of Apostles and Evangelists or the very words of our Lord himself.

And here is to be marked a point of paramount interest and importance. All negative views of sin, which make it a necessity either of nature or of the divine ordainment are uncompromisingly excluded from even the more rudimentary concepts of sin in Scripture.

In the account of the fall in the third chapter of the book of Genesis the divine will and personality stands over against the human.

Adam had been made in the divine image with the perfect characters of wisdom and righteousness, self consciousness and self determination, in full communion with God and the exercise of real freedom. The world around him reflected as in an unstained mirror the glorious attributes of its Maker. "God saw everything which he had made, and behold, it was very good."

How then did evil break out in this paradise of bliss? Why, the glorious endowment of freedom involved a possibility of transgression. Otherwise obedience would be no longer voluntary or moral but a necessity of nature. There could be no free exercise of virtue without danger or temptation to the contrary. The strange enigma is that a soul created perfect

should have failed to repel the seductions of the serpent and to preserve intact its integrity. The holy spirit of the primal man becomes unaccountably the victim of sensuousness and pride, forfeits the divine fellowship and is cast out from the presence of God and an estate of bliss on account of transgression of a positive command which was made the test of his fidelity. Such in true historical figure is the genesis and consequences of all sin.

The primitive character of the narrative is notably distinguishable by the amount of allegory with which it is clothed. The tree of knowledge of good and evil, the taste of whose fruit proved so disastrous to our first parents, and the tree of life which was redolent of immortality, together with the serpent "the most subtle of all the beasts of the field" which idea in its simplicity of conception must not be confounded with the later full grown Jewish conception of the Tempter and Satan, are plainly part of the poetic drapery or scaffolding of a moral incident. These are not topics on which we need now enlarge.

Upon the giving of the moral law on Sinai, the eternal and immutable 'ten words' embodying

the principles of all moral order, with the contemporaneous promulgation of the Mosaic institutes and its burdensome routine of sacrifice and ritual, the divine imperative accompanied by suitable promises and threatenings quickened indefinitely the moral consciousness of the Hebrew people, widened and intensified the idea of sin they had hitherto entertained. "The law was given," as S. Paul says, "that sin may abound," *i.e.*, by provoking to increased hostility the sinful principle of the heart, as well as extending and deepening the sweep of its obligations, and intensifying the sense of spiritual need.

In the prophetical writings there is a still greater advance in the spiritual conception of sin as in that of law. It is conceived no longer in any particulars merely under the idea of outward transgression of positive ordinance for which the levitical sacrifice could atone, but it is traced to the inward thought or motive, and righteousness with truth in the hidden parts of the heart is felt increasingly to be necessary. The prophets were all preachers of righteousness and of godliness, of purity of disposition, and singleness of purpose as distinguished from the superstitious observance of the mere outward minutiae of

religion, 'new moons, Sabbaths, assemblies, etc.,' or scrupulous performance of the accustomed sacrifices. The law of the Mosaic institute, for example, that "children should suffer for the sin of their ancestor until the third or fourth generation," had passed away and given place to the recognition of the more general law of the divine providence that everyone should bear the burden and punishment of his own sin. This is a subject with which every reader is familiar and which he can follow out at leisure.

The words for sin in the Hebrew Scriptures will present it under various instructive aspects.

The word *Chatath*, perhaps the most frequent word for sin in the Hebrew Scriptures, has as its primary idea a misstep, slip with the foot, or stumbling on the way to a goal. Sin is a missing of the true mark or end of life.

Pesha, which has also a wide range, denotes in special a trespass or transgression of law, a breaking of covenant or rebellion against moral order.

Avon, another word of general use, conveys the idea of distortion, a bending aside from the right way or perversity of will and outward act of sin involving deep guilt and desert of punishment.

Resha, of extensive occurrence from the ancient book of Job, through the psalms to the book of the prophet Micah, signifies more particularly the disturbance or turbulence of wickedness, the restlessness inherent in unrighteousness, a sin of violent purpose.

In the fifty-first Psalm some of these Hebrew terms for sin are grouped together. "According to the multitude of thy tender mercies blot out my transgression (*pesha*). Wash me thoroughly from mine iniquity (*avon*), and cleanse me from my sin (*chatath*)."

The general expression for evil in Hebrew, *Ra*, also occurs in this psalm "Against thee have I done evil (*ra*), which is applicable to whatever is noxious or bad physically as well as denotive of moral evil.

Aven, which signifies the vanity and nothingness of sin in God's sight, is the most negative conception attached to it in Scripture.

Asham has as its distinctive notion, the guilt attached to transgression. Hence under the Mosaic law it came to signify the sacrifice for the guilt of trespass.

The thing principally to be remarked in all these Hebrew terms for sin, with perhaps the

exception of *aven*, is its positive character with the implied freedom of will on the part of the agent, whence arises self reference and a certain feeling of condemnation for sin in the conscious presence of a superior will, whose law is the expression of perfect goodness and righteousness.

The Evangelists and Apostles, our Lord himself inherited the Hebrew conception of sin and unfolded it to greater clearness. The idea however being essentially the same in all, distinctive features are scarcely to be looked for in the different schools of Apostolic thought.

Thus the conception of sin in the Petrine Gospels, S. Matthew and S. Mark, is not to be distinguished from that of the Pauline Gospel of S. Luke, or even from the later Johannine Gospel, so different from one another in divers other respects.

In the same way the representation of the doctrine of sin in the Epistles of S. Peter and S. James is identical in essential characters with that of the letters of S. Paul or of S. John, though the apostle of the Gentiles is marked out from all the others by logical and systematic development of the universal and hereditary aspect of the doctrine.

There was nothing to be taken from or altered in the Hebrew conception. The characters of sin in the Jewish consciousness were real, but they were capable of a deeper colouring and more explicit and clearer statement. For just as the principles of the law were susceptible of still more comprehensive scope and of profounder penetration than hitherto, the doctrine of sin must necessarily be set forth in proportionately clearer outline.

The essential inwardness and thorough spiritual reference therefore, of the principles of the moral law, upon which the prophets had begun so strongly and uncompromisingly to insist, is in the Gospels and Epistles brought home to the heart with the searching penetration and self attestation of a vastly better enlightened and instructed conscience than the Hebrews ever had.

There could not be conceived a purer or sublimer system of morality than that sketched by the hand of the Master in the sermon on the mount. The most secret illicit thoughts or desires are probed and laid bare as criminal offences against the eternal and inviolable majesty and authority of moral principle which

have their home in the human heart though their primal seat be the mind and character of God.

Under the economy of grace the outward law was thus designed to be transformed into inner principle. The voice of God Almighty which echoed from the depth of past centuries, "I will put my law in their minds and on their hearts will I write them," was now realized. No one will say that the fleshly tablets of the heart were not worthier of the inscription than the stone tables outside.

The moral law having become a moral ideal, sin is no longer a mere transgression of law but a violation of an eternal principle and ideal, whereby the image of God in man is marred, it may be, destroyed to all intents and purposes though it can never be altogether lost.

The idea of sin as the violation of the moral ideal or divine image engraven on the human heart is a decided step in advance of previous notions. But if we thoughtfully consider the much clearer and fuller revelation of the divine character in the New Testament we will speedily perceive further striking developments.

Since God is made known to us in the Gospels and Epistles as essential goodness and

love, a Father in heaven with most earnestly tender paternal affections and solicitude, sin is proportionately intensified. It is no longer mere disobedience to the theocratic Ruler and Lawgiver, an opposition or rebellion against a covenant God, but an offence against the heavenly Father who is the impersonation of moral goodness. The God of the ancient elect people is indeed inviolably righteous and venerable, to be adored and revered as well as feared, but the God of the Gospels is to be loved and trusted with an entirety of devoted affection, 'the whole heart and soul strength and mind.' "There is none good but one, *i.e.*, God," says Christ. "God is love," "God is light," in whom is no darkness of wrath, says the Apostle.

S. John is called the apostle of love just as S. Peter may be called the apostle of hope, and S. Paul the apostle of faith. If S. John contributes something very special to the full conception of sin, it is in his representation of God as pre-eminently a God of love. Such is the main gist or scope of his epistles. And throughout his gospel the idea of God as the Father is emphatic and predominant. So that

really this apostle contributes something very definite toward the fullest development of this doctrine as of many others in Holy Scripture.

Sin therefore in the light of grace is not simply disobedience toward God the author and giver of moral law,—no mere infraction of the divine authority and command, but besides being an infringement of the moral ideal in the heart, it is moreover an offence against absolute goodness in the person of God Himself. It is iniquity and crime, with not a shadow of extenuating excuse, perpetrated against a most loving Father, who continues to yearn after the recovery of the sinner with the utmost intensity of paternal anxiety and affection.

The reader may now be directed to certain New Testament expressions descriptive of sin, which are worth following out at greater length than the time and opportunities at disposal, or indeed the scope of this treatise permit.

Plemmeleia, πλημμέλεια, denotes sin as discord and disharmony. Although it does not occur in the New Testament it is found in the writings of some of the Apostolic Fathers, as S. Clement of Rome, not to speak of its frequency in the Septuagint.

Hamartia, ἁμαρτία, a general and abstract term, and ἁμαρτημα its concrete and particular co-relative, represent sin under the character of missing a mark, or failing of the true end and scope of man's being. *Hamartia* from which the title of this treatise has been taken is the equivalent of the Hebrew *chatath*.

Parabasis, παράβασις describes sin as the overpassing of a line or transgression of a positive command. During the interval between Adam and Moses there was *hamartia*. There could be no *parabasis* simply because there was no law promulged.

Parakoe, παρακοή, Rom. v., 19, sets forth sin as disobedience to a voice, *i.e.*, of God, consequent on inattentive or careless hearing. παρακούειν in the sense of failing to hear occurs in Matt. xvii., 17.

Paraptoma, παράπτωμα, conveys the special idea of sin as a falling where one should have stood upright occurs together with ἁμαρτία in Eph. ii., 1. S. Jerome understood it as signifying a less aggravated form of sin, a sin of the thought or error of judgment. S. Augustine made it equivalent to 'delictum' a negative omission of good.

Agnoema, Ἀγνόημα, Heb. ix, 7, seems to denote a sin of ignorance which admits of extenuation or mitigation of ill desert.

Hettema, Ἡττημα, I. Cor. vi., 7, represents sin as a diminishing of what ought to have been rendered in full measure, a coming short of duty.

Anomia, Ἀνομία, is sin as contradiction or opposition to law.

Paranomia, παρανομία, II. Peter, ii., 16, translated iniquity in our version, specifically describes sin as transgression.

The universal and hereditary aspect of sin with its development in Scripture falls now briefly to be indicated.

Gen. vi., 5. "The wickedness of man is great in the earth, and every imagination of the thoughts of his heart is only evil continually," partakes of the vagueness of a primitive and imperfect generalization.

Gen. viii., 21. "The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth" is a testimony of similar value, pointing indistinctly though surely to the hereditary character of sin.

Job xiv., 4. "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean thing? Not one," alludes if distantly yet unmistakingly to an inherited

sinfulness. The same still holds of the more approximate statement in chap. xv., 14. "What is man that he should be clean? or he who is born of a woman that he should be righteous?"

Ps. xiv., 1—3. "There is none that doeth good," etc., is quoted by S. Paul in the third chapter of the epistle to the Romans with a number of others, Ps. v., 10; x., 7; etc., in proof of the universality of moral corruption of mankind.

Ps. li., 5. "Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me," is perhaps as explicit a statement of the hereditary character of sin as is to be found in the whole Old Testament.

Ecc. vii., 20. "There is not a just man on earth, that doeth good and sinneth not," seems as universal and categorical as any proposition can be. There are not a few quite as conclusive statements throughout the Old Testament. (Ps. cxlii., 2; Prov. xx., 9; Isa. liii., 6; Jer. xvii., 5, 9), etc.

The universal and necessary character of regeneration and redemption implies the universality of sin. John iii., 3, 5. "Except a man be born again of water and of the spirit," *i.e.*,

become a new creature by regeneration, he cannot inherit the Kingdom of God.

The redemptive work of Christ is accomplished for all men (II. Cor., v, 14, 15 ; I. Tim., ii., 4, 6 ; Rom. v., 18 ; Heb. ii., 8), which would be unnecessary if sin were not universal.

The complete generalization of S. Paul and the well defined shape that the doctrine of universal and hereditary sin assumed under his hand is well known, besides that it has been already explained more at length in the second section of this treatise.

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